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Theoretical Effects
Mena Mitrano

When I am in love, there is palpitating,
passionate, unique meaning, but onlyright here and now, a meaning that
might be absurd in another conjunction.
—Julia Kristeva, Histoires d'amour

Mena Mitrano has a
Ph.D. in English from
Rutgers University,
and is a part-time lec
turer at the Universi
ty ofMaryland in
Europe and at the
University of Cassino
(Italy), She has pub
lished in Modern

Therefore, one who speaks in tongue
should pray to be able to interpret. For if
I pray in tongue, my spirit is at prayer
but my mind is unproductive. So what is
to be done?
—Paul, “The Second Letter to the
Corinthians”

Language Studies
and College Litera
ture. Among her

work in progress is a
book-length study
entitled "Visitations:
Gertrude Stein and
the Act of Writing. ”
She attended The
School of Criticism
and Theory at Cornell
University in the
summer of1997.

At the theater
In The Ravishing of Lol Stein, Marguerite Duras
writes what might be called the primal scene of tie
formation. We are at a seaside town, in a casino. It’s
night. The public place is brightly lit, full of people
enjoying themselves. They are dancing. Food and
drinks are laid out; huge plants form improvised
screens beyond which people are chatting and mov
ing. The moment comes when Anne-Marie Stretter
appears at the door. Michael Richardson looks she
makes her way through the crowd and stands by oth
ers. From then on he seeks her. He crosses the crowd
in her direction; more than once he misses her just
before their trajectories match, swept astray by people
moving and dancing. Not long after he reaches her
and invites her to dance. They dance without mak-
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ing a sound for each other. At the end of the dance, Anne-Marie Stretter leads
the way and Michael Richardson, who had been with Lol, follows without
turning back. Lol has been watching from the start; when the scene slows
down too much for her eyes, she faints.
Lol’s amnesia draws out for us the essentially schizoid link of social and pri
vate. Lol's loss of consciousness remarks flatly — in what other way could one
comment? — on the incommensurability of the two. Shifted to the position of
the third as Anne-Marie Stretter comes in and Michael Richardson follows her
back with unremitting concentration, Lol’s person is taken over by a revolu
tionary change. She must understand Being as being in a place, a temporary
place from which the sudden other removes us.1 She must know Being as
awaiting to be moved to a third position, that of the witness. Through the uni
vocal encounter of Anne-Marie Stretter and Michael Richardson, Lol now
made to watch what Being had so recently meant to her. She must bear wit
ness to a brutal, full meaning that asserts itself without history, precedents, or
knowledge (the two are complete strangers until they walk away so obviously as
lovers). Lol’s amnesia inaugurates a dissociative link: as I say I, the other rises;
as I say I, my identity withdraws, shifted at the request of the other that I can
not — what else could I do? — resist. “What at stake here, the incision of
an outside in an inside, a withdrawal of identity in the advent of identity”
(Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 200). Lol’s fainting proves how “inaudible,
untenable” (203) this “strange election of dissociation: the choice of a nonobjectifiable object [Lol’s splitting from Michael Richardson who chooses
Anne-Marie Stretter] which, incorporating itself, divides me,” leaving me rav
ished every time after this (207). In the casino scene of The Ravishing of Lol
Stein, Duras records a woman’s birth into the philosophy of the Other. As she
does so, she throws into relief a problem attendant to this birth.
In the third position the witness cedes to the other, and to the primacy of
the other — Anne-Marie Stretter’s velvet sheet was irresistible! — which she
cannot change. The third position is ethical subjectivity, the alternative subjec
tivity of the dissociative link. Thereafter driven to the witness position in the
triangulated space in which she has been newly born, Lol will experience her
self in the non-event of being-as-the-object-of-choice, of private love. Duras,
or Lol, raises an impossible question, a doubt without answer: must private love
die for the Other, that is to say, for the sake of the social tie?

***
A woman and a man early in the evening. What kind of leap, and across what
kind of abyss, needed to bring this man and this woman near? Even simply
in space, materially close. When I think that this is impossible — it was at
hand and so impossible for our main and our woman in the evening — I think
about love.
On their way to the theater, he said: “You are already forming schools.”
The man had uttered the call; the woman understood. From there she, too,
could watch Anne-Marie Stretter and her lover coming together. On the
threshold of the theater she stepped forth. Uninventively, she said, “You could
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start your own school," submitting to that something between terror and bore
dom she had not asked to repeat this time. His voice rose at her back, from a
larger distance now, “Yes....” Having for sure seen which direction the woman
would walk down the theater steps, the man went down the opposite way. He
did not follow; he did not sit near. From that place one could watch and tell
the tale of Anne-Marie Stretter and her lover.

Che cos’ la teoria?
Why can’t the institution speak of love? Would (an attempt to theorize) love
fold theory away? Would the institution have to learn of its own retreat? See
itself as a grave from beyond which it speaks? And yet, to speak theoretically
is, for me, my dearest, to speak lovingly, for when one speaks the truth one
in love.
—Ewa Badowska, “Amuck”

To be welcomed into a School of Theory automatically means to attempt to
write about theory. And writing about theory after a School of Theory invites
you in means entering a contract: to give to the institution the practice that
exceeds its own institutionalization. If it is hard to make sense of the notion of
theory, it is because this notion perhaps appears as theory writes, in unpre
dictable turns. It would be easy to absolutize the institution and take writing
outside a school — writing would be a pretext for the romance of madness, of
the drift toward madness with which any institution tantalizes its outsiders.
Being given theory by a school turns out to be more complex affair.
In his essay on schizophrenia, “The Effort to Drive the Other Person
Crazy,” Harold Searles recounts the story of a patient who was a brilliant inter
preter: “She appeared to find some hidden meaning in almost every word and
even in almost every syllable, looking at me significantly, with sarcastic smile,
very frequently, as though convinced I was aware of the secret meanings which
she found in all this” (274-5). The woman’s exegetical passion is so boundless,
it puts beside the point interpretive boundaries and decorum. Where others
stop at suspecting them, the woman draws the meanings out in the open of
words. Searles may be “aware of the secret meanings” but it is the woman who
“appeared to find” them. “What she was doing with me,” Searles concludes,
“compares very closely with her mother’s taking her to movies, during her
childhood, and repeatedly commanding her, ‘Now, think!’ which the patient
took — correctly, I believe — as the mother’s command for the daughter to per
ceive the same secret, special meanings in the course of the movie which the
mother, an actively psychotic person throughout the girl’s upbringing, found in
it” (275).
Searles’s anecdote gives an idea of the fantasy of symmetry to which the
members of the institution feel invited: to know how to read, as Searles’s
patient demonstrates, at times means to answer a call — “Now, think!” — to
match some secret, special meanings already found. Institutions may be con-
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strued by their own members as a bit like the schizophrenogenic mother who
has found the meanings and asks the daughter to think them. Or they may
resemble
liberal father whose permission still governs even the most
Dionysian, anarchic carnivalesque.
The Digital Dnderground’s song
doowutchyalike ends: “Daddy, can I go outside? / Gowhereyalike, kid.”
Daddy still grants permission. In both cases —. the meaning-granting schizo
phrenogenic mother and the anarchic father — what stands out is the institu
tion’s self-questioning, evident in the gifts it exchanges with its acolytes:
unlimited semiosis in the first case, disinhibition in the second. Thus, what the
institution gives the moment one comes into contact with it is an anxiety about
its own training power: how can I not exclude what I cannot train?2
It would seem a contradiction in terms to think of an institution of theory
since theory initially emerged as a place from which to question traditional
institutional practices of reading (and writing). To be given theory from its
institution has a strange effect: one does not know whether to read the movie
or do what one likes. While indecision lasts, one writes. But as one writes, the
heady combination of schizophrenogenic power and the father’s yes that has
come with the institution of theory assails one with a doubt: why does writing
about theory seem to remain, even after a School, an improvisation? Why, even
after the entitlement of an institution, does writing about theory seem to drift
toward a minor plot? Why does it seem as if it were the tongue of a mind
unproductive?
In Searles’s anecdote the woman’s exegetic passion is especially evocative of
a view of meaning commonly associated with theory — multiplicity and poly
semy. And ambiguity, the offspring of proliferation of meaning that throws the
very process — if not sense — of interpretation off.3 This vocation for dis
banding meaning, this tendency to assail the reader “with feelings of confusion
and unreality,” proof that theory has a pressing story to tell.
Theory rose in the academy when the university began to throw its doors
open to all sorts of historical subjectivities previously barred from its halls.
Theory has functioned as both the pretext for this opening and a surveilling
device of the entrance of the new subjects. Perhaps, it is owing to this dual
work that theory, although synonymous with the self-critique of privilege and
the consequent disbanding of the unified literary canon, and despite its fortune,
has not yet managed to dispel the suspicion of phylogenetic bond of word and
blood. According to this suspicion, linguistic access (linguistic subjectivity)
flows from socially inflected symbolic access.
If it has become popular because it wants to do away with any hereditary
right to language, theory is still sensitive to the classic charm of a familial,
mimetic bond between language and society. Indeed, even structuralism, which
for many, especially through its marriage to linguistics, anthropology, and
Marxism, marked an initiation to theory as it came later to be known, might be
said to have been victim to such seductive closure. As Emile Benveniste has
established, subjectivity is an effect of language: I am when I say I. But how
do we know that, even when taken as a purely formal universe, language still
does not mimic, in incurable servility, history with all its institutions — class,
materiality (which means material disparities), and, not least, affects: envy,
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hatred, as well as love, etc. — whose origins get lost in the accidents of misfor
tune? If the signifying chain of differences is at once the chain of language and
the circle of society, as an effect of language, subjectivity remains firmly plant
ed in the terrain of justice — in the question of who can rise and who cant in
the social circle. If we do not want to think of language in an exclusive way, as
a faculty that comes (or does not come) to us through family (therefore, nation,
academy, class) blood, then it is necessary to separate the symbolic from the
familial transmission of language. (The linguistic and symbolic existences of
the subject may not be one and the same.) In order to do this, language, which
in its public dimension is voice, must be installed neither through the father nor
the mother; it must be given by another. Similarly it can also be taken away,
scandalously, unjustly, when the other abandons us.
The abandonment leaves the subject to an unsymbolized impoverishment
that wanders through thought without aim; the withdrawal of the linguistic
pass from another abandons the subject to an unjust and unhealed disparity.
Correcting structuralism, "theory” says that the subject is neither born at birth
nor in the mother tongue, but through a pass coming from another. Theory
may be understood as the dialectical image of a contemporary tale difficult to
bear: the tale about another giving you language or cutting you off from it,
telling you that you can pass into it or taking the pass away. This and only this
pass satisfactorily legitimizes the subject’s citizenship in the country of the
Concept.
For so long language and class have been locked in the reciprocal panic of
a Hegelian dialectic: one, somehow, needed to kill the other in order to rise.
Class has never meant linguistic entitlement or conceptual power; on the con
trary, it has wandered through thought quietly withdrawn in the melancholic
incorporation of the lost object of language, mourning a lost linguistic fluency.
But in the tension between narrative and conceptuality, theory can disband the
bond of blood and language; it can turn against a discriminatory Law that enti
tles, including or excluding, and thus permit the bond between class and lan
guage to come to the fore. Theory is language’s belated mourning of class,” the
name for an unjust and unhealed disparity — a discontent — at the heart of the
social tie.

June 17
Sputiamo su Hegel (The ordinary)
Man has searched for the meaning of life beyond and against life itself. For a
woman, life and the meaning of life never cease to overlap.
—Carla Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel

The woman is at the School of Theory. She is expecting her birth. She wan
ders in the morning along the outskirts of the beautiful campus, where the front
gardens are in bloom with the giant poppies she had not seen before, with
peonies and irises; where the silent houses and the sloping lawns are supposed
to consign to her something of the spirit of the place. "You are new,” some
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voice out of the landscape will say in a moment. But no wrinkle, no dehiscence;
only the muteness of an adherence, taking root inside, pulling outward — like
destiny.
Back in her room, she gives in. “I realize,” the hand writes. This what
stoops down to kiss her eerily at The School of Theory: not Kant, not Hegel,
not Foucault. Like Kafka’s man before the law she is missing the last good
chance to enter with support. “I realize,” the hand pulls on without mercy, “the
human tie.” The stark truth she could know really anywhere else, not here, not
now but anywhere far and outside of the beautiful campus, had found her again.
The woman now regresses back and back to a place she confusedly calls her
“origins.” Her mind tumbles down — zero degree of thought. Now, once
again, she will fall flat in that region where any School would leave, where no
one and language does not improve. No matter what it did before, the mind
tumbles down in the swamp, reduced to feeling what the woman calls the banal
pain of dialectics. The hand writes: “the possibility of someone else coming
close brings immediately the pain of exclusion — one excludes as one comes
close.” And she has no system against it. She had dreamed of acquiring the
words of a truth beyond all reasons: a shared logos, like a vineyard with fruits
for all, “whose only worth lies in being exposed ... as when a face lights up,
opening” (Jean-Luc Nancy xxxviii). The Face-Logos. But how to think the
shareable logos, which is neither project nor appropriation, without setting
everyone on the axis of the ethical, always ceding to another, living for another
and in another? Finally oblivious to self-consciousness through this ceding, all
trembling on the same bough? “Are you a Concept human tie?” the woman
screams.

Now the woman unlocking the door of the building. She hears someone’s
quick footsteps. As she opening the door, she turns and sees a young woman
behind her. As the woman is opening the door, the young woman sweeps by
into the building. She has a purpose and is holding onto it avidly, trying to be
on her best behavior with others.
The woman goes up to her room and knows that time has changed her,
changed her mind. Thought no longer comes in surging motions. One wave
after another after another. Now it comes in fits. She does not know whether
there is any desire attached to it now. It is more like a necessity: time and
thought had come to coincide.
After the episode of the young woman, she looks at herself in the mirror.
She sees the change in her face. She sees her past. She sees her young lover
turn and go. She is wearing her gifts
she turns — a leather jacket, the ruby
stones. From the back she looks burdened, yet expectant. She is the younger.
Was that when the intellect and the body had collapsed into each other never
to split again? The woman and the lover had come together originally to
assuage the violence of history, one in the name of the ethical, the other in the
name of private love. For one of them the body had to step aside. Believing
she was fighting the violence of history, all the while she had prolonged it by
choosing a body that from birth had had to step aside. She had only been
telling a family story. Fearing for her mind, wanting a mind, she had chosen a
woman. But in doing so, she had only prolonged a family story.
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On her way to the theater she looked down at the gorge. “I realize,” the
hand writes. She was falling — back and back. She heard the monotonous
noise of the water, and the two o’clock chimes. She remembered Quentin in
The Sound and the Fury, shaving. She thought of the smell of death in the midst
of life and of laughing at the days to come.

June 25
Language could carry

At one point language could carry. At the table of the café, the five people
jumped into verbal confrontation. It’s not that language carries immediately,
even the most dexterous; we can carry our points more or less skillfully when
we hear a comprehensible idiom. It follows that one can speak only after train
ing, and less from accord. Does training at this café table disguise as accord?
It might feel like a problem of boundaries: how do I step into this circle?
Will I? Can I? The questions, which essentially reduce speech to a case of
mustering power among others, however, appear as a misguided plea for the ful
fillment of a want one cannot decently thrust on strangers too soon. Will I?
Can I? The personal labor required to attain a proposition and, thus, the ter
ror of differential speech, are not discredited by the want behind them — a
want for the event of thinking.
At this table, our voices taking turns, we allow one another to hear truths
we had already come to, though scattered in different places, perhaps mixed to
what Gramsci would take as signs of non-thought — "brilliant paradoxes, witty
word games, verbal acrobatics” (25) — because, after all, the voice needs to find
point d'appui, and so spectacularly, before it can step in and warm up for the
dialogue. But the coldness with which the others in the circle meet our inter
nal agitation, almost thrusting the voice back below the throat, should not be
taken at its face value. The novelty of our group is that the voice meets the
obligation to rise and move outward not for our ears, in a way, not to put on
this table the individual truths we have labored at so devotedly, oftentimes in
such bleak isolation, but to carry on the obligation to hear the other "asking you
to find the words with which he’ll make you hear him” (Nancy and Smock
311). Just for tonight, the Face-Logos with no project. We are in the vineyard,
on the same bough.

June 27-28
Really
At the threshold of the theater, since their planets were revolving around each
other, they took themselves in opposite directions, in haste, without looking.
He did not follow, their eyeballs fixed solely on the lights on the wooden stage
and the podium, on the rows of red seats. She thought he was another who
wanted her to watch Anne-Marie Stretter again, so she took her place among
the others. She would clear the path and go into the soul. Even as she
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watched, her mind would be made strong by the speaker’s propositions. She
would know his ambition to make transparent the process of thinking as a
squandering of his gift outward to many, many, and his self-destructive . . .
social passion when thinking is on the verge of wanting to draw in things that
cannot really be talked about, because how could we carry them in speech with
out also wailing about coffee, about having a coffee or a coke alone or with
someone, about a pang, a betrayal, a carnal fear, a falling for . .. tenderness, for
the language of tenderness?
The man was drinking coffee in the square, sitting on the steps. He was
writing. The woman saw that he was watching women. She went to where he
was. He said "No,” and walked back with her over the bridge.
At
at night, he knocks on the door. He watches. Then he says, "So, can
I kiss you?” The woman thinks, "let me give you a story.” "Do you want me to
watch Anne-Marie Stretter?” it is saying. “Go to the many others and I’ll go
to the soul,” it is saying. At the end of cruelty they kiss and kiss. It is as if the
man let the woman kiss him.

June 29
Meditation on need
In Group Psychology, searching for an explanation of contagion, of "the mental
change which is experienced by an individual in a group” (88) and that makes
him/her consent to things that, when alone he/she would not do, Freud comes
up with the word "libido.” Much later, in Foucault this word would become
"power” and by this name will expose itself as both the reason and limit of
groups. But, originally, for Freud libido is the energy of love, cosmically under
stood, and therefore not yet, as in Foucault, the mechanism of a public State
that has perfectly infiltrated private souls. Freud writes:

Libido an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by
that name the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at
present actually measurable), of those instincts which have to do with all
that may be comprised under the word "love.” The nucleus of what we
mean by love naturally consists (and this what is commonly called love,
and what the poets sing of) in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But
we do not separate from this — what in any case has a share in the name
"love” — on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and
children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to
concrete objects and to abstract ideas.
(90; emphasis added)

Extricated from the context of the couple, sexual love confuses itself with
humanitarian love; the sexual union prolongs the social love for family, friends,
and humanity in general. Having lost its boundaries, "love” dissolves into the
muddle of love. Freud’s indistinction between the social and the private spheres
is here less reminiscent of a Foucauldian ideological continuum of individual
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and State apparatus and more of feminism. In this passage psychoanalysis and
feminism, especially that form of historical feminism that in the 1970s and
early 1980s was called woman-identified feminism, seem to meet on common
ground, arising both from a similar passion to experience in the choice of
another social justice in action. (The feminist partners find their equal in the
couple analyst/analysand). To a certain extent, feminism reproposed Freuds
muddle of love. Thriving on the juxtaposition of social and private love,
woman-to-woman love (the politicized version of the lesbian relationship) per
mits to assimilate to the sphere of intimacy the logic of reparation for the
unfairness daily met by all the needs of others, an unfairness that the social is
unable to repair.
Feminist love of the same celebrated synchronicity between the partners:
"Sleeping, turning in turn like planets / rotating in their midnight meadow”
(Rich 82). The private couple, in turn, became a fit metaphor for a better social
tie admitting the possibility of equality. From this perspective, the feminist
couple represents a position similar to what John Rawls calls "the veil of igno
rance.” The essential premise of social justice, the veil of ignorance, demands
that we cede to the other’s right as if it were our right. We start as same and
we see the need of others. Out of restriction and in recognition of this need,
one yields to the other’s part-taking. The problem with this position is that it
conflates social justice and private love. From Freud to feminism to Rawls, it
seems that a healed, just social tie would depend on this confusion.

***
Now that you are, the needs of others have become my numbness from you.
When you turn against me you save me from the crudeness of this split; you
give me back to the social. Clad in a veil of ignorance, mindful of others’ fair
ness to part-take of you, I have to give you.
Perhaps I was your social from the start. Did you kiss in me all the others’
need for justice? Did you repair with your kiss? Did you want to opt for the
manageable and stop at night with the language of tenderness at least one of
the million simultaneous cries, "Unfair to me”?
"There
no doubt,” Martin Stanton writes, "that Freud sternly admon
ished Ferenczi for what he termed 'the kissing technique’ (Kusstechnik), that is,
the purported permission for patients to express physical affection to their ana
lyst — as long, of course, as it did not drift into ull-scale sexual intercourse”
(2). Freud thunders with disapproval of his pupil, who was taking the teacher’s
psychoanalysis in an anarchic direction: "I see that the differences between us
come to a head in a technical detail which is well worth discussing. You have
not made a secret of the fact that you kiss your patients and let them kiss you;
I had also heard that from a patient of my own” (quoted in Jones 174-5).
Enraged, the master lashes out at the pupil, explaining the "new” kissing tech
nique less with Ferenczi’s healing zeal and more with his self-serving desire to
dethrone Freud himself in the eyes of future psychoanalytic adepts: "A number
of independent thinkers in matters of technique will say to themselves: why
stop at a kiss? Certainly one gets further when one adopts pawing’ as well,
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which after all doesn't make a baby. And then bolder ones will come along who
will go further to peeping and showing — and soon we shall have accepted in
the technique of analysis the whole repertoire of demiviergerie and petting-par
ties . . . and God the Father Ferenczi gazing at the lively scene he has created
will perhaps say to himself: maybe after all I should have halted in my tech
nique . . . before the kiss.”
Yet, despite Freud’s rage, Ferenczi may be viewed
Freud’s true disciple.
He was acting out the muddle of love that the teacher himself— only an agent
of history, as we all are
registered in his thinking. "Psychoanalytic 'cure’ is
in direct proportion to the cherishing love given by the psychoanalyst to the
patient” (Ferenczi quoted in Stanton 139). To assuage the unfairness of their
pain, to nurture and maybe heal his patients, it was said that Ferenczi, the prac
titioner of Freud’s muddle of love, kissed them by letting them kiss him.

July 5
Literature is fire4

Literature fire: being sought, being written to — a kind of panic — coming
into debt, indebted — "please forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who
trespass against us” — debtor coming back to make you debtor with exhausted
eyes.

July 9
Antigone (At the Thai restaurant)
As if you were my brother — before you, this coarse uniform, as if you were my
brother — no candle at our table because you are my brother. When you are
my brother I outspeak the tyrant — gloriously — outside of the polis, anony
mous, unfeminine in my coarse tunic, yet unique in my rebellion. Because you
are my brother, the Law does not exist, this fragile thing invented by the whims
of hysterical men. Everybody can see that. Then why do so few speak? If
women had brothers, they would speak more often. When you are my brother
I am on my quest to find the law; there no reason for its fixity, I have noth
ing to lose in knocking down tyrants, my uniform makes me strong. The tie
snaps. I share nothing with the polis. My comrades and I laugh at the awe with
which you hold yourselves subjected to the Symbolic. There is nothing sure
about it; you invent your own chains and call them male eyes that see you in,
inside your societies, giving you rights — be insiders inside. Power does not
come through them. Unchain yourselves. If you were my brother I would not
be endangered near the tyrant. Strong in my anonymous uniform, I would not
be prevailed upon by such an anonymous force to dream of having my hair
untied and perfume oil between my fingers since you’d be my brother.
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July 11
May I laugh
Now we are in the ringed wood with the wall round it. This is Elvedon. I have
seen signposts at the cross roads with one arm pointing "To Elvedon.” No one
has been here. The ferns smell very strong, and there are red funguses grow
ing beneath them. Now we wake the sleeping daws who have never seen a
human form; now we tread on rotten oak apples, red with age and slippery.
There is a ring of wall round this wood; nobody comes here. . .. That is Elve
don. The lady sits between the two long windows, writing.
—Virginia Woolf, The Waves

Every reader of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves has fantasized about the mysteri
ous woman in Elvedon. Every reader has probably wanted to carry on with
Bernard’s story about her. The woman sat writing in the empty house, tied to
her desk, charmed in Elvedon. The spruce tree boughs fluttered through the
window pane, over the grey slates of the roof of the white garage. Through the
night the windows were kept lit, and the woman wrote at her desk in Elvedon.
Every reader of The Waves has wished Bernard had finally shown a text by this
woman in Elvedon. What was she writing all the time?
If we read again, however, another, perhaps more pressing, question forms
in the mind: How might it feel to be in an enchanted place that has never seen
a human form,” where “[n]o one has been,” and where the ripples of this unique
absence have irradiated from the center outward, to the things in the landscape
deep in sleep, to the oak apples “red with age.” The woman is in a heroic place,
romantic to the outsider’s eye. Her unity with her writing
indeed unvan
quished: she always the woman writing, the one designated by her exclusive
activity. Thus she has passed into subjectivity to the eyes of those who stare at
the scene: less a woman and more a writer, herself now a figure of speech in the
race of her writing. This why Bernard cannot show us any text of hers; so
wide has the distance had to be between the palpitations inflecting the woman’s
orthography and the expectations raised by the scene of her tenacity, by the
unchanging intensity with which she gives her existence between the two long
windows lit through the night. One, like Bernard, wouldn’t look for anything
less than an interminable text of the future. Yet, considering the place of the
woman, it sensible to imagine her in a moment of weakness. On her desk her
notebook worn with use, she succumbs to a roughness of expression, lets the
hand go after the ink, annotating. Those who have discovered Elvedon would
not think of reading in the text they are awaiting from her perhaps a curse
against the interminable human distance that — unaware to them — she con
tinues to occupy.

July 15
Just for an hour
The woman crossed the lawn, reached the mansion, and lingered in the dining
room. As calm descended on her, she walked out into the garden, slowly. It
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was late afternoon in the summer. People were humming to each other in cou
ples and in groups, and her dress was billowing
if in a novel. She saw a cir
cle with an empty spot. She took her place there. She saw the friendly faces
who took her in the circle. The air became very still. People were chatting
around her, yet their talk was held still at a remove from her; she could not dis
tinguish a syllable. She was at the far end of the pier looking on the stilled
mainland.
After a while the man got up as she was trying to. He went to get her a
glass of wine; he got them both a glass of white wine. He came back and sat
by her side. People’s eyes in the circle were on them; the woman and the man
were being together. She did not know what she was saying. She was talking
about Foucault and how American he was, and going for the philosophical
experience of the subject without ground, then about Foucault in the summer,
lying in the scorching sun of the long strip of beach in Civitavecchia, discover
ing Nietzsche for the first time. They saw an ant carrying her food in the grass.
The man looked at the ant carrying the food approvingly, then he looked at the
woman and asked her to go swimming. The woman was scared of crowds.
Everything stood extremely still. People held their plates. The man and
the woman finished the wine. He said to go. The woman stood up; a bell jar
had fallen on the entire party; noises were numb. The moment had come; peo
ple receded in the background. But before she took the first step her soul stum
bled; she saw the scene again. Her lover had cut her tongue before all times,
for all times. Her voice said, “I am positioned; you are positioning me now in
the place left empty not long ago, and only for a while, by chance. I am arbi
trarily in place of... ” “Your choice,” she said to the man, “moving of objects
if, as if,” she stumbled. “Even in our most private motions when we soar with
Plato’s charioteer it is the violence of history that chooses, when we flutter,
twitching and abandoned, under its blows and mistake that trembling for love.”
She wanted to go mad and caress the horses and the animals in all cities. Her
rage would have destroyed the world. Through the long window of the man
sion’s dining room, S.’s eyes caught hers for the classic fraction of a second. He
waited to see what she would do. Following the man, the woman stopped to
throw her paper plate in the trash can. The man stopped to wait. Although
someone else followed them, everyone knew the woman and the man were
walking out together.
The man dived; the water kept them apart, a wide space in between. The
woman thought, “Will our minds meet? Are they meeting?” Keeping at bay
the loss of a plot just when one could be begun, she enjoyed letting him be a
stranger with the privilege of scrutiny — pondering decisions, weighing, bal
ancing accounts in his mind while the watery space in between kept them still
untied. She dreamed of questions which he bore as a beacon. He had reached
the rocky ledge beside the falls, on the other shore of the gorge. He sat in the
evening sun; she saw his shape in focus but removed at the other end. Perhaps
their gazes met, but who knows for sure from afar, with the pool of water in
between. She waved; he waved back, lit by sunset. She went down with her
mouth into the water. “He my brother,” she said to the water. She was in
Virgil. She held to the rock on her side of the gorge.
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The stillness she had brought over from the party cracked; she woke up to
the presence of people around the circle of the gorge — the children, the moth
ers and the fathers, men, women — they stirred, played, made noises. She
thought of coming from overseas, from beyond her ultramarine sea and being
in the book of paradise if only for an hour. She cut herself lose, untied from
narrative. She thought, “I am positioned and he not positioning me: I am
the fullness of sunset on my brother to send him forth.” Only her eyes above
the water, her body in this water tinged with earth and tree reflections as if now
it were in her ultramarine sea from beyond — no difference. On the surface of
the well of the gorge — “just for an hour” he had said “to cool down” — con
tingency, brotherhood, nature.

July 16
Ontology and the Symbolic
For politics does not happen when you act on behalf of your own damaged
good, but when you act, without guarantees, for the good of all-this is to take
the risk of the universal interest. Politics in this sense requires representation,
the critique of representation, and the critique of the critique of representation.
—Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law

The Symbolic the circle of the gorge. If the woman were to follow the man
she would be lost to ontology. If she swam to him, the love-object would be
made to consent to being the object of choice. Then, from him an infinite gain
would come, resembling the touch of universality. In the convergence of the
erotic and the intellectual, desire for the Concept consents to the ontologizing
confusion of individual self-interest and the interest of the other. One’s gain
made to become the other’s.
Martin Heidegger met Hannah Arendt and gained Being and Time from
her. In turn, she received intellectual empowerment. In his presence she
received the indelible birthmark of the kin of philosophy and of philosophers.
Love was installed, a love that meant being chosen by thinking, by the Concept
itself— lastingly:

so bright,
different, so young, so sexual, so Jewishmerry and melancholy
at the same time — this woman, half his age and so knowledgeable ... he
wasn’t used to that, was entranced,
was she. What female student, 18
and willing to listen, open to the spirit and tone of the lecture room and
male character and male tongues, would want to resist? Nor did she want
to resist, she wanted to love what she heard, and did so.
(Theweleit 28)

Entranced by the unresisting consent of another that needs our need, our sense
of locality and of limits dissipates. For Heidegger, Arendt was “the inspiration
for his work in those years, the impetus to his passionate thinking” (Theweleit
28). In a European hut, removed in a nature away from the city and the hub of
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modernity, and not despite the body, but precisely because his ontic body was
sustained by an unresisting love-object, Heidegger could theorize the world.
The Heidegger/Arendt relationship is exemplary because in this case theoriz
ing the world, that is, the authority of the Concept, presumes the male body’s
kinship with a giving maternal breast. Heidegger gave to the young, to an
Arendt “willing” and “open ... to male character and male tongues” what the
young will not be easily weaned from — the milk of thought . . . la filosofia.
From her erotic tie to Heidegger she gained a universal tongue, a tongue that
one speaks as easily as one can draw milk from a generous breast. At the con
junction of the erotic and the intellectual, Arendt thus received the pass to phi
losophy. The erotic alone could not give her the pass; it could come to her if
Heidegger functioned simultaneously as male love-object and yielding breast,
nourishing the young with the milk of thought.5 Thus her pass came to Arendt
from a “mother” beyond the Father, both beyond the father figure that the older
Heidegger was to his young pupil, and beyond the Freudian sense of the male
child’s identification with the father as a necessary event in the child’s develop
ment, which ultimately means beyond homosexuality as the privileged figure of
the social tie.
This “mother” might have nothing to do with gender. In fact, the presumed
necessity to think through the gender binary (sexed thought) might be a nega
tion of that primary attestation of her kinship to philosophy that a woman
intellectual gains from the convergence of the erotic and the intellectual situa
tions. Though entitling, this convergence begs a question: if for women intel
lectuals identification with the father means gaining the milk of thought and
becoming fluent in the Concept, can one think without a Master?
If from her identification with the Father — which is more complex than
it appears because it also sends us to a maternal source — Arendt gained intel
lectual entitlement, Heidegger, in his turn, did not learn anything from
Arendt’s difference — as a Jew, as young, as woman, as listener. What was at
stake was Heidegger’s milk-philosophia, its absolute essentiality as it made the
listener willing, yielding from the very youth, giving up the possession of her
difference (the Symbolic) in exchange for that which the thing she heard would
bring. She was in a love-debt: “open to the spirit and tone of male character
and male tongues, who would want to resist?” (Theweleit 28).
Through his willing Jewish pupil, Heidegger had renewed proof that this
milk could feed the aggressor and the betrayed equally. And as he gave and
betrayed, Heidegger became hypnotized into the fundamental disengagement
of thought and the State. This disengagement is another name for ontology.
Like politics, ontology “take[s] the risk of the universal interest” (G. Rose 62):
in the name of, on behalf of, for, with, on the side. Like politics, ontology takes
the risk that if I speak for you, you will submit, breast-feeding as it betrays oth
ers but lending them the milk. “It requires representation,” a primary castra
tion: no withdrawal is possible from the potlatch of love-debt. Gender must
be left out for the milk-philosophia to run from the breast of the modern world
(Theweleit 59).
Exchanged for the pass to universality that comes with the milk, gender, an
initial and long-lasting sacrifice, must ultimately remain before thought, an
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abyss in which thought risks to fall. The problem is who can and would want
to resist this pass? If the pass is so difficult to resist, gender will never inter
rupt the intimate, seductive, and exclusive whispering flowing directly from
thought to State. (With “Heidegger-lord” [Theweleit 59] catatonic to the
good or evil of the universal interest that his children loved to hear when they
loved his milk, we have the Nazi Heidegger.)

July 16
Euryalus and Nisus, the poem of force
The woman and the man returned to the gorge, in full daylight. The bustle was
carrying on: the young men, the children at play, and the women. The man
watched. There were two people between them, but the stillness from the pre
vious day had caught up with them. The man and the womans gazes never
met. They were called, would be called even before death, elsewhere, each
responding to that magnetic instance just passing by the presence of the other.
They destroyed each other’s presence. The woman thought she and the man
were making love in the stillness, across from the presence of the two people
between.
The man came out from the water for the second time to lie in the after
noon sun. His hair was dripping; his eyes elsewhere, after the magnet. They
were in Virgil, where a difference so discouraging to the Concept must be
forced through the brotherly tie. The woman lived, wrote, had time — and the
letter, and what was the point of the letter? “Your body is so fragile, my Love!”

[...]

July 17-18
“So, can I kiss you?”
[A]ny society — is essentially political, since it is wholly dependent on the fig
ure of the Chief.... But we must go on to
that society, any society, is fun
damentally totalitarian — not, I hasten to add, because state coercion or tyran
nical violence are somehow essential to this conception; these traits are in no
way exclusive to totalitarian societies, and Freud clearly said that the reign of
the Führer rests above all on the fiction of his love. Rather, if society for Freud
is totalitarian in the strictest sense, it because it presents itself as an inte
grally political totality, a totale Staat, knowing no divisions except the one —
minimal, and solely intended to relate the social body to itself— between the
beloved Chief and his loving subjects.
—Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional

Can one-to-one love be other than fascistic? What do we do with this passion
in private human relation, with this glitch that nevertheless requires reckon
ing in our rightful search for an alternative sociality? You turn. As both moth-
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er tongue and language slip, you turn away; you turn your back and this is good.
As you turn, you interrupt the totality. I can then hesitate: should I swim into
you, should I not. If I know you will turn just as my mind slips toward you, if
I know you will follow someone else’s back, I will also know in you a crack in
the totality. I will be “beyond,” more toward the ethical, less stuck in the polit
ical. “In the name of what do we need to imagine an alternative sociality?”6 My
rope is cut loose; I float; I regress to the integral totality — your loving subject,
my beloved chief. There is nothing ethical about private love; only religion
could restrain its extremist political vocation, or you — when you turn away.
The greatest welling up of absence of private love gives rise to fascism. Now
you, as you turn against me as I slip, teach me and cure me.

[...]

July 22-23
Trauma and parataxis

No man is Hand, intire of itselfe; every man a peece of the Continent, a part
of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well
as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends, or of thine owne
were; Any Mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde ...
—John Donne, Meditation XVII
Parataxis is a figure of accretion, it heaps words on, using them more than
choosing them. It departs from calculation for lack of time, and from exegesis
for the same reason, because the writer in a hurry, “so inspired by his theme,
it fills him so completely, and the desire to communicate himself and to be
understood is so overwhelming” (Auerbach 166).
If lyric dreams of an “absolute inseparation” (Derrida 229) of body and let
ter, parataxis lives this desire in the light of day — acting out one’s being, mak
ing a scene, graphic and therefore comprehensible to all, striking at “the crucial
spot” in the heart, dissolving its memorized lines into haziness — “it arouses
emotion, it staggers” (Auerbach 168).
An affront to the sovereignty of language, paratactic expression — “hurried,
awkward, uncalculated” (166), constantly driving itself into public display —
lives on language’s raw material. The hurried writer loses one figure of speech
after the other to the urgency of the acting-out of being — “to communicate
himself.”
Parataxis gains conviction when details can no longer mislead, when, no
longer a question of symbolic investiture, language becomes rudiment, occasion
at the unilateral service of expression. An arresting exaggeration? A sec
ond-hand possession, that is not given, not by the mother, not with the moth
er tongue, a secondariness that, therefore, no munificent giver could ever give.
Therefore not even a law, benign — that is, inviting — or otherwise castrating.
The writer so filled with the gripping theme, with the aim of such “unilaterary
directness of expression” (167), arrives at the scene.
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Possession-love and metaphysics
Concealing shame sabotages intimacy.
—Adam Phillips, Terrors and Experts

In the classic philosophy of Plato the ascent toward wisdom begins in love.
Philosophical and linguistic power, figured by the upward movement of the
soul, coincide with erotic attraction. As Julia Kristeva discusses it, the episode
of the charioteer in Phaedrus illustrates the interdependence of soul and eros
and, by extension, the dependence of the philosopher on “the surge of empath
ic desire” (66) that unfolds in a violent “sadomasochistic psychodrama” (64):

Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love, and has his whole soul
warmed through sense, and is full of pricklings and ticklings of desire, the
obedient steed, then as always under the government of shame, refrains
from leaping on the beloved; but the other, heedless of the pricks and of the
blows of the whip, plunges and runs away, giving all manner of trouble to
his companion and the charioteer, whom he forces to approach the beloved
and to remember the joys of love. They at first indignantly oppose him and
will not be urged on to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but at last, when he
persists in plaguing them, they yield and agree to do as he bids them.
(Plato, Phaedras, quoted in Kristeva 65)
The bildung of the philosopher relies on the struggle with possession-love to
the extent that,
Kristeva comments, “phallic domination is elevated and
metamorphosed into apprenticeship of the Good and the True” (67). Quite a
different version of love can be found in Platos Symposium. There, Diotima
bears the tale of an ideal love that constructs in view of the supreme good and
of immortality. The knot of desire and intellectual empowerment seems less
significant than the choice of the Good, a choice that unites the lover and the
philosopher. In Diotima’s tale the philosopher/lover is the one who can stand
midway between ignorance and wisdom, the position of tempered desire. As
far as the reader can tell, in the case of a woman — Diotima’s — occupying this
position of wisdom does not make her an entitled philosopher: though erudite,
Diotima not present at the banquet of the dialecticians. In Plato’s text she
a removed presence, and her theorizing is reported secondhand by Socrates.

***
Now imagine the woman again, and a room. Imagine the night in which the
lover has come within the reach of the object of Beauty that had been before
forever out of sight, lost, merely a shadow crumbling to the touch in the cave
of imagos. Imagine the path ahead of which the object of Beauty now leads the
lover; the lover’s hand extended and the path. From a point on, the beloved fol
lows, his hand too reaching to heal, taking the language of tenderness out of the
room and in the roads and over the bridge almost imperceptibly for the lover
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— his hand falling lightly over the hip of the lover, healing, already a healer’s
hand in place of the beloved’ then already again quickly out of sight
it was
before, ahead of the path. Imagine the path leading up to the room and the
lover once more having covered the distance up to the point of beholding the
object of Beauty.
Imagine the room, the lover and the beloved locked into the embrace in
which the lover can no longer let go of the beloved. If in the classic philoso
phy of Plato the dialectician and the philosopher begin in love, if knowledge
plants itself primarily in tie of love, for the woman in the room, who has come
within the reach of Beauty, knowledge remains a drama of perpetual suspen
sion. Positioned between the winged pair, with the prickling of desire that
demands the narrativization of erotic aggression and domination, and Diotima’s
ideal concept of love, how will the woman choose the path of wisdom? What
will make of her the philosopher, the dialectician — which she knows she will
be — with any sense of conviction? The beloved’s embrace locks her between
an empowering subjection and an unreachable object of Beauty, two as yet
uninitiated, unresolved paths. When will philosophy begin?
Imagine the room, the brightness of the lights, the knotted bodies sus
pended between the act-predicated narrative of the sadomasochistic drama of
the charioteer and Diotima’s path which if taken, the woman now thinks, is
bound for elliptical narrative, for the loss of the Concept. What will the
woman do?
For the woman locked in the embrace, bidden by the presence of the
beloved, her soul born through the pricklings of sense, divided between the
horror at the beloved’s flight and her own undecidability, wisdom (metaphysics)
lies in the trauma of an in-between. The solution of the kiss, while reestab
lishing an accord, a mutuality without violence, comes
the pass into a sec
ondary form of metaphysics. The kiss returns her to the poverty of an originary
suspension, a figure of reciprocity and yet of secondary thought. Does the
metaphysical power passed with a kiss that stops before possession-love amount
to boring theories? Does it risk itself as a subplot of the universal? A local,
sexed thought, forever an image, a representation, a death-in-life?
Styles of kissing can be seen but not easily described, as though kissing
resists verbal representation. It is striking that, unlike other forms of sexu
ality, there little synonymy of kissing. It has generated no familiar slang,
acquired virtually no language in which it can be redescribed. . . . Appar
ently for the sake of interest stories often ignore, in a way films do not, the
fact that the kiss itself is a story in miniature, a subplot.
(Phillips, On Kissing 95-6)
Imagine the room. The two locked in the embrace, kissing. The woman
thought of the beloved’s hair as he led, ahead on the path, before approaching.
She thought he got the book, read it, and went swimming because he had
become the charioteer feeling. She saw him swimming in the gorge, and his
slender body, as he kissed her in the room. The beloved lifts the lover and car
ries the lover until the end of the bright light, near the lit candle. Both are now
suspended in a kissing that neither eradicates her from language nor sends
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through her the birth of conceptuality. Until before the beloved’s boredom.
Even as the beloved is telling what he loves, almost beginning the narrative, the
kiss reunites the two and returns them to human mutuality, freezing their
shapes into the paradigm for the good social tie — a brotherly tie. It was as if
the man let the woman kiss him: only the network of metaphors of healing
could describe the kiss. This terminable, almost session-long kissing, out of
need.
Arrived at on the way to a dialogue with his patient, Hungarian psychoan
alyst Sandor Ferenczi’s healing tenderness would seem the logical outcome of a
psychoanalysis understood as a philosophy in practice, almost as a “vitafilosofica.” Ferenczi’s tenderness revisits the classic scenario of the knot of knowledge
and love, the dialogue of Socrates and Phaedrus by the plane tree and the
spring. In the passage from philosophy to psychoanalysis, however, the philo
sophical dialogue is no longer complicitous with possession-love. The “mater
nal friendliness” (Stanton 135) of Ferenczi’s kiss displaces the power of the
Concept with the quest for a healing social tie. While in the charioteer story
conceptual power was indivisible from the eroticized traumatic transit of the
initiated, Ferenczi’s tenderness — with a touch of utopian impatience, perhaps
— rephrases for all of us the Concept as the question of an ethical beyond, of
better, more vigilant intersubjective tie: “Ferenczi wanted the psychoanalytic
relationship to be the paradigm for social relations” (Phillips, Terrors 28). Tak
ing its cue from the modern urban spectacle — so well portrayed by Marx and
Engels — of strangers brutally, arbitrarily, thrown into a sudden intimacy, Fer
enczi’s psychoanalysis concerns itself with “the greatest need.”7 But in trying to
heal from this historical trauma, it also necessarily awakens the originary par
allel trauma of philosophy’s love.

Notes
1. The third position is a familiar theme in Duras’s writing. The story of
Anne-Marie Stretter and her lover appears again in The Vice-consul, and one of
Duras’s last works, Yann Andrea Steiner, returns to this theme through the con
siderable age difference separating the woman protagonist (Duras) and her
young lover. In the love-making scene the old woman must put herself in the
position of a child to bridge in her mind the scandalous gap between herself
and her lover, half her age.
2. This is the question Jacqueline Rose asks in her page for the SCT Sym
posium, in Postcardsfrom the Edge.
3. In her essay on Henry James’s “The Turn of the Screw,” Shoshana Felman asks: “Is it at all possible to read and to interpret ambiguity without reduc
ing it in the very process of interpretation? Are reading and ambiguity in any
way compatible?” (Writing and Madness 165).
4.
Title of a 1967 essay by Vargas Llosa and included in Making Waves.
5. For the exigencies of this fiction, the relationship between Heidegger
and her pupil has been simplified. For a more articulate discussion on the light
that this relationship might shed on the question of love and the transmission
of ideas, see my more academic, unpublished version of “Theoretical Effects.”
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6. Benjamin Meyer, study group session, 18 July 1997, School of Criticism
and Theory, Cornell University.
7. “If we keep our cool, educational attitude, even vis-à-vis an opisthotonic
patient [that is, one whose body is tensed up with anxiety], we tear to shreds
the last thread that connects him to us. The patient gone off into his trance
a child indeed who no longer reacts to intellectual explanations, only perhaps to
maternal friendliness; without it, he feels lonely and abandoned in his greatest
need” (Ferenczi quoted in Stanton 135).
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1.
Over the past ten years, Nella Larsens 1929 novel
Passing has become an important reference within
contemporary debates over the status of racial difference, especially those debates carried out by critics
whose work interrogates the thresholds of biology
and culture. For many of these readers, the novel
contains strong suggestions that Larsen herself
viewed "race” as an ontologically bankrupt term.
Samira Kawash, for instance, regards passing narra
tives such as Larsens as part of the project of “dislo
cating the color line,” insofar as the forms of social
encounter these narratives enact — in which geno
typically “black” characters are able to move freely
through otherwise restrictive social spaces by virtue
of their phenotypically “white” characteristics —
“makes impossible and irrelevant appeals to authen
'
ticity as a signal of ethnicity” (149). “Difference,”
Kawash explains, “refers not to some reality... but to
positionality,” a fact that Passing should underscore.
Working along a similar vein of thought, Robyn
Wiegman points out that Passing enacts a “visible
negation of‘blackness’” and thus unsettles the “visible
epistemology of black skin” to which traditional par
adigms of American racism have been anchored.
Larsens literary project, then, takes up an overt polit
ical agenda for such readers, since as Wiegman goes
on to explain, “[t]o interrupt this equation [“between
the idea of ‘race’ and the ‘black’ body”] is crucial to
the political articulation of antiracist cultural cri
tique” (21-2). At the very least, Passing raises persis-
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tent questions concerning the efficacy of racial difference inasmuch as the nar
rative consistently returns to question the premises that ground our knowledge
of such difference. When Larsen’s protagonist, Irene Redfield,
asked to
explain “the trick” of distinguishing an “authentic” Caucasian from an individ
ual who merely passes as one — when, in short, she is asked to locate and give
a name to that thing that makes all the difference between two phenotypically
similar individuals — she can offer little more than the dubious reply: “There
are ways. But they’re not definite or tangible” (Larsen 206). Pushed further,
she adds, “Just — just something. A thing that couldn’t be registered.”
It is, of course, a statement that tends to mystify matters of racial differ
ence, and yet such mystification is what Passing cannot avoid, what Larsen
seems forced to engage in a novel that removes “race” from the level of the phe
notypical, the corporeal, the visible. Irene’s comment might in this sense seem
to offer us a glimpse at Larsen’s true hand in Passing: doesn’t “a thing that
couldn’t be registered,” the ambiguous “something” that purports to substanti
ate racial difference, indicate that
soon as we begin to speak of racial ontol
ogy, we are already knee-deep in pure fantasy, pure projection — that, in short,
the differences between whites and blacks are the differences they themselves
inscribe and maintain? For her part, Kawash follows up on these possibilities
when she suggests that Irene’s remark figures “race” as more “nothing” than
“something,” more a cultural phantasm (like the mysterious “drop of black
blood” that ostensibly condenses the world of difference between blacks and
whites) than a substantive component of biological reality (155).
Such readings of Passing as a narrative project that disturbs essentialist for
mulations of racial difference, and hence challenges the racist economies these
formulations authorize, draw upon a nuanced association between the pleasures
of parody and the political effects of performance. In this sense, Judith Butler’s
reading of Passing deserves special attention, since it was Butler’s earlier Gender
Trouble that first articulated, in ways that resonated widely among Anglophone
cultural critics, the subversive properties of parodic performance. Butler con
tends that parodic performances are inherently disruptive of the norms they
mimic and, more particularly, that the disruptions at issue here disperse them
selves through the vehicle of laughter. “The loss of the sense of ‘the normal,”’
Butler explains, “can be its own occasion for laughter, especially when ‘the nor
mal,’ ‘the original’ is revealed to be a copy, and an inevitably failed one, an ideal
that no one can embody. In this sense, laughter emerges in the realization that
all along the original was derived” (138-9). For Butler, parody and the laugh
ter it incites tend to undermine the matrix of prescribed norms we typically
experience as reality itself, inflicting a form of category crisis that is all the more
powerful because grounded in our sensation of unregulated pleasure.
This model of parodic subversion asserts itself throughout Butler’s later
reading of Passing, especially insofar as this reading finds the tension of Larsen’s
narrative at precisely that point where an understanding of “race” as a biologi
cally sustained and impermeable boundary gives way to the performative
process of passing, the effect of which to submit every absolute racial demar
cation to the prospect of its own contingency and flux. In her reading of
Larsen, Butler explains that “the uncertain border between black and white” —
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the very uncertain, Du Boisian "color line” upon which Irene fails to lay hold as
she gropes for this “thing that couldn’t be registered” — precisely what racist
essentialism must specify in order to maintain its fantasies of racial purity and
hierarchy. For this reason, Butler suggests that passing’s implicit challenge to
naturalistic categories of difference — more specifically, its displacement of
such naturalistic categories with performative simulacra of these categories —
presents a profound threat to racial essentialism and hence racism itself; for the
latter, as Butler explains, it “the spectre of a racial ambiguity that must be
conquered,” that must be refused and effaced in order for the white-suprema
cist mind to retain its own epistemological footing (Bodies 172). Thus, the risky
pleasures to which passing yields access become strictly subordinate to the plea
sures inherent to the form of passing itself, a form in which we witness the col
lapse of “original” into "copy,” of “white” into “black.” In Larsen’s novel, Butler
would suggest, racial ontology itself becomes
kind of joke, since Passing
inspires laughter at the expense of those who cling to such an ontology, dis
crediting those particular criteria of corporeal difference to which larger notions
of racial differentiation are often attached.
To a certain extent, Butler’s premise makes enough sense. When Irene
Redfield, passing into the racially segregated Drayton tearoom, finds herself the
object of an anonymous, apparently Caucasian gaze — when she succumbs to
the fear that a nearby Caucasian onlooker has discerned her legally marginalized
racial status — her growing sense of dread is tempered by her sense of the
ridiculousness of the situation. “Absurd!” she muses. “White people were so
stupid about such things for all that they usually asserted that they were able to
tell; and by the most ridiculous means, finger-nails, palms of hands, shapes of
ears, teeth, and other equally silly rot” (150). The prospect of discovery dead
ly serious for Irene, and yet the whole sequence underlines the “absurd,” laugh
able possibility that, precisely through its myopic fixation upon corporeal
details that actually mean nothing whatsoever, the anonymous Caucasian gaze
has effectively mistaken Irene for what she is. Thus, Larsen tells us, “Irene
laughed softly, but her eyes flashed” (150). That the truth may sometimes arise
from a misrecognition would be funny in itself, if not for Irene’s fear of being
discovered and hence ejected from the Drayton tearoom, but the overriding
joke and its implicit punch line become clear once the anonymous observer
steps forward to introduce herself as Irene’s long-lost childhood friend and fel
low “Negro,” Clare Kendry.
This early moment of revelation typifies Larsen’s narrative technique in
Passing, which often appears at pains to emphasize a dissonance between the
“surface” layer of intersubjective encounter and its underlying substratum of
“authentic” subjective experience. In this first passing encounter of Passing, it
is the passer herself (Irene) who has succumbed to the “absurd” set of racial/corporeal equations that usually lead “white people” to dupe themselves, and that
have now led Irene herself to mistake Clare Kandry for a Caucasian. It also,
however, a critical moment for any approach to Larsen that seeks out Passings
attitude toward racial substance, for after the renewal of acquaintances that
takes place during this sequence, Irene find herself confronted with a vexed
ontological question: in what sense, she now wonders,
Clare actually a
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"Negro,” especially when all of her visible, corporeal qualities — her "ivory” skin
and "golden hair,” for instance — seem to bespeak "whiteness,” so much so that
Irene had never doubted Clare’s Caucasian status even throughout a close visu
al scrutiny of her? Finding herself at a loss to explain precisely how or why the
phenotypically "Caucasian” Clare actually qualifies
"black,” Irene finally
decides that the elusive moment of racial essence resides within the depths of
Clare’s gaze:
Surely! They were Negro eyes! mysterious and concealing,”
Irene concludes, but even here, the eyes of the Negro are not configured with
in the anatomical geometries Irene considers little more than "silly rot” but are
instead mystified, sublimated as that place from which racial difference, Clare’s
secret inheritance from "her grandmother and later her mother and father,” the
"thing that couldn’t be registered” in mere corporeal terms, somehow emanates
(161).
It is also, therefore, a moment that places definite limits upon the subver
sive effects of parodic imitation, since it is the very seamlessness of Clare’s pass
ing performance, the mimetic flawlessness of her simulation of a white woman,
that prompts Irene not to abandon "race”
a legitimate differential term but
rather to re-locate it on a mysterious plane beyond that of the merely corpore
al. Inasmuch as it locates a kernel of raw, unmediated racial alterity within the
sanctum of Clare’s gaze, the sequence in the Drayton anticipates another miseen-scene of performance and misrecognition, one that similarly pokes quiet fun
at what Wiegman calls the "visible epistemology of black skin,” though this
time, the butt of the joke appears in the form of Clare’s husband, the openly
racist John Bellew. Larsen presents Bellew as the dupe, the racist fool who fails
to realize that his own wife among the very "black scrimy devils” he impugns
through his frequent diatribes. When asked to explain his apparently affec
tionate pet name for his wife (usually, we discover, Bellew greets Clare as
"Nig”), he offers Clare and Irene what he clearly considers a clever witticism.
"When we were first married,” he explains, "she was as white as — as — well
white
a lily. But I declare she’s gettin darker and darker. I tell her if she
don’t look out, she’ll wake up one of these days and find she’s turned into a nig
ger” (171). At this, of course, Bellew "roar[s] with laughter,” and his laughter
is reciprocated by the women surrounding him. But though it might appear to
affirm Bellew’s bad joke, the laughter of Clare and Irene actually stems from a
surreptitious comedic source, since both passing women are laughing at Bellew
rather than with him, are laughing at the racist’s ridiculous blindness and truly
laughable assumptions rather than alongside those assumptions. Availing
themselves of that outlet Freud describes in Jokes and Their Relation to the
Unconscious, Clare and Irene laugh as a way of striking a blow at an adversary
they are otherwise powerless to assail; Irene, Larsen tells us, "had a leaping
desire to shout at the man beside her, And you’re sitting here surrounded by
three black devils, drinking tea’” (172), but instead of denouncing Bellew open
ly, Irene savors the hidden comedy through her unconcealed laughter.
So in a definite sense, Irene’s laughter during this sequence also qualifies as
a form of Butlerian, parodic laughter: part of the comedy to which her laugh
ter responds lies in the fact that the ostensibly "Caucasian” women surrounding
Bellew are in fact "copies,” the very "black scrimy devils” from which he imag

Published by eGrove, 2001

31

Journal X, Vol. 5 [2001], No. 1, Art. 14

Christopher Hanlon

27

ines himself safely distanced. But even if Irenes laughter finds its source in the
very forms of parody and imitation Butler describes in Gender Trouble, this
laughter fails to deliver the liberating, denaturalizing effects Butler forecasts —
quite the opposite, in fact. Larsens description of Irenes laughter draws it out,
stretches it to conspicuous dimensions, so that while the laughter indicates
certain furtive pleasure with Bellew’s catastrophic mistake, the pleasure itself
now appears
if situated along a Mobius strip, now verging upon its reversal
into anguish: “Irene, who had been sitting with lips tightly compressed, cried
out, ‘That’s good!’ and gave way to gales of laughter. She laughed and laughed
and laughed. Tears ran down her cheeks. Her sides ached. Her throat hurt.
She laughed on and on and on, long after the others had subsided” (171). It
while in the midst of this vertigo of laughter, Larsen tells us, that Irene, sud
denly glancing into the eyes of Clare, “encountered her peculiar eyes fixed on
her with an expression so dark and deep and unfathomable that she had for a
short moment the sensation of gazing into the eyes of some creature utterly
strange and apart” (172). Momentarily, Irene sees Clare as a “creature,” a mon
ster of some kind, and in this sense, Irene sees Clare as Bellew sees all African
Americans: even if not precisely as “black scrimy devils,” certainly as “unfath
omable” and “utterly strange and apart.” As in the earlier sequence in the Dray
ton, the gaze of Clare contains something “dark and deep,” something as
“unfathomable” as race itself, the “thing that couldn’t be registered” otherwise.
So even if readers such as Kawash, Wiegman, and Butler are fundamental
ly correct when they suggest that Passing turns suspicious eye toward tradi
tional notions of racial difference, and even if they are correct when they insist
that the novel works to undermine those connections between corporeality and
“race” that have most usually been taken for granted in American culture, why
then do such moments from Passing seem to invest racial difference with a
phantasmic power that perseveres despite the ontological deficiencies of “race ?
The first contention I want to make here is that Passings paradoxical fixation
with racial difference (ontologically bankrupt on the one hand yet irreducibly
charged on the other) should remind us of what Jaques Lacan aims at in his
deliberations over another category of difference — sexual difference — and
especially in his insistence that sexual difference real. By referring to sexual
difference
real, Lacan does not mean that sexual difference pertains to some
level of immutable, biologically fixed “reality” that stands apart from our dis
cursive or epistemological renditions of sex but rather that sexual difference
belongs to what he terms the order of the real, precisely as that which cannot be
enclosed in either the symbolic register (which to say, in language itself) or
what Lacan refers to as the imaginary (the visual world of corporeal images by
means of which the subject may liken or differentiate herself from others).
“Real,” for Lacan, what perturbs both the imaginary and the symbolic, what
exceeds the conceptual limits of either domain, and in Passing, racial difference
— like sexual difference as described by Lacan — appears as “the essential
object which isn’t an object any longer, but this something faced with which all
words cease and all categories fail, the object of anxiety par excellence” (Semi
nar II 164). Passing, in other words, denies racial difference both its symbolic
and its imaginary support: in this novel, there is no phrase that can answer the
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question, "What is racial difference?” (we have seen, for instance, how a version
of this question leaves Irene Redfield with nothing meaningful to say), and nei
ther does there seem to be any corporeal quality or set of qualities that can reli
ably distinguish members of putatively distinct racial groups (all such efforts at
the corporeal specification of race,
Irene rightly muses, are little more than
"silly rot”). But the symbolic and imaginary bankruptcy of "race” as the term
functions or dysfunctions in Passing should not lead us to conclude that Larsen
dismisses the term
a mere social illusion — a mere "nothing” that twentieth
century subjects continue wrongly to invest
"something.” Instead, Larsens
treatments of racial difference aim at its impossibly charged status, the sense in
which racial difference, beyond the fact of its imaginary or symbolic deficien
cies, replete with its own real symptomatology. Another way to put this to
say that regardless of Larsens purpose the effect of her narrative is to reverse
the sort of historicist premise that informs so many approaches to her novel
today: the point about Passing is not simply that racial difference is an histor
ically contingent notion, that certain twentieth-century American subjects cre
ated or inscribed racial difference for the purposes of post-reconstruction
racism. The point, rather, is something like the opposite, that racial difference
is in a way what created or inscribed the twentieth-century American subject.

2.
This to suggest that the sort of antiracist cultural critique for which Wiegman calls (and which she also enacts in sophisticated and illuminating ways),
the fundamental aim of which is to interrupt the axis "between the idea of‘race’
and the ‘black’ body,” falls somewhat short of the challenge Larsen poses in
Passing. For if the racist economies Larsen unveils persist even in the apparent
absence of such a connection, this would imply that the cultural force of "race”
is conceptually resistant to any critical tactic that focuses strictly upon the dubi
ousness of its corporeal transfigurations.
What exactly meant by "race”
the word is used and contested in Pass
ing? Responding to his wife’s self-assured remark ("What would it matter if
... I were one or two percent coloured?”), Bellew exclaims, "Oh, no, Nig. [. ..]
Nothing like that with me. I know you’re no nigger, so it’s all right. You can
get as black as you please as far as I’m concerned, since I know you’re no nig
ger” (171). It is an intriguing formulation. Bellew’s statement would imply
that "nigger” is something that is irreducible to a set of positive physical char
acteristics, though these very characteristics are at the same time what demar
cate whites from blacks. (Again: "I declare she’s gettin’ darker and darker. I
tell her if she don’t look out, she’ll wake up one of these days and find she’s
turned into a nigger.”) That is, one "can get as black as [one] please[s],” as far
as Bellew is concerned, without actually qualifying as "black”; blackness thus
designates a kind of uncanny surplus, what is "in the subject more than the sub
ject itself,” to borrow the Lacanian phrase; and in Passing, racial substance most
often resides here, a kernel of alterity that exceeds the literal characteristics that
designate alterity itself. If one may embody all of the physical qualities associ-
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ated with blackness without actually being black, this means that “black” is that
which bypasses the level of imaginary identification (the level of specularizable
difference by means of which one may liken or differentiate oneself), penetrat
ing to the level of the real, the supposed inner stratum of the subject in his or
her raw authenticity. So when Bellew explains that Clare may become as dark
ly colored
she pleases without actually becoming “coloured,” the corollary of
this logic is that one may appear as “Bly” white as whites themselves without
actually being white. The matrix of corporeal qualities (skin, nose, hair, and so
on) that ostensibly separates whites from blacks functions strictly as pretext
here: what matters for the white-supremacist mentality that Bellew incarnates
and Passing exposes is the phantasmic moment of difference that, since it can
never be confined to a finite set of terms, can never be dispelled.
Such a prospect of an immaterial and yet substantial kernel of racial alteri
ty allows us to see how passing, far from undermining the apparently rigid sys
tem of partitions that appears on the surface level of racist fantasy (in which the
divisions that separate whites from blacks are presented as absolute and imper
meable), actually provides the necessary exception that grounds the white
supremacist logic. If, as Bellew believes, African Americans are not only the
bearers of a particular class of physical characteristics but also the embodiment
and source of a deep social malignancy (as he informs the passing women in his
home, “I read in the papers about them. Always robbing and killing people”
[172]), what, may we imagine, would be Bellew’s response to an African Amer
ican who did not rob and kill? To Bellew’s paranoiac vision of “all blacks” as
those who rob and kill, we may of course add a list of traditional stereotypes:
all blacks are lazy, all blacks are unintelligent, all blacks are possessed of an
excessive sexual drive for which their unhappy social predicament may be
blamed, and so on. The point here is that such lists are, like the physical char
acteristics Clare may display without “really” being black, pure pretext; the log
ical formulae, “Because they steal,” “Because they are lazy,” and “Because they
cannot control their urges” all serve to obscure the fundamental logic: “Because
they are black — because there is a universal something in them that overrides
its own particular expression in theft, violence, or indigence.” If we are to
imagine Bellew — or someone like Bellew — faced with a black subject who
does not exhibit any of these supposedly constant, particular qualities, we can
also easily imagine how he would explain such a phenomenon without relin
quishing his understanding of what blackness entails. His refrain would go
something like this: “Do you see how clever they are? Here we have one who
carefully refrains from criminal activity, who manages to keep his sexual urges
in check, who has learned to sound intelligent. ... In short, here we have a
black who has learned to pass
white!”
It is this paradox of an exception to the universal law, the exception that
rather than undermining actually grounds the law as universally effective, that
Lacan articulated in his mathemes of sexual difference contained in the twen
tieth seminar, Encore. If, as Lacan suggests, all subjects are subject to the uni
versal condition of castration, this maxim nevertheless provides space for “at
least one” subject that is not castrated (what Lacan calls the Name-of-theFather, the master signifier against which all other signifiers appear as lacking
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or "castrated”), so that the universal rule requires some particular instance that
escapes its function.1 Intrinsic to the white-supremacist logic according to
which "all blacks” are x, according to which all black subjects fall under the
dominion of some universal rule or set of rules, is the proviso that "some blacks”
may not exhibit x traits; in order to maintain its epistemological footing in the
face of clear evidence that many blacks are not the embodiment of x, the white
supremacist mindset we are describing must have recourse to a conceptual
frame within which "some blacks” may appear to escape the universal rule con
cerning "all blacks” that defines white supremacy itself. The key point here is
that passing in no way constitutes a threat to racist-essentialist thinking, not
even insofar as it allegedly "deconstructs” the rigidly binarist logic of
white/black; on the contrary, it is only through reference to the possibility of
passing itself that racists can maintain their essentialist convictions in the face
of black subjects who do not fit their paradigm of what "all blacks” must be.
Of definite interest here, moreover, is the way in which this sleight of hand
by means of which the prospect of racial essence is preserved, even once bereft
of its imaginary or symbolic support, is played out within much of the criticism
Larsen’s novel has generated over the past few decades. According to readers
such as Cheryl Wall and Mary Mabel Youman, Passing presents a pair of
women, Irene and Clare, who have paid for their upper-middle class existence
by severing what Irene at one point refers to as "the bonds of race.” 1920s
upper-middle-class affluence is thus diametrically opposed not only to solidar
ity with other African Americans (Irene’s orchestration of tea parties for vari
ous racial uplift organizations does in fact seem hypocritically distanced from
actual political involvement) but also more troublingly to the self-acceptance of
"blackness” itself. Even Deborah McDowell, whose pathbreaking work with
the queer dimensions of Larsen’s narrative distinguishes itself from the more
racially focused readings of other scholars, argues that Larsen "parodies the
manners and morals of the black middle class” with her "descriptions of the
endless tea and cocktail parties, and charity balls [that] capture the sterility and
banality of the bourgeoisie” (xxv). The manners and morals at issue here are
codified as "white” manners and morals, so that Irene’s comfortable lifestyle
may be treated the index of her alienation — or, as McDowell puts it, of the
problem of "racial identity and loyalty” raised by Irene’s genteel existence
(xxvii).2 A sequence from Larsen’s 1928 novel Quicksand provides another case
study for this tendency in Larsen scholarship. When the (also) mulatta, (also)
bourgeois Helga Crane attends a Harlem cabaret in which, Larsen tells us, "the
essence of life seemed bodily motion” (59), her involvement and fascination
with the scene is somehow tinged with a sense of displacement, so that "when
suddenly the music died, [Helga] dragged herself back to the present with
conscious effort; and a shameful certainty that not only had she been in the jun
gle, but that she had enjoyed it, began to taunt her.” For Cheryl Wall, the
severe sense of disjointedness to which Helga succumbs during this sequence
comes about a result of her close encounter with the ethnic Thing she strives
to repress throughout the rest of the novel. For such readers, the repression of
one’s own racial identity becomes the dominant leitmotif of Larsen’s work, as in
Youmans explanation that “Passing, in my opinion, is a novel which shows that
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Blacks can and do lose the spiritual values of Blackness though they remain in
the Black world” (235)
What deserves attention in such readings of Larsen, which formulate sort
of repressive hypothesis concerning upper-middle-class, African-American
subjects who appear detached from the set of desires that are even today often
taken as somehow fundamental to the "authentic” African-American subjective
experience, is the supposition these readings necessarily entail: strictly by virtue
of their racial status — albeit a racial status that is comprised neither by "black”
physical characteristics (since these are a priori ""invisible” in passing novels) nor
allegedly ""black” proclivities (since it is the absence of such proclivities that
itself remarked upon as conspicuous) — African-American subjects are by def
inition "out of joint” within the staid milieu of the bourgeoisie. This supposi
tion carries with it an implicit injunction: in order to ""be black” (that is, in
order to show solidarity with other African Americans, in order to attain the
ideal of self-realization, in order to be ""comfortable with who I am,” and so on),
African-American subjects must not only make certain choices (for instance,
they must choose the cabaret over the tea-party), they must also go the further
step of actually enjoying the "correct” choice. It is not enough simply to go
through ones social ritual in a mechanical, dutiful fashion, since one may
attend the cabaret without really embracing it; rather, one must take the addi
tional step of actually, "really” preferring this cultural ritual over that one. If one
cannot make this psychic turn — if, in spite of going through all of the outward
motions that should signal one’s willingness to embrace some sense of ethnic
belonging, one
nevertheless unable to close one’s sense of distance — this
failure points to the fact that one "still passing”; the inability to enjoy the rit
ual wholeheartedly is indicative of a fundamental betrayal.3
It should come as no surprise that this formula for racial essentialism, one
that draws explicitly upon wider suppositions about the modes of pleasure and
preference proper to racially distinct individuals, extends beyond Larsen’s work
to infiltrate many levels of contemporary culture. Perhaps the most striking
recent instance of the demand that African Americans organize their desires in
particular ways appears as the central trope of George Tillman’s 1997 film Soul
Food, where ethnic cuisine used as the fundamental test of the subject’s self
acceptance. The particular pairing of words that makes up this film’s title is of
course related to the Lacanian motif of sublimation, whereby a random, arbi
trary object ("food”) is elevated to the status of the formless, ineffable Thing
that is the subject as such ("soul”). That is, the degree to which one loves one
self and one’s family
African American is precisely commensurate, in Till
man’s film, with one’s desire for "soul food”; only by renouncing other culinary
styles, or at least subordinating one’s taste for these styles, can the subject prove
his or her solidarity and self-acceptance. Another version of this problematic
is well-known to African-American literary scholars who choose to specialize
in, for example, Victorian or Chaucerian Studies
opposed to (again for
instance) the nineteenth-century slave narrative or postcolonial theory. Often
such scholars may be regarded as unusual exceptions to the universal rule that
all black scholars are postcolonial theorists of the slave narrative, so that the
very existence of such individuals seems to betray a form of deep "identity
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struggle” on their behalf: does not the very fact that here is an African-Amer
ican intellectual who does not show any interest in such areas of inquiry point
to the fact that this individual has already been interpellated into the white
supremacist mindset that privileges George Eliot over Harriet Jacobs? Does
not the fact that this individual has failed not only to choose Jacobs over Eliot
but to do so freely, to prefer wholeheartedly Jacobs to Eliot, indicate the sad
truth that this individual is really ‘passing” — not only to other academics but,
more tragically, to him- or herself?

3.

So — to return to our earlier concern — while Butler’s tendency is to invest
pleasure, and especially the sort of spontaneous pleasure she associates with par
odic laughter,
a form of unregulated affect that provides our surest resistance
against the normative prescriptions of race, gender, and so on, I would point out
that in many cases, the very “authentic” pleasure of the subject who would resist
his or her normative, paradigmatic role is already the projection par excellence
of this role, already well within the horizon of the normative paradigm to which
this subject is already submitted. On the view I offer, we cannot extract the
subject in his or her authenticity through reference to this subject’s apparently
genuine experience of pleasure because even at this innermost level of the sub
ject’s self-experience, the subject’s psychic interiority is already co-opted and
reduced by external socio-symbolic forces. This, moreover, is what Lacan aims
at with his insistence that “Desire is desire of the Other” (Seminar XI235): the
same internal, private desire to which we might appeal in order to extract the
subject from his or her suffocating, publicly induced, socio-symbolic role in
fact already the extenuation of this role, such that the opposition of surface and
depth that seems to inform so much of the criticism Passing generates finally
becomes impossible to maintain.
This is to say that the public level of socio-symbolic exchange and
encounter intrudes upon the psychic interiority of the subject of Passing, and to
such an extent that this intrusion provides the fundamental scheme for the
novel’s narrative process. Toward the end of Passing, the collapse of boundaries
between private desire and public happenstance follows a pattern of wish-ful
fillment, wherein Irene’s internal drives are realized through the activities of
others, actuated in the public space — but apparently without her explicit con
sent. After arriving at the conclusion that Clare has been carrying on an affair
with Irene’s husband, Brian, Irene suddenly realizes “how easily she could put
Clare out of her fife! She had only to tell John Bellew — No. Not that!” If
Bellew were to stumble upon the fact that Clare is in fact a passing “Negro,”
Irene concludes, “[i]t would be enough to rid her forever of Clare Kendry”
(225). Irene, however, immediately abandons this plan, unable to muster the
resolve necessary to inform Bellew of Clare’s secret identity — but sure enough,
“[a]s if in answer to her wish,” Larsen tells us, the very next scene of Passing
brings Irene face to face with John Bellew, whom she meets in a chance
encounter on the streets of downtown Manhattan. During this second meet
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ing with Bellew, Irene is literally “linked,” arm in arm, with her friend Felise
Freeland, an African American whose skin too dark to allow her to pass, and
so Irene does not have to say a word in order for Bellew to conclude that his
wife, as well as Irene Redfield, consorts with “Negroes” and hence (according to
the string of associations that apparently structures Bellew’s logic) may well be
black herself.
Since her earlier hopes are now reached through an unplanned encounter,
and further, since they are realized not by Irene herself but chiefly by virtue of
the paranoid associations of Bellew (who apparently believes that mere contact
with African Americans indicates one’s identification with African Americans),
Irene is spared having to confront the fact that she herself has been psychically
complicit in this disclosure of Clare’s secret; she able, in other words, to dis
avow her own previous desire for such a meeting with Bellew, since she herself
did nothing to orchestrate this meeting. The denouement of Passing, moreover,
follows a similar trajectory of disavowal and wish-fulfillment. After realizing
that Bellew’s discovery of Clare’s identity will probably cause him simply to
divorce his wife (as in the contemporaneous case of “Kip” Rhinelander, who was
granted a divorce in New York State after the revelation of his wife’s AfricanAmerican status) and hence free the latter to pursue a relationship with Brian,
Irene now concludes she would be happiest if Clare would simply die. Once
again, Irene immediately represses this traumatic wish (“Oh, it was vile!” she
thinks, “To think, yes, to wish that!” [228]), and once again, the disavowal of
the wish immediately precedes the wish’s chance realization; in the closing
pages of the novel, Clare falls from a sixth-story window, apparently in response
to her husband’s denunciation of her as “a nigger, a damned dirty nigger!”
(238).4
All of this is not simply intended as an digression into the question of
Irene’s level of responsibility for Clare’s social and literal downfall, for the ques
tions of accountability at play in both of these mysterious sequences finally
intersect with the problems of identity and agency intrinsic to passing itself.
Who, after all, passes in Passing? When Clare or Irene passes, she never does
so by means of a direct proclamation of whiteness; rather, it is the network of
communally held, socially circulated assumptions, assumptions grounded in a
model of Caucasian normativity, that does the passing for both women, that
generates the fiction that each woman then only inhabits — into which she
simply passes. Is passing equivalent to lying? If so, it is the sort of lie from
which the subject retains a definite distance, a “lie” that initiates and sustains
itself quite apart from the passing subject’s overt efforts at deception. In this
sense, passing of a piece with the sort of lie at issue in Freud’s famous joke
concerning the two Jews — First Jew: “I’m going to Cracow.” Second Jew:
“Liar! Why do you tell me you’re going to Cracow so that I’ll think you’re
going to Lvov? You, in fact, are going to Cracow!” (Jokes 115; see also Lacan,
Écrits 173).
The lesson Lacan extrapolates from Freud’s joke that while many animals
can deceive, human beings are the animals that can lie by telling the truth, who
can formulate “lies” strictly in light of the Other’s unwillingness to see the truth
even and perhaps especially when it
hidden in plain sight. Larsen’s acute
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understanding of the logic behind Freud’s joke imbues every page of Passing,
where passing mainly occurs at the level of the Other’s myopic failure to see
blackness except as an aberration of norms. It is in the spirit of this joke, more
over, that Larsen invites us to laugh alongside Irene and Clare as the latter asks
her husband, “My goodness, Jack! What difference would it make if, after all
these years, you were to find out that I was one or two percent coloured?”
To speak of this dynamic
a form of subversive performance obscures the
sense in which passing only acquires its performative status against the backdrop of primarily repressive presuppositions and prerogatives; the day-to-day
activities of a subject only become a form of passing once enclosed within a
conceptual space that overdetermines these activities as inherently transgres
sive. This why Irene, who later admits to occasional passing “for the sake of
convenience” (227) and whom we witness in the act of passing on at least two
occasions, nevertheless distances herself from the act itself. “Tell me, honest
ly,” Clare asks, “haven’t you ever thought of passing’?” Irene responds, “No.
Why should I?” (160). Irene’s response does not, as we might initially think,
twist the truth so very far indeed, since one need not premeditate or even think
of one’s own passing in order actually to pass; passing, rather, occurs by its own
volition, is already underway prior to the passing subject’s apprehension. “It’s
funny about passing,”’ Irene later comments. “We disapprove of it and at the
same time condone it. It excites our contempt and yet we rather admire it. We
shy away from it with an odd kind of revulsion, but we protect it” (186). Like
racial difference itself, passing extends from a point beyond the words the sub
ject speaks, prior to the images he or she embodies, emerges from a place past
the reaches of these considerations, where contempt, revulsion, and fascination
merge into one another. “A thing that couldn’t be registered,” indeed.

Notes
1. See Lacan, Seminar XX 78-80: “through the phallic function . . . man
as a whole acquires his inscription, with the proviso that this function is limit
ed due to the existence of an x by means of which the function Φx [Lacan’s
matheme for castration] is negated” (79).
2. Other readers who follow the trajectory I describe here, by means of
which Irene and/or Clare are viewed subjects who actively efface some extant
dimension of racial/ethnic “identity” through the cultural alignments they
assume, include Davis, whose critical biography of Larsen explains that Irene’s
attraction for Clare should be read
an “aesthetic attraction to whiteness” that
we should understand as a “logical extension of her bourgeoisie lifestyle and
ideology” (306), and Sullivan, who contends that “Irene passes’ not by adopt
ing a white identity
Clare does, but by adopting white values, including
white standards of beauty” (374). Last, I might mention that by interrogating
the formal logic these readings seem to embrace, I do not mean to deny the
possibility that Irene is indeed invested in some form of racial distancing
throughout Passing. Rather, what I am trying to underline here is simply that
signifiers of affluence and blackness need not exist in an antithetical relation
ship.
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3. The implicit injunction at issue here is thus a version of what Lacan
refers to as the superegoic demand. As Lacan stressed over and over again,
superego and law are not equivalent, since while the law insists that the subject
must curtail his or her enjoyment (and thus tacitly incites transgression), the
superego issues the very opposite commandment: “Enjoy!” Superego, Lacan
explains, emerges out of the blind spots of the law, the places at which “the law
is entirely reduced to something, which cannot even be expressed, like the You
must, which is speech deprived of all its meaning” (Seminar I 102). In the con
ceptual framework of Larsens novels, we can see how the superegotistical
injunction to enjoy can be infinitely more oppressive than mere prohibition.
How, after all, can the subject obey such a demand? Often, he or she simply
cannot; for Helga Crane, who cannot unproblematically enjoy herself at the
cabaret, the failure to respond correctly to stimuli that “should” (according to
readers such as Wall and Youman) provide pleasure and satisfaction produces a
very particular, poisonous form of guilt, the guilt of a subject whose very failure
to enjoy must indicate a deeper loathing of the values that supposedly comprise
his or her core being as subject. On the superegotistical injunction to enjoy, see
Lacan, Ecrits 256. For more detailed analyses of the split between law and
superego, see Žižek, Metastases 54-85 and Plague 113-7.
4. Almost all Larsen scholars have focused upon this final sequence in an
attempt to solve the plot-level mystery it seems to present. Irene herself, after
all, standing closest to Clare when the latter falls, and so the narrative raises
the possibility that Irene, and not Bellew or Clare herself, is the actual agent
behind this catastrophe. Indeed, Irene herself appears on the verge of such a
conclusion in the novel’s final moments; apparently suffering from a form of
amnesia as she tries to sort through the events immediately prior to Clare’s
death, Irene nevertheless recalls “the image of her hand on Irene’s arm” (239),
a memory that costs her the realization that she herself may have pushed Clare
from the open window. But since the novel simply does not supply its reader
with the factual information required to reach this conclusion, it is helpful here
to refer, once again, to Lacan’s distinction between reality and the real. Accord
ing to Lacan, even when a husband who suffers from the delusion that his wife
unfaithful discovers that his wife has indeed been carrying on a series of
affairs, the reality of his wife’s indiscretions in no way changes the fact that the
husband is a paranoid delusional. In such an instance, Lacan tells us, “reality”
renders itself as projection or symptom of the real, the real as condensed in
the husband’s paranoid delusions of his cheating wife (which, we can well
imagine, would persist even if his wife were utterly faithful). For this reason,
Lacan stipulates in his eleventh seminar that “the unconscious is outside”; the
unconscious, in other words, does not end at the periphery of internal, purely
psychic associations and fixations. Rather, it is bound up with the material real
ity of the world that surrounds us, infiltrating the sphere of social relations
itself. Mutatis mutandis, our final assessments of Irene’s role during this scene
should not depend upon whether or not she herself actually pushes Clare from
the sixth-story window, for the fact is that, whoever initiated Clare’s fall, Irene
herself is responsible for having desired this fall; the entire sequence, like the
earlier sequence during which Bellew accidentally discovers his wife’s African-
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American status, should be read as the public rendition of Irene’s private
desires, and hence as an illustration of reality’s symptomatic relation to the real.
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"White was a colored man,” or so claims a Jewish
pawnbroker in the late-nineteeenth-century novel As
It Was Written: A Jewish Musicians Story (1885), in
which the colored man named White never actually
appears (176). The pawnbroker even implies that
White’s name and address may be falsified. Howev
White is instrumental in enabling the highly com
plex plot to unfold plausibly.
In a crucial
extradiegetic event, White hocks the legacy of the
novel’s protagonist, Ernest Neuman. This legacy, a
miniature portrait and an ornamented wooden box
with a secret compartment containing a message
from Neuman’s dead father, is later recovered by
Neuman and his gentile friend Merivale through a
circuitous series of apparently fortuitous occurrences.
The message contains a gruesome curse forbidding
Neuman to marry and commanding him to murder
his father’s former best friend in retribution for hav
ing defiled Neuman’s late mother. This leads Neu
man to discover the horrifying truth about his
fiancée’s murder, which has occurred earlier in the
narrative.
White’s offstage yet instrumental anonymity in
this novel is comparable to his creator’s position in
both traditional and revisionist accounts of American
literary history. Henry Harland wrote As It Was
Written under the Jewish pseudonym of Sidney
Luska. He would write several other novels under
this pseudonym before moving to England and join
ing fin-de-siècle bohemian culture as founding editor
of The Yellow Book. He spent the final years of his
short life living off the royalties of his highly popular
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novel, The Cardinal's Snuffbox, which, like all his later novels, substitutes Euro
pean aristocracy for American Jewry By this time he had become crankily antiSemitic, and before his death he converted to Roman Catholicism.
Clearly Harland was never quite comfortable with who he was; standard
biographical sources on him all conflict. Who Who 1899 has his birthplace as
St. Petersburg, Russia; the Dictionary ofNational Biography claims he was born
in New York City; The Oxford Companion to American Literature has him born
in Russia to American parents; and Louis Harap, in his study of The Image of
the Jew in American Literature, says Harland was born in Norwich, Connecticut
(455). Harland once claimed he was the illegitimate son of Emperor Franz
Josef; he also tried to attain an English baronetcy by tracing his lineage to the
Harlands of Sprague Hall. One must agree with Leslie Fiedler’s appraisal:

Henry Harland was above all else an inveterate poseur, a liar who lied for
his soul’s sake, and the ordinary biographical sources are likely to contain
whatever fabrication suited his view of himself at the moment he was asked
for information.
(24)
Though he concedes that Harland’s life was “a success story in the end: from
Rags to Riches, from Ethical Culture on the East Side to Roman Catholicism
on the Riviera,” Fiedler affirms that Harland’s origins were “to his everlasting
regret, more prosaic than he could tolerate.”
Judging by the pattern of Harland’s lies, we can see that “prosaic” here
means without heritage, aristocratic or ethnic, and it is the great irony of Har
land’s career that this need for a past would make him something of a forgot
ten father of American ethnic literature. This literary historical joke is not lost
on Fiedler, who feels that “there is an appropriate irony in the fact that the first
Jewish-American novelist was not a Jew at all, or that, more precisely, he was a
creation of his own fiction, an imaginary Jew” (24). Yet Fiedler maintains “a
vestigial doubt. .. that Luska/Harland may, after all, have been a Jew pretend
ing to be a Gentile pretending to be a Jew.” Is Fiedler really relishing this “best
joke of all,” a final subterfuge to sabotage all attempts at fixing authorial iden
tity, or he masking a secret hope that, after all, the author of the first JewishAmerican novel really was an American Jew?
Fiedler’s ambivalent appraisal registers a contradiction at the very heart of
the modern concept of ethnicity that is foregrounded by figures such as
Luska/Harland. On the one hand, ethnic transvestism would seem to confirm
the permeable boundaries and social constructedness of American ethnic iden
tity. Thus Fiedler can celebrate Harland’s charade as a paradigmatic expression
of the American Dream. On the other hand, some sort of palpable descent
relation seems necessary if the ethnic category is to have any viability at all.
Thus Fiedler concludes his discussion with a doubt (or a hope) that Harland
really was a Jew. Ethnic transvestism would seem to render Werner Sollors’
dramatic conflict between “consent and descent” as a logical contradiction at
the very core of American ethnic identity.1
Significantly, Harland never appears in what is possibly the most promi
nent recent discussion of ethnic literary transvestism in the United States,
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Henry Louis Gates’s 1991 article, “Authenticity/ or the Lesson of Little Tree.”
Claiming that “our literary judgements . . . remain hostage to the ideology of
authenticity,” Gates accuses us of identifying authorial legitimacy with biolog
ical identity in our struggles over the literary canon (1). In a move reminiscent
of Sollors, Gates prods his readers to acknowledge the “distasteful truth . . .
[that], like it or not, all writers are cultural impersonators’”; in fact, “even real
people . . . are never quite real” (28).
The category of the literary allows Gates to make the logical leap from Lit
tle Tree to literally everyone. The figure of the writer provides him with the
mediating mechanism whereby he can generalize from an extremely small social
group — American writers who masquerade as members of ethnic communi
ties — to the entire human population of “real people.” By such a logic, liter
ary impersonation is liberatory:

[O]ur histories, individual and collective, do affect what we wish to write
and what we are able to write. But that relation is never one of fixed deter
minism. No human culture is inaccessible to someone who makes the
effort to understand, to learn, to inhabit another world.
(30)
For Gates, writing literally enables us to wrest a realm of freedom from a realm
of necessity. If you make the effort, you can, through writing, be anyone you
want to be.
Gates’s rhetoric in this piece references a lengthy tradition in American cul
tural and political thought that envisions writing and print in liberatory terms.
From the Enlightenment ideal of democratic access to a public sphere of print,
to the drama of literacy and liberation in the nineteenth-century AfricanAmerican slave narrative, to the centrality of higher education and literary
vocation in twentieth-century narratives of immigrant mobility, mastering
written language and getting into print have remained both avenues to and
signs of the achievement of America’s many political promises. And although
Gates himself has been a key player in recent efforts to complicate and chal
lenge these literary-political equations — which are so much more frequently
honored in the breach than in the observance — his investments
an acade
mic scholar and public intellectual reveal their continuing appeal.2
As It Was Written, as its title implies, constructs a relation between literature
and liberation that runs completely counter to the tradition that Gates’s article
references, and I offer it as documenting the historical repressed of his claims.
This novel, written by a compulsive cultural impersonator, nevertheless repre
sents writing and creative endeavor the conduit through which “our histories”
exert a tyrannical power over the present. If Harland’s choice of an ethnic pseu
donym seems to support Gates’s claims for authorial freedom, the role of artis
tic production in As It Was Written contradicts these claims. In its persistent
staging of creative automatism, psychic possession, and prophetic fiat, the novel
refigures authorial agency as a form of enslavement and thus reveals some of the
historical necessities that haunt the ideology of literary freedom under Ameri
can capitalism.
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On the surface, then, As It Was Written exhibits a contradictory relation
between text and context: the novel’s plot figures ethnic identity in terms of
unalterable descent relations, whereas its authorship reveals ethnic identity as a
matter of choice. In the following analysis, I will identify correspondences
between the novel’s structure and its marketplace that render this contradiction
historically intelligible. These correspondences reveal that it not a coinci
dence that the ethnic American narrative emerges in the same era as what pub
lisher Henry Holt famously called “the commercialization of literature.” The
dilemmas of agency, subjectivity, and identity staged within the narrative of As
It Was Written closely mirror contemporary anxieties about the fate of reading
and writing in the emergent mass marketplace. These correspondences
between the drama of identity
it is represented in the ethnic narrative and
the drama of author/audience relations forming the historical context of that
narrative reveal more broadly that ethnicity as a literary formation in America
must be understood in dialectical relation to the conditions of the print mar
ketplace at the time of its emergence.

Mediums and Melodramas

The formidable complexity of this novel’s plot requires some initial exposition.
As It Was Written is narrated by its protagonist, Ernest Neuman, a GermanJewish musician living in New York City. At the opening of the novel, Neu
man falls in love with and becomes engaged to Veronica Pathzuol, a Jewish
singer. Before they can be married, Veronika is brutally murdered and Neuman
is charged with the crime. Since no motive can be determined, Neuman
acquitted, after which he gives up his musical career and becomes a waiter. He
then meets a young gentile named Daniel Merivale, with whom he discovers
the written legacy from Neuman’s father that explains Veronika’s murder. Neu
man’s father writes that his entire family line is under a curse forcing each hus
band to murder his unfaithful wife, and that Neuman’s own mother had been
unfaithful with Veronika’s father. In the end, Neuman discovers that he did
himself murder his fiancée while under psychic possession by the ghost of his
father.
Thus we see that, in As It Was Written, the artist is always in thrall to some
agency beyond his control. Furthermore, the medium of artistic expression
becomes a conduit through which this agency exercises its dominion. The
novel subtitled A Jewish Musicians Story, and the relationship of the musician
to his music repeatedly figures for the relationship between the narrator and his
narrative and between the individual and his past. Neuman meets his fiancée
through music, when he hears her singing
he strolls the streets of New York
City. She and her uncle invite him in, immediately recognize him
a Jewish
musician like themselves, and demand that he play the violin for them. Already
half in love with Veronika, Neuman nervously acquiesces:
I played as best I could. Rather, the music played itself. With a violin
under my chin, I lapse into semi-consciousness, lose my identity. Another
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spirit impels my arm, pouring itself out through the voice of my instru
ment. Not until silence is restored do I realize that I have been the per
former. While the music is going on my personality is annihilated.
(9)
Music plays itself through the passive medium of Neumans body. The almost
awkwardly foregrounded shifts in predication grammatically signal this mediumistic relations centrality to the narrative. The deceptively simple inversion of
“I played” to “the music played itself” immediately gets complicated by the
equivocations and qualifications of the passage that follows, in which pronouns,
instruments, body parts, and spirits vie for position as subject and object of the
ambiguous performance.
The many similar scenes of musical performance in the novel foreground
the problem of agency relative to writing partly because of the functional dif
ferences between the musical score and the verbal narrative. Audiences at
musical performances don’t normally read the musical score; classical musicians
usually don’t compose the music they play. With writing, particularly with
blood-and-thunder thrillers such as As It Was Written, these relations seem less
obliquely mediated: we read the same words the author wrote and there is no
“performer” wedged in between. On the other hand, music, in its apparent
transcendence of linguistic difference and in its immediate communication at
the moment of performance, can figure as the “purer” medium. Thus Neuman
makes the conventional claim that music is superior to words when it comes to
representing love:
I am not accustomed to expressing such matters in words, but with my vio
lin I should have no sort of difficulty. If I wanted to give utterance to my
idea of Veronika, all I should have to do would be to take my violin and play
this heavenly melody from Chopin’s Impromptu in C-sharp minor.
(21)
The very choice of an “Impromptu” — a piece composed to sound improvised
— indicates once again problems of agency and intention. And the actual score
of the piece follows, illustrating both the disjunctions and the overlaps between
literary and musical notation and expression in the novel.3
Harland’s use of different media to foreground problems of authorial
agency frames how the relation between inherited and acquired experience con
stitutes ethnic identity in As It Was Written. Directly after printing the musical
score in order to compensate for his inability to describe his betrothed in words,
Neuman describes her anyway:

A mystery that would neither be defined nor penetrated nor ignored,
brooded over her, as the perfume broods over the rose. I doubt whether an
American woman can be like this unless she is older and has had certain
experiences of her own. Veronika had not had sufficient experience of her
own to account for what I have described; but she was a Jewess, and all the
experience of the Jewish race, all the martyrdom of the scattered hosts, were
hers by inheritance.
(23-4)
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The convenient paradox of maintaining innocence through the generational
transmission of certain experiences” parallels the drama of creative agency in
this text; the sources of Veronika’s sexuality are as attenuated as the agency
behind Neumans musicianship. Both characters are “possessed.”
Thus it not surprising that they become obsessed with the agency behind
their betrothal:
“I do believe God’s hand was in it! I do believe it was all pre-ordained in
heaven. I believe our Guardian Angel prompted me to speak and you to
answer. It can’t be that we, who were made for each other, were left to find
out by a mere perilous chance — it isn’t credible.”
(36)

Here the ambiguities of aesthetic agency and ethnic identity in the novel are
framed in the broadest cosmological terms: “God’s hand” versus “perilous
chance.” However, Neuman’s faith in his love’s preordination gets put to the
test by Veronika’s unexpected murder, the memory of which dictates the the
matic anxieties and formal peculiarities of the novel. Chapter two ends with
the following paragraph: “While writing the above I had almost forgotten.
Now I remember. I must stop for a space to get used to remembering again that
she dead” (30). And chapter three provocatively opens:
Yes, she is dead. That is the truth. If truth is good,
men proclaim it to
be, then goodness intrinsically cruel. That Veronika is dead is the truth
which lies like a hot coal upon my consciousness, and goads me along as I
tell this tale. And the manner of her death and the speediness of it — I
must tell all.
(31)

Thus the entire novel has a compulsive confessional structure that lends dra
matic force to the eventual discovery of Neuman’s enthrallment to his past.
When Neuman is arrested and indicted
Veronika’s murderer, he goes
through the motions of his trial “ passively
an automaton” (52). His
automatism hasn’t affected his memory, however, since “stolid, indifferent, and
inattentive as I was, every detail of the trial is stamped upon my memory in
indelible hues. Here is the story of it” (58). Ceding his agency this time to the
law, Neuman himself becomes the conduit through which the trial comes to us.
Thus the trial again stages his thralldom, which ironically vindicates him in the
end since the prosecution is unable to establish a motive for the crime. His
lawyer, Epstein, confirms that “his defense must necessarily be of a passive, not
of an active, kind” (74).
After his acquittal, Neuman takes on his mother’s maiden name of “Lexow”
and starts another life a waiter in a German wine-shop. It is at this shop two
years later that Merivale, a chain-smoking aesthete clearly based on Harland
himself, enters Neuman’s life. And it is Merivale who, upon meeting Neuman,
preaches the novel’s assimilationist creed:
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“There is no American people — or rather there are twenty peoples — the
Irish, the German, the Jewish, the English, and the Negro elements — all
existing independently at the same time, and each
truly American as any
of the others. Good! But in the future, after emigration has ceased, these
elements will begin to amalgamate. A single people of homogenous blood
will be the consequence. ... [I]t is the Jewish element which will leaven the
whole lump — color the whole mixture. The English element alone is, so
to speak, one portion of pure water; the German element, one portion of
eau sucrée; now add the Jewish — it is a dose of strong red wine. It will
give fire and flavor to the decoction. The future Americans, thanks to the
Jew in them, will have passions, enthusiasms. They will paint great pic
tures, compose great music, write great poems . . ”
(105-6)

Thus Harland anticipates Zangwill’s “melting pot” with his own alimentary
metaphor, juxtaposing figurative bread and wine with literal works of great art.
Merivale’s prophecy raises the stakes of the plot, as Neumans own aesthetic
vocation takes on national significance.
Merivale’s peculiar metaphor also registers a link between aesthetics and
intoxication, as the “strong wine” of Jewish blood translates into American pic
tures, music, and poems. His erotically charged relationship to Neuman con
firms this association. When Merivale doesn’t show up at the shop, Neuman
feels “like an opium eater deprived of his daily portion”; when Merivale does
arrive, “he consumed cigarette after cigarette and read his paper through to the
very advertisements on the last page” (108). Chemical dependency and erotic
infatuation rhetorically inform the friendship, and when Merivale persuades
Neuman to play the violin for the first time since before Veronika’s death, he
acts as both seducer and pusher. Neuman resists, but then feels “an irresistible
temptation to continue.” Once again he loses “possession” of himself, claiming,
“I had no power to restrain the motion of my arm and lay the violin aside”
(120). He then performs maniacally, listening “to the music precisely as though
it had been played by another person” (121). Deeply moved by the perfor
mance, Merivale promptly insists that Neuman move in as his private secretary,
since his own unfortunate combination of “scrivener’s palsy and gout” prevents
him from writing down his poetry. Thus Neuman again cedes his creative
agency, this time as Merivale’s amanuensis.
In fact, Merivale completely dictates the events that follow. He tells the
wine-shop proprietor that Neuman won’t be returning to work. He then
maneuvers a position for him as soloist in a prestigious orchestra and badgers
him into taking it against his protestations. This brief career opportunity
shattered when Neuman sees Veronika’s uncle, Mr. Tikulski, in the orchestra
and faints in the middle of his solo. It is Tikulski who directs Neuman to the
pawnshop, where Merivale negotiates with the Jewish pawnbroker for the lega
cy, hocked many years ago by the colored man named White, that apparently
will clear up the mysteries of Neuman’s past.
The episode of the legacy’s retrieval relates Neuman’s problems with agency
to correlative ambiguities around the status of objects in the text. Tikulski
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sends Neuman a “miniature painted on ivory, the likeness of a man,” but Neu
man does not recognize the portrait, or understand why Tikulksi, who found it
at a pawnshop, would consider it his “family memento” (159). It is only when
Merivale holds up the miniature next to a pocket mirror that Neuman realizes
that, “as closely it is possible for one human countenance to resemble anoth
er, the face of the picture resembled my reflection in the glass” (161). The
return of the legacy stages the uncanniness of objects in the narrative; the pro
found resemblance between the portrait and the reflection legitimates Tikulski’s return of the lost object and inaugurates the return of Neuman’s repressed
past. And this return will also clear up the mystery of the murder that inaugu
rated the entire narrative.
Merivale and Neuman go to the pawnshop where Tikulski acquired the
miniature portrait, and there discover the box with the hidden compartment to
which I have alluded earlier. Neuman, an orphan, has been told of such a box
by the rabbi who raised him, but he is at first unconvinced of the box’s authen
ticity, avowing that it could not be “the box” associated with his past since, as
Merivale, who paid five dollars for it, apparently affirms, it “appears to have
been designed
a cheapish jewel-case, now in the last stages of decrepitude”
(181). But Merivale is only baiting Neuman; he promptly avers that he has
seen “the very duplicate” of this box in France, and that it is “a specimen of
cinque-cento” (182). Thus what at first appeared to be an arbitrary object of
little value ends up being the box, and well worth five dollars. And this abrupt
shift in exchange value inheres in the age of the object, its possession of a ven
erable European past.
Neuman’s own Old-World past is concealed in the box’s secret compart
ment, which Merivale also reveals. The compartment contains the note from
Neuman’s father. Ernest Neuman, Sr. begins by ceding to God the power to
insure that the letter is delivered, and confirms his Jewish faith through using
the Hebrew abbreviation (") for the Deity’s name:

" has promised it. He will render this writing indelible, this paper inde
structible. He will guide this to you, even He guides the river to the sea,
the star to the zenith. Blessed be the name of " forever.
(188)
The letter continues in an exalted Old Testament register of prophecy, prohibi
tion, and punishment:

In the fourth generation back of me our ancestor was betrayed by the wife
of his choice. So great was his hatred of her on this account, that he wished
his seed, contaminated as it was by having taken root in her womb, to
become extinct. Therefore he forbade his son to marry. And to this prohi
bition he attached a penalty. If, in defiance of his wish, his son should take
unto himself a woman, then should he too taste the bitterness of infidelity
within the household, then should he too be betrayed and dishonored by
his wife. And this penalty he made to extend to the seventh and eighth
generations. Whosoever of his progeny should enter into the wedded state
should enter by the same step into the antechamber of hell.
(190-1)
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The prophecy somewhat paradoxically depends upon the violation of the pro
hibition, since only the matrimony that forbidden by the curse can carry the
family into the “seventh and eighth generations” that include Neuman himself.
The cross purposes of the father’s rhetoric generate a sort of accelerating hys
teria, as he gradually moves from sententiousness to sensationalism:

Find my enemy out and put him to death.... Do not strike him down with
one blow. Torture him to death, pluck his flesh from his bones shred by
shred. . . . [V]isit the penalty of his sin upon his children and his childrens
children. For has not ” decreed that the sins of the fathers shall be visited
upon the children even unto the third and fourth generations. . . . [T]he
race of Nicholas must be exterminated, obliterated from the face of the
earth. . . . Empty his blood upon the sand as you would the blood of a
swine.... And think ... “At each thrust of my knife into our enemy’s flesh,
the heart of my father leaps with satisfaction. At each scream that escapes
from our enemy’s throat, the voice of my father waxes great with joy.”
(204-5)
The letter proceeds at such a frantic pace that the father even admonishes his
son to “pause for a space and pray that the breath of God may make strong your
heart” (203).
Neuman Sr. seals his grisly command with the threat that “[i]f you hesitate
. . . my spirit will possess your body and do what must be done in spite of your
hesitation” (207). Below the signature appears postscript that the dying father
wrote after rereading his letter: “I have omitted to mention his [Nicholas’] foil
name. His name is Nicholas Pathzuol” (208). Thus Neuman finally discovers
that his fiancée was the daughter of his mother’s defiler, and the letter’s con
trived withholding of this fact, along with its frenzied pace, replicates the
emplotment of the entire narrative, which insistently both defers and hurries
toward explaining the murder with which it opens.
But Neuman still can’t quite figure it out. He admits to Merivale that “this
strange combination of facts must have some awful meaning,” but this meaning
continuously “escapes and eludes” him (215). According to Merivale, this is
because “your problem has no solution, none because it is not a true problem,
but merely a fortuitous arrangement of circumstances which chances to bear a
superficial resemblance to one.” Thus Merivale succinctly states the philo
sophical problem posed by the novel. Is Neuman’s fate sealed from the begin
ning by. the ineradicable force of an Old World, Old Testament prophecy, or
has he just stumbled upon a random set of circumstances that maddeningly
resemble predestination but are actually mutable and escapable? Is ethnicity
determined by blood ties that cannot be severed or by contingent socio-historical conditions that can be changed or avoided? And finally, are narratives
channeled through authors by mysterious supernatural agencies, or are they
freely composed by autonomous artists?
The answer to the last question provides the answer to the first two, as
Neuman finally puts the pieces together through automatic writing. He plays
his violin for Merivale and once again enters into a trance-like state, perform-
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ing an extended and emotionally overwrought piece that neither can identify.
Neuman sits down to write out the score, gradually becoming “so much inter
ested in what I was doing that my hand sped across the paper like a machine
performing the regular function for which it was contrived” (240). He finds
that his “hand was forging along faster than my thought could dictate, in appar
ent obedience to an independent will of its own” (241). When he finishes, the
two men discover that “the last half dozen pages were covered with written
words — blotted, scrawling, scarcely decipherable, but unmistakably written
words” (243). The final chapter consists of these written words, which narrate
how Neuman murdered his fiancée while in a trance, apparently possessed by
the spirit of his father. With this recovered memory, the novel completes its
detective-story circuit, revealing the event in the past whose concealment has
pushed the narrative forward into the future.

Choosing the Past

Henry Harland decided to publish As It Was Written under the pseudonym of
Sidney Luska in order to secure a market for his unusual creation. Harland
wrote to his mentor, Wall Street banker and literary dilettante Edmund
Clarence Stedman, that “with a Jewish name on the title page, the sale of the
book would be vastly increased. I believe lots of Jews would buy it for that rea
son, if for no other — for the sake of seeing what New York can produce in the
way of a truly Jewish story” (quoted in Beckson 28).4 Harland significantly
neglects to consider the content of his narrative in this note. Rather, he for
mulates the pseudonym as a promotional device, correlatively situating New
York’s Jewish population
an untapped reservoir of consumers.
And the promotion worked. The Jewish Messenger applauded the novel,
affirming that “to Sidney Luska we owe a debt of gratitude for charming us
with a powerfill story, and at the same time contributing more powerfully than
could sermons and editorials to the better appreciation of the genius of
Judaism” (5). This “debt” translated into sales of 50,000 copies, a considerable
success for a first novel at that time (Beckson 25). Luska was so successfill that,
when his true identity was discovered, Harland’s novels for a time continued to
include the pseudonym in parentheses in order to boost sales.
However, if Harland managed to get away with his authorial impersonation
with As It Was Written (although the reviewer for The New York Times admitted
some suspicion), he was less successful in selfing the originality of the novel
itself. A number of reviewers felt that he had borrowed his style and ideas from
Hugh Conway’s highly popular earlier novel, Called Back. The Dial was thus
backhanded in its praise:
It is perhaps even more direct and forcible than “Called Back,” and the
introduction of the impossible solution of its mystery is delayed until the
very close, or until the reader’s interest is folly awakened by legitimate
means. Then comes the strictly illegitimate explanation, and the reader is
justly indignant at being made the victim of so miserable a trick — unless,
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indeed, the general tone of what has gone before has led him to suspect
something of the sort. It need not be said that this sort of stuff is unde
serving of the name of literature.
(182)

To deny a novel “the name of literature” is to relegate it to the realm of genre
fiction and mass culture, and this reviewer’s account of his reading experience
in fact mirrors other reports of As It Was Written's frenzied pace, as well
its
peculiarly contrived combination of mystery and predictability. The suspicion
that Luska/Harland was imitating a prior pulp novel reinforces this cultural
distinction, since genre fiction is assumed to consist in the quasi-mechanical
repetition of formulaic tropes and plot devices.
Thus both the formulaic structure and the pseudonymous authorship of As
It Was Written can be understood in terms of market exigencies. In fact, it
worth noting that As It Was Written appeared on the eve of a “revolution” in
publishing that Henry Holt would dub “the commercialization of literature.”
As publishing historians Charles Madison and John Tebbel both affirm, during
the decades surrounding the turn of the century, the forces of corporate finance
capital increasingly penetrated the genteel American publishing industry. This
penetration would have two consequences that are pertinent to As It Was Writ
ten. On one hand, the promotion of authorial personality became closely inte
grated into the marketing of books. Public authorial readings and interviews
became established institutions during these years, and a star system of Amer
ican authors gradually emerged as part of the growing literary marketplace. As
Daniel Borus affirms, “[b]ook advertising, literary gossip columns, publicity
tours, and interviews all pointed toward the creation of a glamorous person,
person whose life had aspects that were admirable or capable of being envied”
(118). Borus contends that such promotional strategies were designed to foster
a species of “brand-name loyalty among readers” in the increasingly competitive
American literary marketplace. Harland’s invention of a Jewish pseudonym as
a sales ploy clearly coincides with this increasing concern for the advertisement
value of authorial personality more generally.
On the other hand, custodians of culture became increasingly anxious about
what Henry Dwight Sedgewick called “The Mob Spirit in Literature,” the ten
dency for readers to display a “haste to get at the plot, to assimilate experience,
to devour the story, the irritation of suspense” (11). This was also the era when,
as Lawrence Levine has shown, a cleavage emerged between highbrow and
lowbrow literature and culture, and it clear from the reviews that Harland’s
novel was unanimously understood to appeal to lowbrow tastes. Its sensation
al subject matter and suspenseful structure both marked its appeal to this “mob
spirit.”
Within the context of these emergent transformations in the structure of
the American literary marketplace, As It Was Written stages the drama of ethnic
identity as a dialectic between writerly agency and readerly thrall, and it
within the terms of this dialectic that ethnic transvestism as an authorial strat
egy in modern America becomes historically intelligible. As Gates affirms,
such imposture does represent a species of freedom, but it an authorial free-
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dom that functions as an exception to the rule of readerly enslavement. Or,
more broadly stated, the ability of the discrete individual to manufacture his
own past is only possible insofar as the vast majority of persons are determined
by theirs. Harland’s transvestism would make no sense if there weren’t a group
of real” Jews for him to imitate.
Thus if we choose to celebrate such impostures as critiques of the “ideolo
gy of authenticity,” we fail to realize the intimate interdependence between the
imposture and the ideology. And, in failing to recognize this interdependence,
we also mask a deeper, and more symptomatic, ideology of individualism that
undergirds such freedom. Ethnic transvestism, after all, is rare; most people
find themselves in ascribed group identities. It is, of course, in the American
tradition to promote the token success as a sign of the essential justness of the
free-market society. However,
critics of this society, we recognize such suc
cesses as the exceptions that prove the rule. A similar recognition is necessary
with Harland. His ability to choose his past only proves that most Americans
are doomed to repeat theirs.

Notes
1. Sollors celebrates Harland — and ethnic transvestites generally — for
“undercutting the image of a presumably stable relationship between in-group
and out-group” (252). Nevertheless, ethnic tranvestism gets only two pages in
Sollors’ encyclopedic study, which is, of course, primarily devoted to “authen
tic” members of American ethnic groups.
2. It would be impossible to summarize the fruitfully complex and occa
sionally contradictory relationship between poststructuralism and theories of
race and ethnicity that I am thumbnailing here. Gates’s considerable contribu
tion includes Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the “Racial” Self, The Signifying
Monkey: A Theory ofAfrican American Literary Criticism, and his edited volume,
“Race,” Writing and Difference, I dwell on Gates here because I feel that his
career conveniently illustrates the persistence of Enlightenment epistemologies
and aspirations across two decades of poststructuralist scrutiny.
3. For a discussion of the role of music in the novel see Aronson, who
claims that “the temptation to find in music a universal criterion for all sense
impressions was particularly hard to resist whenever a writer’s surrender to
physical sensations became an end in itself” (11-12). Pierre Bourdieu reveals
the class inflection of this “temptation”: “Music represents the most radical and
most absolute form of the negation of... the social world, which the bourgeois
ethos tends to demand of all forms of art” (19). As It Was Written exploits this
understanding of music
in some way universal and absolute, while simulta
neously staging its repeated failure in practice.
4. Stedman was Henry Harland’s mentor for much of his life. In fact, it
was Stedman who came up with the title As It Was Written, after rejecting From
Generation to Generation and Mated and Fated, His theories of creative genius
clearly influenced Harland’s own understanding of writing. In “Genius,” for
instance, Stedman claims that “genius lies in the doing of one thing, or many
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things, through power resulting from the unconscious action of the free intel
lect, in a manner unattainable by the conscious effort of ordinary men” (24). It
fortuitous for my argument that Stedman was both a literary scholar and a
successful Wall Street broker.
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1.
In his chapter “Of Virginity” in The Instruction of a
Christian Woman (1529), Spanish humanist Juan Luis
Vives insists on the pricelessness of female chastity,
locating it beyond the reach of calculated exchange
values: “I pray thee understand thine own goodness,
maid, thy price cannot be estimated” (104). While
scholars of early modern England have analyzed how
the subject of female chastity is taken up with partic
ular intensity in the period,1 insufficient attention
has been paid to how the discourses of female chasti
ty are inflected by the early modern preoccupation
with the instability of value in ever-widening net
works of commodity exchange. Given this preoccu
pation, the effort to keep personal relations beyond
the reach of commodity exchange, within an ideal
ized sphere of the gift, adds special urgency to the
construction of female chastity. At the same time,
however, the uneasy status of female sexuality and the
contradictory constructions of its “value” — even, or
especially, within marriage — unsettles the cultural
efforts to construct a strict division between gift and
commodity.
I want to continue recent discussions of early
modern culture’s obsessive concern with what
William Carroll calls “the fetishized commodity that
and is not” (296) by turning to two plays that par
ticipate in that fetishizing. Both Thomas Heywood’s
A Woman Killed with Kindness — first performed in
March 1603 — and William Shakespeare’s Measure
for Measure — performed in December 1604, perhaps
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for the first time — offer plots that explicitly position a woman s chastity as an
object of exchange, but in so doing they enact the conceptual slippage that this
positioning entails. By setting these two plays in dialogue, we open a window
onto how women and womens chastity overlap the two systems of exchange,
slide between them, or escape them.2 This slippage is a problem for a culture
interested in drawing strict boundaries between gift and commodity exchange
— a culture facing a radical reworking of how value is constituted. The plays
become problems when they expose the contradictions entailed in the effort to
position women as gifts, commodities, or currency, when the resolution of plots
relies on women used in these ways, or on women who refuse to be used in
these ways, raising questions about what constitutes women's value. Measurefor
Measure and A Woman Killed with Kindness, both of which enjoy critical histo
ries as problem cases,3 reveal that marriage itself can exacerbate the contradic
tory status of female chastity and the confusion entailed in the effort to keep its
value beyond estimation.
If for Vives the price of maiden chastity "cannot be estimated,” for Seneca
in De Beneficiis (1578)4 — a manual for good giving which insistently distin
guishes "benefiting” from "merchandizing,” or ordinary bargains and loans —
"the estimation of so noble a thing should perish if we make a merchandise of
benefits” (sig. I2V). The treatise focuses on the proper methods and motives for
giving, receiving, and requiting benefits, methods and motives which, when
abused or misunderstood, are seen to threaten the distinction Seneca
insists
on: "In debts it a most upright speech ... to say, Pay that thou owest.- But it
is the foulest word that can be in benefiting, to say, Pay.” Like the effort to
purify chastity of the taint of calculation, Seneca eschews those who would
"reckon” their gifts: "It is a vile Usury to keep a reckoning of benefits, as of
expenses” (sig. A2V). Those who wish to bestow a benefit "must tread profit
underfoot” (sig. M2V). Unlike ordinary merchandizing, the motive for
exchanging benefits is not to profit, but to establish perpetual bonds of fellow
ship:

[T]o him that lends me money, I must pay no more than I have taken; and
when I have paid it, I am free and discharged. But unto the other [one who
gives a benefit] I must pay more; and when I have requited him, yet never
theless I am still beholden to him. For when I have requited I must begin
new again, & friendship warneth me to admit no unworthy person. So
the Law of benefits a most holy law, wheroutof springeth friendship.
(sig. E4; emphasis added)
Here we see that the debt of gratitude is not only unmeasurable and "priceless”
but it also extends beyond an immediate transaction or set of transactions. The
thing given, whether it is money, a material object, or a favor, is merely the
"badge” of the giver’s "good will” (sig. B2); the essence of the benefit the bond
of friendship and obligation between transactors which the thing given signi
fies. Further, benefits are the very source of friendship; for Seneca, they not
only affirm social links but are the wellspring of them.
This view of gift exchange as the foundation of social life is precisely the
formulation offered in Marcel Mauss’s The Gift, a formulation that Levi-
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Strauss extends to the laws of marriage, moving from the exchange of material
goods like food or manufactured objects to “that most precious category of
goods, women” (61). In Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm, woman is “the supreme gift
among those that can only be obtained in the form of reciprocal gifts” (65).
Combined with the incest taboo, the exchange of women creates kinship, which
is, for anthropologists, the founding organizational structure of human society.
According to Gayle Rubin, the concept implies

a distinction between gift and giver. If women are the gifts, then it men
who are the exchange partners. And it is the partners, not the presents,
upon whom reciprocal exchange confers its quasi-mystical power of social
linkage. The relations of such a system are such that women are in no posi
tion to realize the benefits of their own circulation. As long as the relations
specify that men exchange women, it is men who are the beneficiaries of the
product of such exchange — social organization.
(174)
Rubin continues with thorough discussion of the potential limits, from an
anthropological perspective, of the “traffic in women” concept.5 Despite her
discussion of the concept’s limits, it is her influential essay — combined with
Lawrence Stone’s theses about arranged marriages and the patriarchal family in
Family, Sex, and Marriage in England — which has prompted many literary
critics to import Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm uncritically into early modern Eng
land. Part of my goal in reading the representation of female chastity and mar
riage in Heywood and Shakespeare is to refute the wholesale application of the
“traffic in women” paradigm to early modern drama and culture.6

2.
A number of relationships and institutions in early modern England are con
ceptualized by means of the imaginative systems of gift and commodity
exchange. As market forces began to cast a wider net across the economy at
large, bonds of loyalty or allegiance between patron and artist or courtier, mas
ter and apprentice, master and servant, local landowner and tenant could be
subordinated to the desire for individual gain, structured by the commodity
logic that emphasizes the primacy of profit and codified contracts over the
desire for “gift-debtors.” Relations between friends, mothers and children, hus
bands and wives are often signified in terms of idealized gift exchange. The
marital bond often bears the weight of cultural questions about what consti
tutes and ratifies relations of exchange in the early modern social order more
generally. Despite efforts such as Seneca’s to keep gift and commodity sepa
rate, the period's discourses of marriage, like those of many other social rela
tions and institutions, incorporate elements of the symbolic economies of both
gift and commodity for its conceptual articulation. Thinking through the “eco
nomics of love, Richard Horwich argues that many Jacobean comedies
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employ the institution of marriage itself as a testing ground for many of the
new economic ideas which were surfacing at the time. The marital rela
tionship is often seen through an economic prism, so that human transac
tions, as well as mercantile ones, come to seem matters of debit and credit,
profit and loss.
(256)

He argues that the plays often oppose the bond of constancy in marriage to the
“hustle of the marketplace” (259) and the circulation of money. Although Hor
wich offers helpful readings of commercial and monetary imagery in the plays
he discusses, his notion of the “economic” is too general, especially given the
multiple forms of exchange available in the period. Not only does Horwich’s
argument that marriage a “testing ground” for newer economic ideas rely on
a totalized and imprecise notion of the “economic” but it also assumes that mar
riage itself is stable and knowable “ground.” The bond of marriage can be con
ceived as a gift relation, as a mutual bestowing of selves. It can be a trust-based
and insoluble personal bond; in the words of the “Homily of the State of Mat
rimony,” marriage allows its partners to live in “perpetual friendly fellowship”
(“Homily” 13), a phrase resembling Seneca’s descriptions of the insoluble bonds
forged in benefiting. Marriage is a religious sacrament that a “singular gift
of God”; those who enter the state of matrimony “must acknowledge this ben
efit of God with pure and thankful minds” (14). At the same time, however,
marriage
a legal, contractual, and economic arrangement that ensures the
legitimate transfer of property. The giving of selves among the propertied
accompanied by the transfer of dowry, jointure, and rights of access to proper
ty, transfers which are formally contracted, quantified, and legally regulated.
Given the legal status of wives, it is difficult to consider these transfers as mutu
al exchanges.7 The marital relation straddles the competing symbolic
economies of gift and commodity. Both as trust-based and legally binding, as
a mutual bestowing of selves and a hierarchy in which women have no
autonomous legal status, and as an insoluble personal bond and a contract
accompanied by the transfer of money and property, marriage reveals the diffi
culties of purifying personal relations of the taint of calculation and contractu
al obligation.
There are difficulties, moreover, in establishing what exactly comprises true
matrimony. Henry Swinburne’s treatise Of Spousals (1686) begins by catalogu
ing the competing definitions of spousals, and goes on to develop how compet
ing legal codes not only differ in defining this term but also in identifying what
constitutes matrimony itself.8 Although he describes several mitigating condi
tions, Swinburne basically maintains that public solemnization, the giving of
portions of goods, and even carnal copulation do not supersede the insoluble
bond created by the free consent offered in spousals de praesenti:

A present & perfect Consent. . . alone maketh Matrimony, without either
Publick Solemnization or Carnal Copulation; for neither is the one, nor the
other of the Essence of Matrimony, but Consent only.... Spousals de prae-
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senti, though not consummate, be in truth and substance very Matrimony,
and therefore perpetually indissoluble.
(14-15)9
Swinburne repeatedly refers to the love tokens and gifts that commonly sym
bolize the exchange of consent in spousals, but like Seneca’s benefits — in
which objects exchanged are the “mere badge” of good will between transactors
— these tokens are merely the expression, not the essence, of the bond between
transactors. Thus, in defining the essence of matrimony, conscience and inten
tion figure more prominently than the exchange of material objects, even if the
“objects” exchanged are bodies in intercourse. Swinburne’s definition therefore
positions the marital relation as a bond, like that forged by means of benefit
ing, in the sphere of the gift.
Despite the mitigating conditions and the competition in Swinburne’s trea
tise between several potential ratifying acts or objects — “effects” such as the
kiss, taking of hands, or gifts; “subarration”; public solemnization; and consum
mation — he nonetheless adheres to the position that present consent alone
constitutes the essence of matrimony. The exchange of trust-based vows that is
the spousal, rather than more external and publicly regulated practices, consti
tutes the essence of matrimony. Swinburne’s response to questions about the
relationship between public ratification and intention offers an ideal that is dif
ficult to achieve in practice, because the intentions of marital “transactors” are
often difficult, if not impossible, to verify in a court of law. Yet the ideal per
sists — even in a legal treatise. Concerned as they are with exploring what
makes relations of exchange binding, A Woman Killed with Kindness and Mea
sure for Measure exert tremendous pressure on this ideal, exposing the contra
dictory function of female chastity and how it can preclude the happy union of
gift and commodity in the institution of marriage. Because they slide between
the competing imaginative economies, female chastity and marriage reveal the
contradictions entailed in the effort to purify personal relations of the taint of
calculation and contractual obligation.

3.
In the final scene of Measure for Measure, Angelo trivializes his and Mariana’s
original spousals — a trust-based vow of constancy — calling them “some
speech of marriage” (5.1.222). Calculated considerations weigh more heavily
for him than his verbal promises: Mariana’s “promised proportions / Came
short of composition” (224-5). These justifications, along with Angelo’s spe
cious claim that Mariana’s “reputation was disvalued” (226), might at first be
seen as the best illustration of how the institution of marriage straddles the
economies of gift and commodity, and might tempt us to see Angelo as the sole
figure of a commodity mentality that disrupts an ideal of marriage of true
minds. But Angelo’s deceitful self-defenses are not the only impediments to
this ideal. After Mariana unmasks, she explains that “this is the body / That
took away the match from Isabel, / And did supply thee at thy garden-house /
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In her imagin’d person” (214-17). When the duke asks Angelo, “know you this
woman?”, Lucio puns, “Carnally, she says” (217-18). Mariana goes even further
than Lucio, however, claiming Angelo “knew me a wife” (235); her claim that
Angelo knew her as wife even though he “imagined” she was Isabel implies that
carnal exchange alone is sufficient to make them husband and wife. For Swin
burne, this is “not true Matrimony in conscience.” It isn’t just that Mariana has
not read her Swinburne, for the duke-as-friar makes this claim well when he
justifies the bed trick to her (4.1.71-4), elevating the “rules and precepts of law”
over trust-based intention. The whole play shares in the nervousness of Mari
ana’s statement that “I am affianc’d as strongly / As words could make up vows”
(232-3). Couched in this assertion is a question: just how strongly can words
make up vows? Mariana’s “could” indicates a distrust of verbal promises that
the entire play shares. In Shakespeare’s Vienna, promises are unreliable and
there no guarantee that people, including the duke, will not say one thing and
mean another.
Seneca’s treatise on gift-giving rejects recourse to the law as the means of
enforcing the bonds of fellowship created by benefits. Seneca insists on “mens’
consciences” rather than “surety” to guarantee obligation:
Thou stainest [benefits], if thou make them a matter of Law. . . . Would
God that no surety might be taken of the purchaser by the seller, nor bar
gains and covenants be made under hand & seal: but rather, that the per
formance of them were referred to the faithfulness and upright meaning of
mens consciences.
(sig. I2V)

Just
Seneca calls for trust rather than “surety” — a legal bond or piece of
property used to guarantee fulfillment of an obligation — as the binding force
of exchange, duke Vincentio, disguised as the friar, condemns “security,” or con
tractual obligations, as the solvent of trust-based fellowship:

There is scarce truth enough alive to make societies secure, but security
enough to make fellowships accurs’d. Much upon this riddle runs the wis
dom of the world.
(3.2.221-4)
Although the duke’s opposition here between contractual obligation and trust
based transactions parallels the Senecan view of what binds men in fellowship,
the duke’s assertion remains an empty aphorism, for the logic of exchange oper
ating in Measure belies the duke’s aphoristic wisdom. Despite his repeated
invocation of the language of the benefit to justify the bed trick, the duke
betrays the calculated, and calculating, understanding underpinning his plan.
He tells Isabella that “the satisfaction I would require is likewise your own ben
efit” (3.1.154-5) and that “I do make myself believe that you may most uprighteously do a poor wrong’d lady a merited benefit” (197-9). Claiming that the
bed trick and Mariana’s pregnancy “may compel [Angelo] to her recompense”
(3.1.250), the duke corrupts the language of idealized benefiting with the taint
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of deceit and coercion. (He also assumes that the one-night stand will result in
conception, the confirmation of sexual exchange.) The coercion and deceit the
duke’s benefits entail align them with the debased forms of exchange against
which Seneca posits the economy of the benefit. In the duke’s alliterative jus
tification of deceit — “the doubleness of the benefit defends the deceit from
reproof” (254-6) — he quantifies gains, undermining the Senecan notion that
it is “a foul shame ... a vile Usury to keep a reckoning of benefits, as of expens
es” (sig. A2V). Further, the duke relies on rather than rejects “security” when he
rationalizes the deceit of the bed trick to Mariana:

He is your husband on a pre-contract;
To bring you thus together, ’tis no sin,
Sith that the justice of your title to him
Doth flourish the deceit.
(4.1.71-4)10
Likening his plan to a speculative agrarian enterprise, the duke again betrays
the commodified imagination underlying the “benefits” he doles out to his sub
jects: “Our corn’s to reap, for yet our tithe’s to sow” (75). The impersonal sex
ual exchange of the bed trick likened to sowing grain to pay tithe dues; doing
this will lead to the harvest, the contractually enforced marital union.
The duke further reveals a calculating, “measured” understanding of mar
riage and social exchange by positing an economy of craft, vice, and deceit that
is necessary in order to “exact” the “performance” of the “old contracting”
between Mariana and Claudio:
Craft against vice I must apply.
With Angelo tonight shall he
His old betrothed but despised;
So disguise shall, by th’ disguised,
Pay with falsehood false exacting,
And perform an old contracting.
(3.2.270-5)

Victoria Hayne suggests that this passage “crown[s] the developing intimacy
between the audience and the Duke-friar,” inviting the audience’s complicity in
the opposition to vice that the disguised duke enacts (26). The plodding
tetrameter of the duke’s lines emphasizes the measure-for-measure logic that he
follows, a logic that underlies the complicated exchanges and substitutions that
generate the play’s final marriages. In addition to presenting the duke
a
“kind of inverted Vice figure,” the play presents him as constructing kind of
inverted gift economy, one that draws on the rhetoric of benefits. Rather than
inviting the audience’s complicity in the opposition to vice, the play invites its
complicity in the deceit and contractual vision of marriage and social relations
that the duke “performs.”
For the duke, virtue itself functions like currency. In order to have value,
he claims, Angelo’s virtue must circulate. Vincentio calls nature a “creditor” to
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whom Angelo owes “thanks and use” (1.1,39-41) for the attributes she has
loaned him. Rather than hoarded in the convent, Isabella’s chastity must be put
into circulation as well, the controlled circulation of marriage.11 After present
ing his “offer” of marriage in imperative form, “Give me your hand and say you
will be mine” (5.1.497), the duke corrects himself in order to make his propos
al more suited to the staged princely magnanimity of his final pardons: “I have
a motion much imports your good, / Whereto if you’ll a willing ear incline, /
What’s mine yours and what is yours is mine” (540-2).12
The parodic “good turns” between Pompey and Abhorson approximate the
Senecan ideal of benefits more closely than any other exchanges we see in the
play:

ABHORSON Come on, bawd. I will instruct thee in my trade; follow.
POMPEY I do desire to learn, sir; and I hope, if you have occasion to use me
for your own turn, you shall find me yare. For truly, sir, for your kindness
I owe you a good turn.
(4.2.54-9)
The jocular goodwill between the bawd and hangman — a parodic rendering of
the relation between master and apprentice — is set in reief against the shady
“good turns” between the duke and the Provost in the same scene: the duke
asks for a “dangerous courtesy” (162), and has much ado to convince the fear
ful Provost to grant his suit. Except for the parodic good turns between Pom
pey and Abhorson, the closest we come to a gift ethos in Measure for Measure
emerges in the final scene, as the duke requites his subjects with pardons, mer
ciful punishments, and marriage offers. However, the play exposes the machi
nation and calculation that buttress the duke’s display of sovereign clemency, as
well
exposing how his pose
the liberal gift-giver at the end of the play
relies on the very antithesis of the gift, the “security” that he earlier decries.
The play’s project therefore diverges starkly from one of its probable sources,
Whetstone’s Right Excellent and Famous History of Promos and Cassandra
(1578), which aims to show “the perfect magnanimitye of a noble kinge, in
checking Vice and favouringe Vertue: Wherein is showne, the Ruyne and overthrowe, of dishonest practices, the advauncement of upright dealing” (tide
page). Rather than “upright dealing” and “perfect magnanimitye,” the duke
himself engages in deceitful substitutions and “dishonest practices.” Despite
Vincentio’s (largely ineffective) efforts to interrogate and reform his subjects’
consciences, Measure reveals the extent to which sovereign power enforces con
tracts as a way of regulating sexual desire.13 Sexual desire, including marital
sexuality, subordinated in the play to a contractual, commodified logic that
barely acknowledges the personal bonds of constancy associated with the gift.
While Angelo enforces legal bonds he tries to evade them himself, the duke, as
we have seen, relies on legally enforceable contractual obligations even as he
condemns them.
The duke and Angelo are not alone in Vienna, of course, in adopting a
commodified perspective of sexual relations. The bawds most frankly acknowl
edge, and profit from, the fink between sexuality and commodity exchange.
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Pompey, for example, envisions the ramifications of the new law against forni
cation for the housing market: "If this law hold in Vienna ten year, I’ll rent the
fairest house in it after threepence a bay” (2.1.239-41). 14 He conflates the "two
usuries,” money-lending and procuring for fornication, pointing to the capri
ciousness of the law that condemns one while allowing the "worser” (3.2.6-8).
Even the chastened Claudio betrays a commodified understanding of virtue
when he claims that Authority "make[s] us pay down for our offense by weight
/ The words of heaven” (1.2.121-2). Lucio jestingly responds that he would
send for his creditors if he were so eloquent under arrest (133). Here Lucio,
like Pompey, conflates sexual and financial crimes, as does Angelo when he
describes fornication as "coining heaven’s image in stamps that are forbid”
(2.4.45-6). Behind the conflation of bastardizing and counterfeiting lurks the
assumption that producing legitimate children is like minting coins.15 Unlike
bastard children, legitimate ones are authorized by the "stamp” of public
authority, or "outward order” (1.2.149), as Claudio calls it when vouching for
the legitimacy of his marriage to, "mutual” sexual commerce with, and "posses
sion of” Juliet:
Thus stands it with me: upon a true contract
I got possession of Julietta’s bed.
You know the lady; she is fast my wife,
Save that we do the denunciation lack
Of outward order. This we came not to,
Only for propagation of a dow’r
Remaining in the coffer of her friends,
From whom we thought it meet to hide our love
Till time had made them for us. But it chances
The stealth of our most mutual entertainment
With character too gross is writ on Juliet.

(145-51)

While waiting publicly to solemnize their marriage in the hopes of "propagat
ing” a dowry — wresting the wealth of Juliet’s "friends” out of their coffers and
into circulation — Juliet and Claudio "unhappily” (157) propagate
child.
These confusions between sexual desire, procreation, and legally-based finan
cial exchanges even infiltrate the insulated world of the moated grange where
Mariana resides; just before the duke arrives, the boy’s song images kisses as the
"seals of love” that are "seal’d in vain” (4.1.5-6).
Hence, the play does not merely elide illicit sexual exchange with commod
ity exchange and the circulation of money. The pervasiveness of substitution in
Measurefor Measure16 reveals how female chastity can be made to function like
currency in the enforcement of "true” marriage contracts. As long as she
chaste — a difficult "fact” to determine — one woman can stand in for anoth
er; their very interchangeability renders them equivalent,17 precluding the pos
sibility of personal bonds that are the definitive feature of a gift transaction.
This impersonal exchangeability is even more clear in the case of the duke’s
machinations than in the case of prostitution; the bawds trade bodies for money,
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whereas in the bed trick, as Marc Shell points out (125), Isabellas and Mari
ana’s chaste bodies function like money. In his efforts to close the deal that will
force Isabella to yield up what she calls the “gift of my chaste body” (5.1.102),
Angelo simply makes explicit how the “most holy law” of the benefit is a staged
affair, based on substitutions, legitimated by the logic of the commodity. Words
alone cannot create the faithful intentions that should make up vows, but nei
ther can formal contracts alone. The play exposes the need for staged sovereign
liberality
the pretense of a gift economy — to supplement strict legal
enforcement on the one hand18 and conscience on the other, both of which, on
their own, fail to bind men, and men and women, in fellowship. Through its
treatment of female chastity, the play shows how the pretense of sovereign lib
erality actually reinforces the measured, commodified basis of social relations.
The duke’s argument that Angelo owes nature “use,” or interest, for the
virtue she has loaned to him parallels Aristotelian arguments about money
appealed to in the defense of usury. Based on the idea that usury a crime of
intent, rather than a factual, contractual matter, Du Moulin argues that usurers
create “a relationship between those who have money and those who need
money. Without them money would be nearly useless. Moreover, money is the
most useful when it is most used, and usurers see to it that it is kept in use”
(quoted in Jones 17). Money is only productive when it is kept in circulation,
not hoarded. Keeping female sexuality out of circulation likewise curtails its
productivity, a line of argument familiar from Parolles’s speeches on virginity in
All's Well that Ends Well:
It not politic in the commonwealth of nature to preserve virginity. Loss
of virginity rational increase, and there was never virgin got till virginity
was first lost.... Keep it not; you cannot choose but lose by’t. Out with’t!
Within t’ one year it will make itself two, which is a goodly increase, and
the principal itself not much the worse. Away with’t! . . . ’Tis a commodi
ty will lose the gloss with lying; the longer kept, the less worth. Off with’t
while ’tis vendible; answer the time of request.
(1.1.128-31,147-50,154-6)

Although Helena’s own socially-based transacting with the King of France and
the Florentine women in All's Well come to complicate this notion of how vir
ginity acquires its value in the “commonwealth of nature,” Parolles offers a clear,
if facetious, sense of how arguments about the relation between use, exchange,
and value can easily be appropriated to discuss women’s sexuality. Female sex
uality does indeed gain cultural value by circulating, but it is often circulation
controlled by authorities other than young women themselves.19
We can thus see how these texts’ figurations of female chastity jostle
against the ideological strategies in Seneca’s De Beneficiis, and in the wider cul
tural discourses of exchange, for keeping the forces of commodification at bay.
Golding’s Seneca offers a moral economy of the benefit that purifies personal
relations from the taint of commerce by keeping them distinct from traffic in
quantifiable, alienable objects that rely on formal contract and the law as the
guarantors of honest dealing. Like Seneca’s “benefits,” the construction of
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female chastity is, in part, an ideological strategy for keeping sexual relations
distinct from commodity relations. The obsession with womens chastity in the
period is an elaborate defense against how, in some contexts, a chaste woman
can be made to function as a kind of currency — an arbitrarily authorized unit
of measure with no use-value of its own — to ensure the legitimacy of a system
of private property.20 Barbara Baines asserts that chastity is a theologically pre
scribed virtue that is “appropriated as the standard upon which the economy of
secular power based” (284).21 A market economy depends on just such a set
standard by which the values of commodities can be measured. The construc
tion of women s sexuality through the moral virtue chastity in plays, homilies,
conduct books, is an effort to keep it priceless, a matter of conscience :— as
Vives implores, “I pray thee, understand thine own goodness, maid, thy price
cannot be estimated” (104) — out of the reaches of a system of exchange gov
erned by calculated exchange values. Although it does so less directly than
Parolles’s witty speech, Measure exposes such a system as that which often
determines the “value” of female chastity. The complex, calculating negotia
tions that generate the play’s marriages expose that the gift ethos is a ruse —
albeit a necessary one — that both relies on and buttresses the logic and
motives of the commodity.

4.
If in Measure for Measure, female chastity helps to expose the economy of the
gift
a necessary fuse, in Thomas Heywood’s A Woman Killed with Kindness
— another play with a critical history as a problem case — marital chastity
exposes the limits of conscious gift ethos. Unlike the pervasive commodity
mentality of Vienna, Heywood’s gentry have an acute sense of the gift ethic,
even among those such as Wendoll and the usurer Shafton who violate it. The
play opens with the celebration of John and Anne Frankford’s marriage.
Although Heywood does not stage the precise moment at which the couple
exchanges “present consent” (as Swinburne would call it), its definitive elements
— the exchange of vows and the taking of hands — are scattered throughout
the opening scene and the play generally, indicating some nervousness over
trust-based marital vows. Francis Acton, Anne Frankford’s brother, “borrows”
her hand to dance: “By your leave, sister — by your husband’s leave /I should
have said — the hand that but this day / Was given you in the church, I’ll bor
row” (1.6-8). Anne Frankford’s hand is her husband’s hand, but her husband’s
itself was “given” to her. Acton and Charles Mountford clasp hands in a friend
ly wager (“here’s my hand” [101]), as do their followers Cranwell and Wendoll
(“What, clap you hands? / Or is’t not bargain?” “Yes, and stake them down”
(106-7)). When Charles Mountford is first freed’ from prison for murdering
one of Acton’s followers during a hunt, Shafton soon reveals that his friendly
offers of money and hands — “Sir Charles, a hand, a hand — at liberty!” (5.21)
— are disingenuous: “If I can fasten but one finger on him, / With my full
hand I’ll grip him to the heart. / ’Tis not for love I proffered him this coin, /
But for my gain and pleasure” (50-3). In all cases, the moment of promise or
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friendly wager — rendered physically in the taking of hands — modulates to
antagonism, violence or the betrayal of trust, or, in the case of Shafton, was
insincere to begin with.22 Anne will be borrowed from Frankford by Wendoll;
the hunting competition between Acton and Charles quickly escalates to vio-.
lence that culminates in Charles committing murder; and Charles’s loan (with
interest, of course) from Shafton leads to his second arrest and ultimate
bondage to vengeful Acton who pays his debts. The play’s anxiety over the
nuptial spousal manifests itself first by the dispersal of the moment of promise
throughout the opening scene, and then through the eruption of violence or
betrayal in the scenes that follow. Heywood’s play shares in the fear of Shake
speare’s Vienna that words cannot “make up vows” and the concomitant fear
that perhaps it is only formal legal regulation (the “bond”) that can bind men,
and men and women, or that can guarantee honest dealing in all forms of
exchange.
Of all the play’s characters, Shafton certainly the least compelling and the
least “developed” or “motivated”; in fact, he disappears from the play complete
ly after having Charles arrested for debt in scene seven, making him seem like
a gratuitous plot device. But his function is central: he plays out the logic by
which competing forms of exchange can only be articulated relationally.23 His
repeated references to and delight in litigation (5.35-8; 7.29-30, 57-62, 70-1)
counter the appeals to conscience throughout the play, thus serving as the
antithesis to the gift ethic.24 Willfully disregarding the knowledge that “love”
should be what motivates his offers, the bad giver Shafton serves as the neces
sary foil to the disinterested liberality of Frankford, which erupts inexplicably
in the scene immediately preceding Shafton’s equally inexplicable usurious
offers.
It is in this scene that we finally witness John Frankford taking vows — not
with his wife Anne, but with Wendoll.25 Here, John offers all at his disposal in
order to forge a friendship with him:
Frankford I will allow you, sir,
Your man, your gelding, and your table,
All at my own charge. Be my companion.
WENDOLL Master Frankford, I have oft been bound to you
By many favours; this exceeds them all
That I shall never merit your least favour.
But when your last remembrance I forget,
Heaven at my soul exact that weighty debt.
FRANKFORD There needs no protestation, for I know you
Virtuous, and therefore grateful. Prithee Nan,
Use him with all thy loving’st courtesy.
ANNE As far
modesty may well extend,
It is my duty to receive your friend.
FRANKFORD To dinner, come sir; from this present day,
Welcome to me forever. Come away!

(4.70-84)
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Except for the lines between John and Anne, this interchange could be read as
a staging of De Beneficiis: John creates perpetual companionship by liberal giv
ing (“Welcome to me forever”), and Wendoll is conscious that he is bound by
the “weighty debt” of gratitude, gratitude that Frankford elides with virtue and
sees as its logical result (“I know you / Virtuous, and therefore grateful”). As
with the earlier examples, this moment of promise will be violated; Wendoll
seduces Anne and
“profuse in Frankford’s richest treasure [that is, Anne]”
(11.116). But the problem at the heart of this plot and of the play not adul
tery, but rather how an ethic of absolute generosity expressed in gift-giving
conflicts with the control of wifely chastity
a privately owned, semi-commodified object. The scene in which this interchange occurs opens with John’s
catalogue of his treasured possessions, “chief / Of all” being his “fair” and
“chaste” wife (4.1-14). John wants to share all his stuff with Wendoll, but
unlike his other possessions — table, purse, horses, servants — Anne has to be
proper to him, and can’t be given. Her response to John’s command to “use”
Wendoll suggests that she aware of the limits her “modesty” places on John’s
ability to be a liberal giver. Rather than viewing friendship with Wendoll
a
gift freely given, Anne views Wendoll as one whom it is a contractual “duty to
receive” (82). John cannot say without qualification to Wendoll “what’s mine
yours,” because Anne is proper to him; unlike all other property in a commod
ity economy, however, she not alienable, she can’t be transferred or loaned to
another “owner.”26
In Wendoll’s prolonged soliloquy before the seduction scene (6.1-52) — a
dramatized struggle with conscience — he acknowledges John’s generosity, the
bond it creates, as well as the consequences of being ungrateful to his liberal
donor. In his witting violation of the gift ethic, the play clearly constructs
Wendoll’s crime not as adultery with Anne but as ingratitude to her husband:
He doth maintain me; he allows me largely
Money to spend—

My gelding and my man.
This kindness grows of no alliance ’twixt us
I never bound him to me by desert;

He cannot eat without me,
Nor laugh without me; I am to his body
As necessary as his digestion,
And equally do make him whole or sick.
And shall I wrong this man? Base man! Ingrate!
Hast thou the power straight with thy gory hands
To rip thy image from his bleeding heart?
... or rend his heart
To whom thy heart was joined and knit together?
(6.27-28, 31, 33, 35, 40-46, 49-50)
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When Anne relays Johns message that Wendoll is to “be a present Frankford
in his absence” (6.78), we discover that the problem is not only that Anne is a
possession that cannot be given but that John cannot fully fuse with his “com
panion” Wendoll. Although the gift-generated bond between the two men
so strong that it makes their desire for the same woman seem almost inevitable,
their loss of the “proper” self should not extend to Johns relationship with
Anne. During the seduction scene, Anne reiterates what Wendoll has already
articulated, that John “esteems” Wendoll “even
his [own] brain, his eye-ball,
or his heart” (6.113-14). The two hearts “joined and knit together” are torn
asunder by the disruptive force of heterosexual desire, a force that cannot be
contained by the ethic of the gift, an ethic of which Wendoll is wholly aware.
Wendoll’s repeated willingness to “hazard all” (129,137) in order to have Anne
reveals that conflicting social and sexual relations can entail the kinds of risks
associated with commodity exchange. However, the play pointedly constructs
Wendoll’s crime as a breach of the gift ethic. Just
Golding’s Seneca argues
that one finds “an unthankful person” beneath all social vices (sig. B3V), Wendoll’s ingratitude to John is presented as the root of the marital and social dis
order in Woman Killed. For him, adultery is an incidental crime. He plans to
wander on the continent “where the report of my ingratitude / Cannot be
heard,” and then to return once this crime, not adultery, is forgotten so that he
can seek honor and praise at court (16.129-37).27
Honor, of course, not gender neutral, and in Anne’s case adultery is not
an incidental crime. Upon his servant’s disclosure of Wendoll and Anne’s
actions, John’s thoughts immediately turn to her birth, education, repute, car
riage, and demeanor, ll of which previously indicated that she was “modest,
chaste, and godly. / Is all this seeming gold plain copper?” (8.99-105). John’s
reaction and question points to the fragility of the usual means by which the
value and “surety” of wifely chastity is constructed. Anne’s homiletic address to
the women in the audience once her crime has been discovered suggests that
unchaste wives debase something other than their own value:
O women, women, you that have yet kept
Your holy matrimonial vow unstained,
Make me your instance: when you tread awry,
Your sins like mine will on your conscience lie.
(13.142-5)

Anne’s “yet” hints at the tenuousness of that holy vow, as if the women she
addresses were just on the verge of doing some staining. Significantly, the mat
rimonial vow is what would be stained, not the womens’ value or reputation, or
even their bodies. Like Swinburne, who posits the exchange of vows as the
essence of matrimony, Anne’s address to her female audience suggests that the
exchange of faithful vows outweighs the giving of bodies in intercourse in mak
ing a true marriage. It is her sin of “staining” not her chaste body but this trust
based vow that lies on Anne’s conscience after John discovers her.
Illustrating how liberal giving can be used to express enmity, John keeps
offering gifts and courtesies as he plots to entrap Anne and Wendoll (11.38-40,
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48-9, 63-4). His novel form of punishment of Anne for committing adultery
— the titular “kindness” and Heywood’s innovation in the revenge plot —
appropriate because it reveals Johns effort to keep his relationship to Wendoll
and to Anne in the sphere of the gift. Rather than taking legal action, taking
their lives, or physically punishing them (as Anne begs him to do just before
addressing the women in the audience), he lets them contemplate their viola
tion of the “most holy law” of the gift; he tells Wendoll:

When thou record st my many courtesies
And shalt compare them with they treacherous heart,
Lay them together, weigh them equally,
’Twill be revenge enough.
(13.72-5)

This weighing and calculating takes place within the sphere of the gift, since
conscience, rather than the law, is to serve as the agent of punishment. John
doles out to Anne a “judgment” that is even more “liberal”:
Woman, hear thy judgment:
Go, make thee ready in thy best attire,
Take with thee all thy gowns, all thy apparel;
Leave nothing that did ever call thee mistress,
Or by whose sight being left here in the house
I may remember such woman by.
Choose thee a bed and hangings for a chamber;
Take with thee everything that hath thy mark,
And get thee to my manor seven mile off,
Where live. ’Tis thine; I freely give it thee.
My tenants by shall furnish thee with wains
To carry all thy stuff, within two hours,
No longer, will I limit thee my sight.
Choose which of all my servants thou likest best,
And they are thine to attend thee.

(158-72)

In “freely” giving Anne all this “stuff,” John uses the same acts of generosity by
which he had tried to establish his friendship with Wendoll to “torment
[Anne’s] soul” (156) and to mark his estrangement from her.28 “It was thy
hand,” he tells her, “cut two hearts out of one” (186). The heart joined in mat
rimony is not the only “one” that has been sundered, since the two hearts of
John and Wendoll were also “joined and knit together”; as Wendoll addressed
himself before seducing Anne: “Ingrate! / Hast thou the power straight with
thy gory hands / To rip thy image from his bleeding heart? ... or rend his heart
/ To whom thy heart was joined and knit together?” (6.44-6, 49-50)
In the final scene of Measurefor Measure, I have argued, the friar-duke has
to use the pretense of princely magnanimity to supplement his earlier unsuc
cessful efforts to shape and interrogate his subjects’ consciences rather than
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enforce the law against fornication. In staging that magnanimity he relies on
the commodity logic that is usually seen as its antithesis. When the law against
adultery and ingratitude has been violated in John Frankford’s “little common
wealth,” his liberal, gift-driven punishment of Anne allows her to repent on her
own so that John is able to shape the consciences of his subjects as Duke Vincentio could not. John deploys the same generosity by which he had forged a
bond with Wendoll to force Anne to repent. Repentance is itself an internal
ized process centered on the individual subject’s conscience, so that John’s
enabling of it through his “kindness,” unlike external punishments or execution,
resides within the sphere of the gift.29 His gift-based punishment allows Anne
herself to repent her crimes, but only on the condition that her connection with
her husband and his children is broken:
But, as thou hopest for heaven, as thou believest
Thy name’s recorded in the book of life,
I charge thee never after this sad day
To see me, or to meet me, or to send
By word, or writing, gift, or otherwise
To move me, by thyself, or by thy friends,
Nor challenge any part in my two children.

(13.173-9)
As John’s prohibitions here indicate, Anne’s estrangement from him is signified
by her inability to approach him as a gift-giver. Anne proceeds to repent with
a vengeance, symbolized when she bids Nick to break her beloved lute, which
John, wishing to remove all material traces of Anne, has sent after her. Anne
wishes to break the lute “not as my husband’s gift, but my farewell / To all
earth’s joy” (16.74-5). She does not reject the gift that constitutes part of his
punishment but rather renounces the material and sensual pleasures that the
instrument signifies; with them she renounces life itself, as she proceeds to
starve herself to death. Anne’s death finally allows John to forgive her —
“Though thy rash offence / Divorced our bodies, thy repentant tears / Unite our
souls” (17.107-9) — and to restore them to their married state, the “singular
gift of God,”
the Homily ofMatrimony calls it.30
No matter how successfully Frankford keeps his “judgment” and forgive
ness of Anne in the sphere of the gift, however, it is the status of her marital
chastity partially outside of this sphere that gets them in trouble in the first
place. Having been given in marriage, Anne’s chastity is out of circulation.
Unlike the other possessions which he offers to Wendoll, her chaste body can
not serve as a “badge” of Frankford’s good will; it cannot be given or shared, and
therefore cannot help cement the relationship between the two men as John’s
other gifts do. The following exhortation from Vives is therefore only partial
ly accurate:

And know thou this, woman, that the chastity and honesty which thou hast
is not thine, but committed and betaken unto thy keeping by thine hus
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band. Wherefore thou dost the more wrong to give away that thing which
another body’s, without the owner’s license.
(113)

If, as Vives cautions, a woman’s chastity not hers to give — or if, as Ruth
Kelso states, it the "greatest gift to her husband” (97) she brings in marriage
— once the marriage transaction takes place, a woman’s chastity is not her hus
band’s to give either. Anne’s value as a wife derives from her being the private
and inalienable property of John. Neither gift nor commodity (since the defin
itive feature of a commodity is its exchangeability), the ambiguous status of
wifely chastity conflicts with the ethic of open generosity and loss of proper
identity which constitutes John’s friendship with Wendoll.

5.

In Heywood’s play, we encounter another plot in which a woman’s chastity
(again a sister’s as in Measurefor Measure) is figured as an object of exchange.31
Like Isabella, Susan Mountford faces the choice between preserving her chasti
ty and preserving her brother. Unlike Claudio, however, Charles Mountford’s
life not at stake. Rather, Susan is called on to save his honor, an honor that
is wholly constituted by adhering to an ethic of the gift. When Susan fears that
Acton will pursue legal action, Charles responds that "my conscience is become
my enemy / And will pursue me more than Acton can” (3.70-3). Like a good
Senecan (and not unlike the Frankfords) he recognizes the binding power of
conscience over that of legal enforcement. Charles is later imprisoned a second
time because he refuses to sell his ancestral home to the usurer Shafton to
whom he owes money. He refuses, in short, to acknowledge the commodifica
tion of his ancient home; he figures the sale as a defloration, calling the title to
the house a "virgin title never yet deflowered” (7.23). Because he resists
Shafton’s seductive offers to buy the estate, Charles goes to prison owing the
principal and the "use.” Literalizing the metaphor of defloration by which he
figured the sale of the family home, he calls on Susan to offer her chastity to
repay his debt to Acton, who has freed him from prison. Charles’s metaphor
— and the subsequent actions (and transactions) that explore this metaphor’s
explanatory power — draw the connection between a crucial cluster of proper
ties that have to be passed on and transferred in order to have value, but that
have to be kept in controlled circulation by being cautiously given as gifts or
traded as "terminal commodities”: female chastity, the family name and estate,
and the sense of personal honor that derives from them.32
In a double movement that illustrates the relationality of gift and com
modity, the play juxtaposes an idealized gift ethic with rigorous scrutiny of its
material and calculable consequences. This attention to materiality is especial
ly true in the Mountford plot. Charles’s refusal to capitulate to commodity
exchange, and the play’s excessive emphasis on the Mountford’s refusal to sell
their remaining land, is accompanied by great specificity in what they lose,
2,500 pounds a year in patrimony, and what they retain, 500 pounds and a sum-
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mer house. This careful bookkeeping combines with explicit attention to the
Mountfords’ changing relation to the means of production; Cranwell reports
that Charles has “turned a plain countryman” (5.7), indicating that he is no
longer a landlord. The play continues to emphasize the labor this new relation
to the land entails, zeroing in on its bodily effects. In order to sustain them
selves, Charles “enforced to follow husbandry” and Susan to “milk” (7.3-4).
Charles points to “this palm” roughened by labor (39) and “her silver brow”
blasted by the elements (40-1). Susan tells Shafton, “we feed sparing and we
labour hard, / We lie uneasy, to reserve to us / And our succession this small
plot of ground” (44-6). Through Charles’s efforts to adhere to an idealized gift
ethic, the Mountford plot, contrary to the Senecan vision of benefits which
effaces the material domain, reinstates the material
a locus of value.
In the very materiality of its unrelenting attention to the consequences of
Charles and Susan’s efforts to “keep this poor house we have left unsold” (7.2),
the play virtually idealizes their downward mobility. As he tries to dissuade
Shafton from his efforts to buy, Charles tells him how the “crisis of the landed
gentry” feels:
I have so bent my thoughts to husbandry
That I protest I scarcely can remember
What a new fashion is, how silk or satin
Feels in my hand; why, pride is grown to us
A mere, mere stranger. I have quite forgot
The names of all that ever waited on me;
I cannot name ye any of my hounds,
Once from whose echoing mouths I heard all the music
That e’er my heart desired. What should I say?
To keep this place I have changed myself away.

(47-65)

Here, Charles recounts a series of alienations and forgettings, both material and
immaterial, from the feel of rich fabrics and the sounds of barking hounds, to
the names of servants. Charles personifies pride in order to express his alien
ation from it. This series of losses culminates in Charles’s alienation from his
former self: “I have changed myself away.” He endures all these losses in order
to hold on to his last vestige of the old order, the ancestral land. These para
doxically ennobling losses cause Charles to bend his thoughts to husbandry, so
that he becomes a most devoted husband to the land, refusing to let it pass out
side of the family.
But the honorable exchange of “good turns” that ideally expresses the bonds
between family members is obstructed when Charles’s kinfolk reject his suit for
help to get out of debtor’s prison. When Susan seeks assistance from their kin
and friends, they not only refuse to offer help but also refuse to recognize their
former ties to Charles. His uncle rejects the bond of kinship, saying Charles
“lost my kindred when he fell to need” (9.17); Sandy rejects friendship, “I knew
you ere your brother sold his land” (22); and Cousin Tydy claims, “I am no
cousin unto them that borrow” (36). Sandy, a former tenant whom Charles
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gave a farm “rent-free” (27), refuses to requite the favor. With the rebuff from
family and friends to help free Charles from prison, the whole range of social
and personal relations' — family/kin, friend, tenant — dissolves, a dissolution
that is expressed by their refusals to grant good turns. When he discovers the
refusal of his kin, Charles laments the fetters of disgrace that their ingratitude
brings to the family name: “Unthankful kinsmen! Mountfords all too base! /
To let thy name lie fettered in disgrace!” (10.5-6). Familial ingratitude, like
deflowering the virgin title to the land, is a violation of the gift ethic; both are
seen, therefore, to disgrace the family name.
Upon the news that it is the bounty of Acton and not of his kin that frees
him from prison, Charles reveals that the accrued debt of honor diminishes his
sense of self. Ever true to the gift ethic, Charles believes physical imprison
ment would be less onerous than the weighty debt of honor to Acton. He
expresses great distress and identity confusion upon the news that Acton freed
him from prison:
By Acton freed! Not all thy manacles
Could fetter so my heels as this one word
Hath thralled my heart, and it must now he bound
In more strict prison than thy stony gaol.
Had this proceeded from my friends, or [father]
From them this action had deserved my life,
And from a stranger more, because from such
There is less execution of good deeds.
But he, nor father, nor ally, nor friend,
More than a stranger, both remote in blood
And in his heart opposed my enemy,
O there I lose myself. What should I say?
What think? what do, his bounty to repay?

(10.92-5,109-18)

If before, Charles “changed [him] self away” in bending his thoughts to hus
bandry, here, his debt to a gift-giving enemy causes him to “lose [him]self.” He
plans to use Susan as a semi-commodified return gift to Acton in order to
redeem himself: “Though poor, my heart is set / In one rich gift to pay back
all my debt” (123-4). Refusing to deflower the virgin title to the family home
retains the honor of the family name; now that that name “lies fettered in dis
grace” due to familial ingratitude, Charles offers the defloration of Susan to
retain his sense of personal honor.
Susan wavers uncontrollably in Charles’s language between gift, commodi
ty, currency, and fellow transactor
he tells her why he has “tricked [her] like
a bride” (14.1). By claiming that she should “stand / In joint-bond bound to
satisfy the debt” (74-5), he situates her as a potential transactor in the deal. But
by referring to Susan as “such a present, such an acquittance for the knight to
seal” (94-5), he positions her both as a gift and
the legal document dis
charging his debt which Acton’s “seal” would formalize. Charles also figures
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her as currency when he values her rich jewel” (48) at 500 pounds plus “inter
est” (46), ignoring Vives’ pleas to chaste maids: “I pray thee, understand thine
own goodness, maid, thy price cannot be estimated” (104). Finally, he offers
Susan to Acton as a “pawn” in absence of “ready coin” (14.105-6). Susan’s vac
illating figuration as gift, money and potential transactor contributes to rather
than allays anxieties about the distinctions between personal and legal
exchanges, and those between gift and commodity.
Because he is freed from the burden of redeeming his family’s name,
Charles can enlist the riches of Susan to save him from incurring “the world’s
disgrace” (14.12) by dying indebted to his enemy. When he tells Susan,
“tricked . . . like a bride” (1), “It lies in thee ... to acquit me free, / And all my
debt I may outstrip by thee” (16-17), she responds much as does Isabella,
“tricked” like a novice nun, to Lucio’s suggestion that she might “assay what
pow’r you have” to help Claudio (Measure 1.4.76). Isabella’s halting questions
— “Alas, what poor / Ability’s in me to do him good? . . . My power? Alas, I
doubt —” (74-5, 77) — parallel those of Susan, who stammers: “By me? Why
I have nothing, nothing ... I am not worth —” (14.18-20). Charles interrupts
her faltering questions:

O sister, say not so.
It lies in you my downcast state to raise,
To make me stand on even points with the world.
Come, sister, you are rich! Indeed you are!
And in your power you have, without delay,
Acton’s five hundred pound back to repay.

(20-5)

Like Charles, Lucio interrupts Isabella’s “Alas, I doubt —”:
Our doubts are traitors,
And makes us lose the good we oft might win,
By fearing to attempt. Go to Lord Angelo,
And let him learn to know, when maidens sue,
Men give like gods.
(1.4.77-81)

Both sisters have to put the power of the virtue that lies “in” them into circula
tion in order for its value to be realized. Both might therefore seem to be fig
ured merely as ransom money or gift-bribes, since both sisters, unbeknownst to
themselves, are brides-(and bribes)-to-be. However, both are also themselves
transactors. Just as Charles positions Susan as a transactor “in joint-bond
bound,” Lucio positions Isabella as a suitor (“when maidens sue / Men give like
gods”). Susan, moreover, has repeatedly refused the gifts Acton has offered in
his efforts to woo her (“He dotes on me, and oft hath sent me gifts, / Letters,.
and tokens: I refused them all” [10.121-2]). Because of this continual slippage,
we cannot assert that either Susan or Isabella is merely a medium or object of
exchange, whether gift, commodity, or money.
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To understand how Susan does not function merely as an object of
exchange, a commodity or currency without value unless put in circulation, we
must attend to her interactions/transactions with Acton before Charles
becomes aware of them. Recalling that Charles has a sister, Acton plans to use
her defloration as a means of revenge, and bribing Susan with gifts is to be the
means for executing this plan: "I'll proffer largely, but the deed being done /
I’ll smile to see her base confusion” (7.83-4). When Acton first sees Susan,
however, sudden desire for her disrupts this original plan,33 as she becomes
invested with value for him independent of the relationship with Charles.
Actons sudden desire for Susan means that she is no longer an empty means of
revenge, but a desirable thing with a kind of use-value,
well
a means of
representing the personal enmity between Charles and Acton. Like Euphues,
courted by “sundry devices” of flatterers, Susan has to resist participating in a
corrupted form of exchange. She is therefore not only a desirable thing with a
use-value but a transactor, a position that enables her to refuse Actons gifts:
See, I spurn his gold; / My honour never shall for gain be sold” (9.53-4).
Acton laments that he cannot “woo her with gifts” since she refuses them (623). At this point he hatches his plan to free Charles: “I will fasten such kind
ness on her / As shall o’ercome her hate and conquer it” (66-7). The “kindness”
Acton plans to “fasten” on Susan links this plot to Johns liberal “judgment.”
Combined with Actons assertion that “In her I’ll bury my hate of him” (72),
Actons new plan to secure Susans indebtedness by using Charles illustrates
that Charles serves as a medium to solidify the relationship between Susan and
Acton as much
Susan serves to eradicate the antagonism between the two
men.34
We can also understand the obsession with female chastity, then, as a
defense against how, in some contexts, a womans desirability for heterosexual
men can incite efforts to bribe her with gifts, not just use her as a semi-com
modified gift; heterosexual male desire becomes a problem because it encour
ages the use of corrupt gifts and turns women not only into sullied objects of
exchange but into potentially corrupted transactors.35
Acton, overcome first by his desire for Susan, and then by what he calls
Charles’s “honourable wrested courtesy” (14.121), suddenly relents, recognizing
that his former desire for revenge cannot be weighed against the debt of grati
tude he would owe to Charles if he accepted Susan
“pawn :
Stern heart, relent

Was ever known in any former age
Such honorable wrested courtesy?
Lands, honors, lives, and all the world forgo
Rather than stand engaged to such a foe.

(14.118,120-3)
Despite his former efforts to bribe and exact revenge, Acton is finally forcibly
converted to the gift ethic. Although he offers marriage almost as unexpected
ly as Duke Vincentio, Acton does so as part of a competitive display of liberal-
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ity and gratitude between himself and the Mountfords. Unlike the duke, who
had to emend his proposal from a command to a generous offer, Acton has
quickly internalized the ethic of the gift. Acton’s proposal comes as both an
acceptance
Your metamorphised foe receives your gift / In satisfaction of all
former wrongs” — and a return offer: “All’s mine yours” (14.141-2,153).
Just
Angelo refuses Isabella’s prayers, which she calls a “bribe” (2.2.150)
whose value is above the fond rate (154) of the market, the “metamorphised
foe Acton receives Charles's gift.” Both sisters are spared from yielding up
their chastity. Rather than the bed trick substitutions and pretense of liberali
ty that spare Isabella from Angelo in Measure for Measure, Susan is spared by
the tortured ethos of the gift operating in the play, an ethos strained almost to
the breaking point by the logic of contractual, calculated debts, and by the mal
leable status of Susans chastity as it slides between gift, commodity, and cur
rency. In its very insistence on refusing commodity exchange, the subplot
enacts the collapse of the imaginative economies of gift and commodity. The
language of calculated debts commingles with that of debts of honor which are
beyond calculation. I therefore disagree with Nancy Gutierrez when she argues
that Susan’s use
repayment makes “all too explicit the patriarchy’s attitude
that a woman’s chastity, in spite of the idealized descriptions of its value as a
sign of worthiness and character, is a mere commodity, to be bought and sold
at male discretion” (280). Despite its centrality in “burying” the antagonism
between Acton and Charles, the status of Susan’s chastity is far too unstable to
be conceived
a “mere commodity.” Seeing it as such discounts the way in
which Susan, refusing Acton’s bribes, acts as a willful non-transactor, not an
object of exchange. Moreover, as we have seen, the inability of a husband to
buy, sell, or give his wife’s chastity at his discretion drives the main plot of the
play. In fact, the way in which Susan’s chastity can be maneuvered in the sub
plot — the way it combines use and exchange value — brings into relief how
brittle the means for determining the value of a wife’s chastity is. Although the
language and logic at work most centrally in the subplot once Acton is “meta
morphised” figures Susan as a gift, the movement back to alliance has been
enabled by the figurative malleability and maneuverability of her maiden
chastity, and her refusal to be a corrupted recipient of Acton’s initial gifts.

6.
The volatility of Susan’s status in Woman Killed belies Gutierrez’s assertion that
“Lévi-Strauss’s thesis that the exchange of woman is the basis of culture is
applicable to early modern England” (272). In addition to discounting the
complexity of Susan’s representation, the claim that Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm is
“applicable to early modern England” assumes that kinship is the primary orga
nizational structure of this culture, since,
Rubin points out, the exchange of
women functions
the basis of the social order in those cultures based pri
marily on kinship as an organizational structure, in the absence of other gov
erning institutions, such as the law or the state. England in the sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries was not devoid of other governing institutions;
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moreover, several historians object to grounding social analysis, including
analysis of the construction of gender, in kinship. Joan Scott, for example,
argues that historical analysis must aim to discover the struggle that leads to the
“appearance of timeless permanence in binary gender representation” (43).
Scott critiques scholarship that focuses exclusively, or even primarily, on kinship
as the domain where gender is constructed for helping to efface such struggle:

Some scholars, notably anthropologists, have restricted the use of gender to
the kinship system (focusing on household and family as the basis for social
organization). We need a broader view that includes not only kinship but
also . . . the labor market (a sex-segregated labor market is a part of the
process of gender construction), education (all-male, single-sex, or coedu
cational institutions are part of the same process), and the polity (universal
male suffrage is part of the process of gender construction). . . . Gender
constructed through kinship, but not exclusively; it is constructed as well in
the economy and the polity, which, in our society at least, now operate
largely independently of kinship.
(43-4)36
Although he does not claim that kinship bears no relation to other institutions
or organizations, Keith Wrightson argues convincingly against the view that
kinship is the basic organizational unit of the local community in early modern
England. He points to great variation in who was recognized as kin, illustrat
ing how “kinship shaded into friendship in its practical importance. It was one
of many social bonds, rather than a dominant principle in the social structure,
one of many foundations on which the individual might build up a network of
social contacts” (50).
A wholesale importation of the exchange-of-women concept into England
in our period introduces the potential for making inaccurate generalizations.
Regarding marriage and inheritance practices, it only applies to those with
property (and even among those with property, not just fathers and potential
suitors “bargain”),37 it fails to consider the legal and social status of widows, and
many historians question the prevalence of arranged, enforced marriage even
among the propertied.38 The uncritical use of the exchange-of-women concept
also has the potential of effacing the extent to which women were transactors
themselves — at market, in the household, at birthings and christenings,
patrons, as providers of charity,
audiences at the theater39 — in addition to
conveyors of their own vows and bodies. Susan and Isabella are situated as
transactors as much as they function as gifts or money. Although she functions
partially as a gift between Charles and Acton, Susan, in her very refusal to
transact with Acton, is a potential transactor. Using the concept uncritically
not only ignores women s potential transactors but also can efface the extent
to which women could and did resist their positioning
objects of exchange.
The uncritical application of the traffic-in-women paradigm needs modifi
cation not only when one thinks of it as a literal structure organizing the social
formation; for early modern England, it needs careful refinement if used
figurative construct or even as a governing fiction. To assert that women are

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14
a

78

Editors: Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (2000/2001): Full issue

74

Journal x

objects of exchange ignores the fact that there is more than one kind of object
of exchange, and that there
more than one system of exchange by which
objects circulate. One cannot assert that women function like commodities, or
that women’s sexuality
a commodity, without considering the distinctions
between commodities and gifts. Strictly speaking, a commodity is alienable;
that is, although it a possession, it is distinct from its owner. As Marx says
at the opening of Capital: “A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside
us” (43), and hence it is transferable to others. Though owned by, or proper to,
an individual or group, a commodity is transferable to others through sale or
barter. Once a marriage “transaction” takes place, thinking literally, a woman
no longer has exchange-value; she is no longer transferable, at least according
to dominant, normative ideologies of marriage. As husband and wife become
“one flesh,” the maid/commodity is no longer an “object outside” her husband.
As the Frankford-Wendoll plot painstakingly unravels, a married woman is
“out of circulation,” and a married man cannot become one with both his wife
and his beloved friend. Also strictly speaking, the exchange-value of a com
modity is calculable according to the going rate. The value of a woman’s chasti
ty, at least in the ideal construction of it, exceeds calculation, priceless, and
hence is positioned conceptually in the gift economy. Unlike the exchange of
commodities, as Nancy Hartsock notes, the exchange of women
transforms all participants in the transaction. The buyer or seller of a com
modity remains buyer or seller after the purchase/sale, but after a woman is
exchanged, those who were strangers are now affines, and the woman her
self becomes part of another lineage, a married woman, an adult. Every
participant occupies a different place afterward.
(275)40
This social transformation of both transactors and transacted approximates the
effects of gift exchange that forges ongoing affiliations between transactors.
But however much the exchange of women approximates the exchange of
gifts, and despite the effort to position women’s chastity in the gift sphere, the
gift of chastity is one that cannot really be given. Rather, it is moré often seen
potentially lost or violated. Chastity is a woman’s virtue, but once she is mar
ried it is not hers to give. Rights of sexual access belong to a husband, but his
wife’s chastity is not a gift which he can bestow on others either. A woman can
lose her chastity or give it up — for money, to save her brother’s life or honor —
but she exchanges the loss of it for this other thing. She is forced to weigh the
negative value of its loss against the value of what she is losing it for. More
over, if desired sexually, women’s chaste bodies do not, like gifts, function as the
“mere badge” of transactors’ goodwill. In the idealist gift scheme, the locus of
value not in the “matter of the benefit,” but things need to be exchanged in
order to manifest or betoken the “benefit itself.” This need for a transaction
event in order to express idealized ties between men becomes a problem when
one or both of the exchange partners has desire for the material object itself.
The best intentions of a giver cannot control the power of the matter of the
benefit to engage the affective or erotic energies of the recipient. This yet
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another way in which the gift relation cannot be utterly separated from the
commodity relation. The gift, as a thing, is in principle the “badge” or token of
some other good, not valued or even desired in its own right. Once they are
valued/desired in their own right (as objects or things or even as persons)
women cannot be used
gifts between men. Once the transactors’ erotic or
affective energies are engaged, woman-as-object-of-exchange slips into a dif
ferent register.
Deliberately or not, the drama that centers on questions of female chastity
and marriage exposes how a sharp distinction cannot be drawn between gift and
commodity exchange. In the plays, marriage is seen to incorporate elements of
both forms of exchange, disrupting other social bonds and itself being disrupt
ed by them. The ethic of the gift, markedly absent in Measurefor Measure, has
to be manufactured by the duke in order to keep female chastity in controlled
circulation. In A Woman Killed with Kindness this ethic, and the power of con
science that underlies it, pushed almost to the breaking point. The plays are
problems because they expose the contradictions that arise when one tries to
distinguish sharply between exchange motivated by the desire for personal or
social bonds, enforceable only by trust, and that motivated by the individual’s
desire for profit, enforceable only by legal coercion. By offering plots and char
acters who try to position women as objects of exchange, the plays expose that
such a sharp distinction between gift relations and commodity relations cannot
be drawn; in the process, they show how female sexuality exceeds the means for
establishing value in either system of exchange. However central to the main
tenance of the dominant social order, female chastity confounds the economic
imagination by eluding its governing constructs.

Notes
1. In “Constructing Female Sexuality in the Renaissance,” Neely aptly
articulates the reasons for the period’s concern with female chastity:
Female sexuality at the center of Renaissance definitions of female gen
der roles. The source of women’s power, it demands their subordination.
Female sexuality necessary for men to satisfy their desires and to fulfill
their gender role requirements appropriately.... But it is potentially uncon
trollable or unobtainable; it reminds men that they are all vulnerable moth
er’s sons, that all children are potentially illegitimate. . . . The reiterated
admonitions in the prescriptive literature that women should be chaste,
modest, silent, and obedient are directed to a single end. Modesty, silence,
and obedience all ensure chastity.
(212-3)
See also the discussions of the cultural and dramatic discourses of female sexu
ality in Breitenberg, Carroll, and DiGangi.
2. I have benefited from Carroll’s attention to the importance of negation
in Shakespeare’s representation of virginity. Rose explores how in Hamlet and
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Measurefor Measure “femininity” functions as excess that is beyond interpretive
schema and beyond representation (114). We will see in A Woman Killed With
Kindness and Measure for Measure how female sexuality, especially a wife’s
chastity, exceeds the means for determining value of both gift and commodity
exchange. In “The Cultural Biography of Things,” Kopytoff explains the
notion of the “singular” or “sacralized” versus the “common,” notions that pro
vide way to understand some of the confusions surrounding female chastity
and the need to complicate the “exchange of women” concept that I have been
stressing here. He asserts: “To be saleable for money or to be exchangeable for
a wide array of other things to have something in common with a large num
ber of exchangeable things that, taken together, partake of a single universe of
comparable values. . . . [T]o be saleable or widely exchangeable is common —
the opposite of being incomparable, singular, unique, and therefore not
exchangeable for anything else” (69). Although Kopytoff argues that these are
“ideal polar types” that no “real economic system could conform to either” (6970), he suggests, following Durkheim, that “societies need to set apart a certain
portion of their environment, marking it
‘sacred,’” and that “singularizaron
is one means to this end” (73). Singularized, sacralized, female chastity is con
structed again and again in the sphere of the gift; but it serves as a gift that has
“terminal” exchange status — once given, it can’t be exchanged again. Women
have relatively greater “commodity candidacy,” mainly in the marriage transac
tion, but female chastity, which defines women’s marriageability, is constructed
partially as a gift. The repeated efforts to mark their chastity as a prime value,
one that cannot be priced, shows a defensive effort to sacralize their sexuality,
to singularize it so that it is not exchangeable for counterpart values. We will
see how the duke’s machinations and the bed trick in Measurefor Measure, and
the “honorable wrested courtesy” of the Mountfords, belie this effort.
3. See Neely’s Broken Nuptials (58-64) for a history of the term “problem
plays.” On Measure in particular, see 92-102. On the critical history of A
Woman Killed with Kindness, see Baines’s Thomas Heywood (79-103), Spacks,
Bromley, and the introduction in Scobie’s edition. It is interesting to me that
much of the negative evaluation of Heywood’s drama lambasts him for pander
ing to commercial tastes; he is attacked for being “a purveyor of this kind of
ware” (xi), a phrase coined by A. C. Swinburne in 1908 and made famous by T.
S. Eliot.
4. The first three books of De Beneficiis were translated by Nicholas Hay
ward, The Line ofLiberalitie Dulie Directinge the
Bestowing ofBenefits (1569;
STC 12939). Seneca’s work was also translated by Thomas Lodge, the author
of An Alarum Against Usurers, a cautionary tale of one young man’s victimiza
tion by a usurer and his agent. Lodge’s first translation of De Beneficiis appears
with a translation of all of Seneca’s prose works in 1613, enlarged in a second
edition in 1620 (STC 22213, 22214).
5. See Cowie for a discussion of how Lévi-Strauss’s exchange of women
concept presupposes what it aims to explain, positing the “value” of woman
prior to culture. Hartsock’s critique of Rubin (293-303) is a wonderfully lucid
theoretical account of how Rubin replicates the problems in Lévi-Strauss. Also
see Henrietta Moore, especially 60-2, on the debate over the exchange of
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women concept among anthropologists. She points to a fundamental concep
tual distinction between discussing women's access to property and seeing them
as a kind of property. This conceptual issue is explored in Strathern. The dif
ference between women as autonomous subjects and as objects in Renaissance
ideologies of marriage is addressed by Belsey.
6. See my “Peopling, Profiting and Pleasure in The Tempest” for a reading
of Miranda that likewise complicates the notion of woman as object of
exchange.
7. See The Lawes Resolution of Womens Rights, 41-7, on dower and jointure,
the exchanges of property that accompany marriage.
8. Swinburne was a leading ecclesiastical lawyer whose work on testaments
and spousals remained standard references for over a century. Of Spousals was
published posthumously. For a discussion of Swinburne and the relation
between common and civil law, see Palliser 359. See Ingram 125-67 for a full
discussion of the legal jurisdiction over marriage. On the difficulties encoun
tered because of competing conceptions of what constituted matrimony, see
Cook, chapter 8. Hayne offers an excellent discussion of how Measurefor Mea
sure intervenes in the debates about the social practices and legalities of
betrothal and marriage
well as helpful summary of critical commentary on
these issues in the play.
9. By de-emphasizing the importance of consummation, Swinburne
departs from The Lawes Resolution of Womens Rights, in which consummation
more central. See Book II, section xxi and Book III, section i.
10. As Wheeler points out, despite his expression of contempt for Pom
pey’s profession (3.2.20-8), the duke approaches it himself (121-2). He argues
that the duke nonetheless exalted over Angelo by play’s end. The exaltation
of the duke takes the form of his liberality; because the play exposes the machi
nations and reliance on degraded forms of exchange entailed in staging the
duke’s liberality, I disagree with Wheeler’s reading of him as the “unacknowl
edged victim” of the comic design. In her focus on the duke as a theatricalist
who arouses the conscience of his spectators, Diehl offers a more salutary view
of him than my reading allows for. Diehl acknowledges, however, that the duke
figures an “imperfect playwright” who can be understood in terms of Calvin
ist notions of depravity.
11. McFeely argues that the play registers Shakespeare’s respect for monas
ticism, and for Isabella’s efforts to keep her chastity out of circulation by enter
ing the convent. She points to the convent as a locus of hospitality (203), one
of the period’s most salient forms of gift exchange,
Heal’s extensive study
demonstrates.
12. Sundelson argues that the duke earns Isabella’s perpetual gratitude by
defining a hierarchy — patron and debtor — in his marriage offer (88). Also
see Baines, “Assaying the Power of Chastity” on how the duke’s marriage offer
exploits the pretense of liberality.
13. Dollimore discusses sexual offense as a seeming threat to authority that
in fact legitimates it.
14. Pompey’s sensitivity to the relation between the law against fornication
and the “laws“ of supply, demand, and market value is like that of Launcelot in
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The Merchant of Venice when he jests that the conversion of Jews will raise the
price of pork:
We were Christians enough before, e’en as many as could well live one by
another. This making of Christians will raise the price of hogs. If we grow
all to be pork eaters, we shall not shortly have a rasher on the coals for
money.
(3.5.20-8)
15. Shell makes a similar point (98-9). Watson explores the implications
of the play’s pervasive coining imagery as well (137-8).
16. See Leonard and Kott. Also see Shell, especially chapters four and five,
on the function of exchange in the play. On the role of human bodies as fun
gible coins in the play’s vision of state-sponsored procreative love, see Watson,
135-6. Diehl examines the pattern of substitutions in the play in terms of
Calvinist notions of representation and idolatrous devotion (see especially 397403).
17. See Halpern on how the "ideology of self-equivalence” is the basis of
commodity logic (173-4).
18. Elbow, the "poor Duke’s constable” who "lean[s] upon justice” (2.1.479), embodies the ineffectiveness of formal legal regulation of sexuality and mar
riage contracts. His malaprop-filled accusations against Froth and Pompey
point to the blurring of licit and illicit sexuality, and to the inability of the law
to interrogate sexual intentions. Although he is the only legally married man
in the play, his wife is "done” (2.1.118,140,142) in Mistress Overdone’s broth
el, or so the cryptic scene suggests. Pompey punningly hints that it is Elbow’s
wife’s own pregnancy-induced "longing” that brings her into the brothel (8990). Arguing that chastity a political principle because it the principle of
the integrity of the family, itself a political unit, Jaffa comments that Elbow
ironically the play’s only "family man” (182-4).
19. Parolles’s arguments for forsaking virginity are echoed by Lucilla’s
father Ferardo, early in Euphues when he tries to control her sexuality by con
vincing her to marry:
This grieveth me most, that thou art almost vowed to the vain order of the
vestal virgins. ... If thy mother had been of that mind when she was a
maiden, thou hadst not now been born to be of this mind to be a virgin.
Weigh with thyself what slender profit they bring to the commonwealth,
what slight pleasure to themselves, what great grief to their parents. . . .
Therefore, Lucilla, if thou have any care to be a comfort to my hoary hairs
or a commodity to thy commonweal, frame thyself to that honourable
estate of matrimony,
(Lyly 71)

By abandoning her vow to remain a virgin, the argument runs, Lucilla will be a
"comfort” and a "commodity,” combining the performance of filial duty and ser
vice to the state. Interestingly, Ferardo’s argument also appeals to the satisfac
tion of young women’s own "pleasure.”
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20. For a discussion of how feudal property relations establish a link
between landholding, marriage and procreation, and how this link in turn
defines womens subordinate position and leads to efforts to control female sex
uality, see Middleton. The violation of marital chastity could bring legal action
in the period, although questions remain about how enforceable these laws
were. See Fletcher and Stevenson 32-3, on the increased attention on the part
of nonecclesiastical court justices to efforts to enforce such laws in 1600-1660.
Also see Ingram.
21. Baines thus explains why the violation of chastity in particular is the
vice selected to reestablish law and order in Vienna. She argues that the play
exposes that chastity a socially and politically determined virtue, rather than
a religious one. As Shell points out, the play focuses on fornication because its
prohibition is the “bulwark of politics and the law itself ” (33).
22. The crucial exception to this pattern comes in the second scene when
a quarrel between the servants and “country fellows” ends with the friendly
clasping of hands in dance. Thus, the corruption or dissolution of promise
class-marked; Heywood’s country folk easily overcome the antagonisms that
impede the friendly handclasp that betokens a faithful promise.
23. My efforts to use the drama to historicize the particular forms of
exchange at work in early modern England are indebted to the theoretical work
of Gregory and the essays by Appadurai and Kopytoff.
24. The usurer is the scapegoat for the whole culture, which uses usury to
explain the economic and social upheaval precipitated by the move toward cap
italistic forms of production and the rise of money form. The plays with usurers
often manipulate the contrasts and overlaps between the bond of fellowship
and legal bonds. Cf. Shylock in The Merchant of Venice and Sir Giles Overreach
in A New Way to Pay Old Debts.
25. Bach asserts that the play “is not about the heterosexual couple in any
way that that couple is now recognizable to us” (504). She argues that the focus
in the critical tradition on the married couple “has obscured some the play’s
central issues” (505), especially its exploration of homosocial relations between
men. I am indebted to Bach’s attention to Anne and John “enmeshed in the
network of friendship, service and kinship relations that the play continually
represents” (509). Gutierrez suggests that the play exposes the inadequacy of
marriage, family, and patriarchal authority as the source of social order, and,
with Wendoll’s disruption of the husband-wife dyad, the tension between “fam
ily interrelationships and extra-familial bondings” (268). Christensen offers a
convincing analysis of the tensions in the play and in the culture that follow
from the transitional nature of household economy in the period.
26. Cf. Orlin’s argument that the old code of Renaissance male friendship
and beneficence can no longer obtain under the new domestic ethic (138,180).
Bach’s reading of Wendoll is likewise instructive: Wendoll “endangers the
bonds between men by identifying too closely with the source of economic
power — Frankford — without possessing a means of allying to that power —
without a female affine who can be traded to form an alliance” (517).
27. Again we see how corrupted exchange class-marked for Heywood.
Wendoll says “I will return. / And I divine, however now dejected, / My worth
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and parts being by some great man praised, / At my return I may in court be
raised” (16.134-7). As in Lyly’s Euphues, aristocrats and courtiers are con
structed as corrupt transactors.
28. Christensen notes how Frankford dwells at length on the wasted gifts
that he has bestowed on Anne, despite the fact that Wendoll has been his pri
mary recipient (333-6).
29. See Wentworth on how the main plot of the play “domesticates” the
fall and repentance pattern of the medieval morality. McLuskie discusses the
iconic, static nature of the play’s presentation of Anne’s punishment and repen
tance (134-6).
30. For a wonderful reading of the way the play blunts and parodies its own
didacticism, see Moisan, who argues that the play destabilizes “the fixity of the
social order in which the husband would claim his victory” (173). His analysis
of how the play “exposes the weaknesses in the very patriarchalist prescriptions
it ostensibly affirms” (178) is consistent with my argument here.
31. Moisan reads the relation between the main plot and subplot in terms
compatible with my own; see 178ff.
32. McLuskie points out the combination of metaphor and dramatic struc
ture concerning honor and the jewel of virginity at work in Heywood’s subplot
(127). Charles Mountford’s metaphor of defloration equates commodifying the
land with female sexual despoliation. His metaphor not only shows the inter
dependence of gendered constructions of honor, it feminizes aristocratic
male/family honor. This same metaphorical move made in discussions of the
sale of titles and honors under James I. In their efforts to impeach James’s
favorite Buckingham, members of both houses of Parliament attacked “[t]he
introduction of this new trade and commerce of honor” (Peck 194); they
claimed that before Buckingham “honor was a virgin and undeflowered” (1945). These metaphors of defloration — the conceptual equation of commodifi
cation and female sexual despoliation that they enact — reveal the interrelated
concerns over what should or should not be passed in unrestricted exchange —
the exchange status of objects, whether land or women, and the gendered
notions of honor that inhere in them.
33. The way in which Acton’s desire for Susan disrupts his desire for
revenge might be compared to how Volpone’s desire for Celia disrupts his
scheme to cheat the legacy hunters who “contend in gifts, as they would seem
in love” (Jonson 1.1.84). Like Susan, Celia is positioned as a slippery combi
nation of gift and commodity, but it is “funnier” in Celia’s case because it is her
husband who is doing so.
34. My argument here departs from Bach’s emphasis on the centrality of
homosocial bonds in the play.
35. Swinburne betrays discomfort over how gifts can be used both to solid
ify a spousal and as “bait” (210) or a means of seduction (209). He both ideal
izes the exchange of the ring
a symbol of the matrimonial bond (207-8) and
laments how its significance can be debased by desire for the material object
itself.
36. Scott is to some extent mistaken in her critique since, for anthropolo
gists, kinship does not simply refer to “household and family,” as she implies
here.
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37. See Cook, chapter five, especially 105-9. Greene and Kahn address the
need to consider women
matchmakers and bearers of wealth (10-12).
38.
See, for example, Wrightson and Ingram
39. See Cahn’s Industry ofDevotion and Chaytor and Lewis’s introduction
to Clark for a discussion of the changing relation of women and the “domestic
economy” to the market in this period. See Heal on birth celebrations as an
“essentially female ritual” (81) and on women’s use of the household as a “sphere
of social action through generosity” (178-83). Harris discusses elite women as
politically influential patrons and gift-givers. Willen discusses ordinary
women’s varying roles as dispensers of charity in poverty relief programs. Argu
ing that women’s work in this area shows the inapplicability of our definitions
of public and private (197), she reveals how women “routinely worked in the
public marketplace to sustain their households; when employed by civic author
ities to perform social welfare services, they served a public function, extending
welfare services to the general population” (198). See also Howard. Gurr pre
sents good evidence of women as playgoers.
40. My formulation, here and throughout, of how women function vari
ously gifts, commodities, and non-gifts and non-commodities — and of the
important differences between materialist and idealist conceptions of value —
is greatly indebted to Hartsock’s critique of Lévi-Strauss and of Rubin’s use of
Lévi-Strauss’s kinship theory in “The Traffic in Women.” For research assis
tance on this
I would like to thank John Crossley.
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In a late poem called “The Planet on the Table,” Wal
lace Stevens observes that a book of verse lying on
table top is simultaneously both a part of the world
and a world unto itself. For Stevens, the book can be
compared to a planet — an independent system with
its own gravity, atmosphere, orbital, etcetera — only
if the poems within

should bear
Some lineament or character,
Some affluence, if only half-perceived,
In the poverty of their words,
Of the planet of which they were part.
(Collected Poetry and Prose 450; emphasis added)

With a slight modulation of their subject clause,
Stevens’ lines also describe the challenge facing con
temporary poets: that their work should bear some
lineament or character, some affluence, if only half
perceived, in the poverty of their words, of the plan
et of which they are part. This problematic has been
discussed under various critical rubrics in our univer
sities, most recently within the debates surrounding
the question of authenticity in contemporary Eng
lish-language writing. Authenticity, seen through
the prism of Stevens’ “Planet on the Table,” can be
read
the test of a poem’s worldliness, the text’s
commitment to its own point of origin. Poets as dif
ferent in style
C. D. Wright and Derek Walcott
have conducted vigorous and prolonged researches
into new methods of establishing this kind of
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“authentic” relation between poem and place of origin; and perhaps no living
poet has negotiated this problem under so much critical scrutiny as Seamus
Heaney. In this essay I will discuss the various strategies employed by Heaney
in the construction and assertion of a place for his poetry in the world; these
strategies range from a deep exploration of the relation between poesis and labor
to a phenomenological account of the tactile sense, ending with the poet’s
ongoing investigation into the play between frames of reference and “centralityHeaney’s verse often approaches the problem of poetry’s place by con
structing a sense of physical place within the poem itself. We see this in lyrics
such
Anahorish and Broagh,” poems whose titles correspond to placenames in the Irish countryside. This poetic act locates the lyric on the most
basic level, that of geography. In his discussion of “Broagh,” Neil Corcoran has
commented on the way topography and typography enter into an almost chiastic relation within the space of the poem:
both place and place-name are being very self-consciously translated out of
actual topography into what we might call the topography of the poem, or
the place of the text, by the way it foregrounds that “black O,” the word
“Broagh” itself, and the last “gh” by distinguishing them in italic font. The
original place is, we might say, visibly displacing itself into the place of
writing.
(48)

Beyond the microscopic level of typography, Heaney often constructs his poet
ic tableaux on the spatial or phenomenological level, as in the anaphoric open
ing stanza of “Field Work”: “ Where the sally tree went pale in every breeze, /
where the perfect eye of the nesting blackbird watched, / where one fern was
always green” (Selected Poems 121; emphasis added) or the deftly situated musi
cian of “The Singer’s House”:

who might stand at the end of summer
in the mouth of a whitewashed turf-shed,
his shoulder to the jamb, his song
a rowboat far out in evening.
(Selected Poems 122)

We can compare the powerfully located and posed figures of Heaney’s verse to
the rootless and unstable subject positions of John Ashbery’s figures, who seem
perpetually thrown off-balance by questions such as, “is anything central?”
(“The One Thing That Can Save America,” [Self-Portrait 21]) in a world where
"dark spirits and connivance / underlay the people-mover it spirals ever high
er beyond the counterpane of colored wooden crows” (Flow Chart 65-6;
emphasis added). In Heaney’s verse, individuals strongly resist the states of flux
and dislocation represented by Ashbery’s preternatural "people-mover.” They
assert the body’s situation within the spaces of the world.
In the following pages, I will refer to the poetic act of situating or posi
tioning figures within a lyric landscape as "stationing.” Stationing is the con
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struction of a habitable physical space within a poem, and the positioning of a
body within that space. I borrow the term from Keats, who writes in the mar
gins of his copy of Paradise Lost

Milton in every instance pursues his imagination to the utmost — he is
“sagacious of his Quarry,” he sees Beauty on the wing, pounces upon it and
gorges it to the producing his essential verse. .. . But in no instance this
sort of perseverance more exemplified than in what may be called his sta
tioning or statu[a]ry. He is not content with simple description, he must
station, — thus here, we not only see how the Birds “with clang despised the
ground” but we see them “under a cloud in prospect” So we see Adam “Fair
indeed and tall— under a plantane” — and so we see Satan “disfigured— on
the Assyrian Mount.
Here, Keats proposes that scenes in Milton are more fully spatialized than cor
responding scenes in other poets’ work. We see not only Adam, but the tree
over his head as well; he is part of a landscape. The same imaginative courtesy
is accorded to Adam’s adversary, Satan, who appears with the Assyrian Mount
underfoot. Heaney consistently shows an imaginative affinity with Keats’s
marginalia, as his poetry is full of references to the act of stationing and to the
idea of the station, a concern most immediately apparent in the titles of his two
books, Stations and Station Island. In each volume, the word “station” takes on
a redoubled significance, adding a sense of moral and spiritual stationing to the
Keatsian sense of the station as a physical place.
Yet at its most literal level, being “stationed” in Heaney means simply main
taining a contact with the earth, as exemplified by the agricultural workers of
his earliest books, the inhumed bog people of North, and the kneeling moments
of penance in “Station Island” (Selected Poems 187). And at a metaphorical and
mythic level, the ideal of gravitas, Heaney’s double invocation of the Antaeus
myth in North, and the lover’s dream of sleeping “in a moss in Donegal / On
turf banks under blankets” (“Glanmore Sonnets,” Selected Poems 133) all gesture
downwards, to the point of contact between our bodies and the earth. Several
critics have commented upon Heaney’s penchant for constructing lyric spaces
that are stationed firmly on the ground.2 In his reading of “Bogland,” Harold
Bloom attributes Heaney’s earthbound stance to the poet’s visionary skepticism
(2); Henry Hart outlines Heaney’s terrestrial grounding in the agricultural-pas
toral tradition (9-31); and Sidney Burris goes on to elaborate the relation
between the pastoral earth and Heaney’s democratizing insistence upon parity
(as opposed to the hieratic and hierarchizing) in the fourth chapter of The Poet
ry of Resistance (91-117). Each critical impulse arises from Heaney’s self
restriction along the vertical spatial axis; readers of this poet are rarely propelled
skyward or cast precipitously into the depths, as in a poem such as Shelley’s
“Ode to the West Wind.”
But this poet limits his imaginative spaces along a horizontal axis as well.
We often find that our perceptual range is limited to the middle distance at best
in Heaney’s verse, an effect he attributes to the topographical variations of his
native landscape in a poem such as “Bogland”: “We have no prairies / To slice
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a big sun at evening — / Everywhere the eye concedes to / Encroaching hori
zon (Selected
22). The lack of a Great Plains region in Ireland is, how
ever, only one reason for this spatial contraction in Heaney, the limits of the
human body also delimit and demarcate the poet’s constructions of space.
Heaney prefers enclosed spaces that seem molded to the shape of the individual’s
form, no broader than one’s armspan, not much higher than one’s head. This
preference for the cloistered and snug manifests in Heaney’s striking impulse to
station himself in trees, an impulse probed in the disguised sonnet, “Oracle”:

Hide in the hollow trunk
of the willow tree

small mouth and ear
in a woody cleft,
lobe and larynx
of the mossy places.
(Selected Poems 34)

We watch Heaney indulge this affinity for the space of the tree-bole repeated
ly in his Sweeney Astray translation, and again in the revisited, modernized
Sweeney of “In the Beech”: “the tree itself a strangeness and a comfort . . . /
My hidebound boundary tree. My tree of knowledge. / My thick-tapped, softfledged, airy listening post” (Selected Poems 213). There is a nearly encomiastic
attitude toward the space of the beech trunk in these lines; the tree as a listen
ing post, as enclosed lobe and larynx, figures as one of the primary stations of
poetic composition in Heaney’s verse.
It is worth noting that poetry is almost never generated out in the open in
Heaney, as it is in Wordsworths Prelude — “I, methought, while the sweet
breath of Heaven / Was blowing upon my body, felt within / A corresponding,
mild, creative breeze” (Selected Poetry and
198) — or in Whitman’s Song
of the Open Road.” Heaney’s poetry is the product of concealed and hidden
areas, spaces fitted to the poet’s body as the womb is to a gestating fetal form.
Even the architectural space of the study or den, the literal site of writing, car
ries this womb-like aspect:
I liked it low and closed,
Its claustrophobic, nest-up-in-the-roof
Effect. I liked the snuff-dry feeling,
The perfect, trunk-fid fit of the old ceiling.
Under there, it was all hutch and hatch.
The blue slates kept the heat like midnight thatch.
(“Skylight Sonnet,” Seeing Things 37)
Though the sonnet goes on to endorse the speaker’s wife’s decision to break
open this cloistered space through the introduction of a skylight, the final six
lines fail to undo this passage’s initial, emphatic praise of the den’s contracted
area. The den, along with the tree-cleft, is an enclosed space of poetic compo
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sition. Like Matisse, Heaney often takes up the site of artistic production (the
painter’s studio for the former, the writing den for the latter) as a subject for
representation. This is the most dramatic and direct strategy possible for
demarcating an independent, hermetic space for the aesthetic. Early into the
"Squarings” section of Seeing Things, Heaney thematizes the process of con
structing a studio space in a lyric that borders on the metaliterary:

Roof it again. Batten down. Dig in.
Drink out of tin. Know the scullery cold,
A latch, a door-bar, forged tongs and a grate.
Touch the cross-beam, drive iron in a wall,
Hang a line to verify the plumb
From lintel, coping-stone and chimney-breast.

Relocate the bedrock in the threshold.
Take squarings from the recessed gable pane.
Make your study the unregardedfloor
Sink every impulse like a bolt. Secure
The bastion of sensation. Do not waver
Into language. Do not waver in it.
("Lightenings II,” Seeing Things 56; emphasis added)

There is an almost Brechtian exposure of the processes and machinery of how
a space is constructed here. The curt, end-stopped sentences, the imperative
voice, and the insistent materiality of the poem ("Do not waver into language”)
all tend to efface its status as a "lyric” in the hieratic, spiritualized sense of the
word; this is a poem that reads like an instruction manual. Helen Vendler reads
the "Squarings” series as partaking of an "effort of re-imagining everything —
not representing it numerically as it happened; not representing it embalmed in
memory; but representing it on an abstract and symbolic plane that presents
itself such” (151); and here, that abstract and symbolic space looks much like
the actual space of a writer’s study, a poet’s station. The space in "Lightenings
II” wholly enclosed and centered on the composition of poetry; its walls block
out both the natural world and social life; like a small fortress, the stanzas
(momentarily) protect and secure a place for poetry.
But spatial constructions can only provide a temporary and provisional
grounding for poesis for a poet dwelling in the social world. Under the pres
sures of shared life, the basic act of physical stationing must develop into a more
thorough act of location; the poet must establish a place for the lyric within the
registers of social discourse. To do so, poets (and especially ones from North
ern Ireland) must enter into a dialogue with other participants in culture and
political life. Heaney takes up this problem at the very outset of his first
Oxford lecture, entitled "The Redress of Poetry”: "Professors of poetry, apolo
gists for it, practitioners of it, from Sir Philip Sidney to Wallace Stevens, all
sooner or later are tempted to show how poetry’s existence as a form of art
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relates to our existence as citizens of society — how it is ofpresent use" (Redress
1; emphasis added). The question of use hangs over the history of poetic dis
course from its beginnings. To secure a position within the social world,
Heaney feels the poet must answer his or her fellow-citizens’ question: "Why
do we need you?” This question of need is further complicated for Heaney by
his family’s agricultural background and by the situation of agricultural prac
tices within the political history of Northern Ireland; Daniel Tobin has point
ed out how the problems of need (specifically, hunger) and colonial politics
intersect in Heaney’s early literary consciousness at the historical topos of the
Great Famine (34).
Another poet might respond to this problem by enlarging the convention
al definition of "need” to include nonphysical aspects of experience, such as
spiritual or emotional need. But to answer the question on its own terms,
Heaney finds it necessary to address questions of need on the most basic, phys
ical level at the outset of his career. This encounter between poetry and the
question of survival takes place at the scene of labor in Heaney’s work. Seen in
terms of utility and pragmatism, the act of writing poetry stands in an almost
adversarial relation to the act of physical labor in society; labor as "necessary”
to the clothing, feeding, and sheltering of human beings as poetry is "unneces
sary.” Labor seems "this-worldly,” just as poetry can seem "otherworldly.” So
the poet and the laborer, like the scientist and the priest, comprise a linked yet
irreconcilable pair. Poets (and laborers) have known this for a long time. Yeats,
for instance, writes:

Better go down upon your marrow-bones
And scrub a kitchen pavement, or break stones
Like an old pauper, in all kinds of weather;
For to articulate sweet sounds together
Is to work harder than all these, and yet
Be thought an idler by the noisy set
Of bankers, schoolmasters, and clergymen
The martyrs call the world.
("Adam’s Curse,” Poems 132; emphasis added)

By placing literary activity in such close proximity to vivid descriptions of
strenuous physical labor, Yeats makes a case (through apposition) for the work
like aspect of writing poetry. This is one strategy for assigning use-value to
poetic discourse: the poet analogizes writing and work.3 Yet David Lloyd
argues that Heaney subscribes to a false model of continuity between literary
and physical labor:
the predicament of a literary culture as a specialized mode of labor is that
it is set over against non-cultural labor, yet Heaney’s writing continually
rests in the untested assumption that a return is possible through writing
back to the "illiterate” culture from which it stems and with which, most
importantly, it remains at all times continuous.
(165)
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The same could be said (incorrectly, to my mind) of “Adam’s Curse.” Yeats’s
modeling of literary activity
“continuous” with physical labor (which we see
again in the divine colt who shivers “under the lash, strain, sweat and jolt / As
though it dragged road metal” in “The Fascination of What’s Difficult” [Poems
188]) is only one way in which work enters into the aesthetic field. If writing
can be compared to dragging road metal or breaking stones, then manual work
can also acquire the traits of poetry; that is, labor can be claimed, reified, and
brought within the space of the lyric. In the next few pages I will try to show
how Heaney gradually develops a model of labor within the lyric that demon
strates the phenomenological continuity between what Lloyd characterizes as
“cultural” and “non-cultural” modes of work.
The poeticization of labor dates back at least to Virgil’s georgics and Latin
verse, and to Hesiod and Homer in Greek poetry. In the wake of the eigh
teenth-century revival of the didactic georgic within English literature, the
Romantic poets turned their attention to the representation of labor as its own
aesthetic telos. Wordsworth repeatedly poeticizes the acts of shepherding, reap
ing, and husbandry throughout his work, as in the description of the shepherd
Michael’s wife: “two wheels she had / Of antique form; this large, for spinning
wool; / That small, for flax; and if one wheel had rest, / It was because the other
was at work” (“Michael,” Selected Poetry and Prose 142). What is the “useful”
work accomplished by poetry in these lines? Here, the act of writing memori
alizes the housewife’s daily acts of labor; the words on the page replicate and
preserve a practice (the spinning of wool and flax) that may disappear alto
gether from culture. Wordsworth assumes the stance of an elegist for rural ways
of life; rather than competing with and degrading the act of physical work (as
in Yeats’s verse), Wordsworth translates laborious activity into figuration and,
by extension, into cultural memory.
The problem for this kind of approach to labor in the lyric is a technical
one, one of adapting the English lyric mode, with its traditional emphasis on
the worlds of love and spirituality, to the representation of vigorous work-activ
ity. Wordsworth, for instance, often gives the impression of simply annotating
the fact of pastoral work without entering into a deeper phenomenological
exploration of the laborer’s experience.4 Among contemporary poets, Heaney
has been most consistently concerned with creating a lyric structure to accom
modate the fact of manual work. That he begins his project in the Wordswor
thian mode is evident in a poem like “Blackberry-Picking,” with its strong
echoes of “Nutting”:
hunger
Sent us out with milk-cans, pea-tins, jam-pots
Where briars scratched and wet grass bleached our boots.
Round hayfields, cornfields, and potato-drills
We trekked and picked until the cans were full,
Until the tinkling bottom had been covered
With green ones, and on top big dark blobs burned
Like a plate of eyes. Our hands were peppered
With thorn pricks, our palms sticky
Bluebeard’s.
(Selected Poems 7)
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The child's mock quest, the subtle violence of reaping the natural world, and an
unnerving sense of having been perceived by nature (in Heaney’s “plate of eyes”
and Wordsworth’s “spirit in the woods” [“Nutting,” Selected Poetry and Prose
107]) align the two lyrics. But Heaney’s child is moved less by the sense of
juvenile play than by a feeling of physical need, driven by a hunger rather than
“the eagerness of boyish hope” that motivates the young Wordsworth in the
“Nutting” fragment. This slight modulation of desire (from boyish hope to
physical hunger) within the Wordsworthian template draws Heaney’s child
away from the demesne of play and toward the regions of work and labor that
will prevail in the poet’s subsequent collections. If hunger is political within the
context of rural Ireland’s colonial history, this representation of childhood work
takes on an aspect of political activity in Heaney’s verse.
“Churning Day,” the poem that directly follows “Blackberry-Picking,” is
one of Heaney’s earliest attempts at bringing the experience of labor over into
the field of the lyric. The poet’s strategy here is adjectival:

A thick crust, coarse-grained as limestone rough-cast,
hardened gradually on top of the four crocks
that stood, large pottery bombs, in the small pantry.
After the hot brewery of gland, cud, and udder
coolporous earthenware fermented the buttermilk
for churning day, when the hooped churn was scoured
with plumping kettles and the busy scrubber
echoed daintily on the seasoned wood.
It stood then, purified, on the flagged kitchen floor.
(Death of Naturalist 21; emphasis added)
It is worth noting that most of these adjectives (thick, coarse-grained, hot, cool,
porous, hooped, and flagged) have a strong tactile aspect. But as the poem con
tinues to document the work of churning, we begin to sense a growing dispar
ity between the high tactility of the language and the conspicuous absence of
human agency in Heaney’s depiction of the churning process:

Out came the four crocks, spilled their heavy lip
of cream, their white insides, into the sterile churn.
The staff, like a great whisky muddler fashioned
in deal wood, was plunged in, the fid fitted.
My mother took first turn, set up rhythms
that slugged and thumped for hours. Arms ached.
Hands blistered. Cheeks and clothes were spattered . . .

Thirteen lines that precisely detail the churning procedure pile up before we
first glimpse a human being at the scene of labor. Until the mother’s appear
ance, the churning seems to happen of its own accord through a succession of
agentless verbs: the crust hardening, the crocks standing, and the buttermilk
fermenting without any apparent aid from human hands. And when an implied
shadow-person does indeed step into the process, he or she is elided behind a
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conspicuous use of passive constructions: to say that the hooped churn “was
scoured” and the staff “was plunged” into the churn excludes more active phrasings such as “I scoured the churn” and “my mother plunged the staff into it.”
The human laborer here is invisible, like Wordsworths spinner, whose presence
at the site of work is detectable only through the actions of her machine: “if
one wheel had rest, / It was because the other was at work.”
This opening passage from “Churning Day” can be aligned with a scene
from the Disney film Fantasia in which tools such brooms and buckets float
through the air as work tasks complete themselves without human exertion. In
the film, the self-propelled tools structure a fantasy of leisure and escape; but in
Heaney’s poem, the scene of agentless labor signals an apparent breakdown in
the representation of work. There is an emphatic refusal to station the human
subject at the scene of labor’s performance in this text. (A negative image of
this “breakdown” would be a poem or film in which we see a person pan
tomiming all of the actions of butter churning in an empty, toolless room).
This distance between the human subject and the hovering, working tools can
be interpreted as a literal avoidance of fitting tools into the human hand at the
scene of work in the lyric.5
Heaney approaches the topic of tools and the hand frequently in his early
poems, especially in Death of Naturalist. The problem of lyric figurations of
tool use even provides a structural frame for the initial poem in the Heaney
canon, “Digging,” which begins and ends with the following lines:

Between my finger and thumb
The squat pen rests; snug
a gun.
Between my finger and thumb
The squat pen rests.
I’ll dig with it.
(Selected Poems 3-4)
“Digging” enacts a kind of trial-and-error experiment in the space between this
opening and close. The lyric first proposes a hypothetical, almost metaphysical
conceit of “pen-as-gun” and, after working through its own logic of nostalgia
and memory for the next six stanzas, it closes by revising or correcting the ini
tial conceit to read “pen-as-spade.” (If the poem had followed through with its
initial figurative hypothesis, the last line would read: “I’ll shoot with it”). First,
pen X; then, pen is Y. Helen Vendler reads this trope as one of moral choice:
the Irish Catholic child grew up between the offers of two instruments: the
spade and the gun. “Choose,” said two opposing voices from his culture.
“Inherit the farm,” said agricultural tradition; “Take up arms,” said Repub
lican militarism. And indeed the poet’s first thought had been to measure,
so to speak, the pen against the sword.
(29)

However, if Heaney’s pen is poised between two moral options in this poem,
the field of potential uses for the pen stretches far beyond the poet’s initial

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14

100

Editors: Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (2000/2001): Full issue

96

Journal x

metaphorical proposition. One could imagine “Digging” as one lyric in a
sequence of figurative experiments, each one picking up where the last left off,
each one undermining and improving upon the final metaphor of its predeces
sor;
the next poem in the sequence would open with the lines: “Between my
finger and thumb / The squat pen rests; snug as a spade" and would end with
the spade’s replacement by an even closer approximation to the pen: “Between
my finger and thumb / The squat pen rests. / I’ll
with it.” This process
could be continued indefinitely, an eternal approach towards figurative accura
cy. The sequence would only find total closure, in the unattainable line: “I’ll
write with it,” a close that would undo the difference between metaphorical
vehicle and tenor. For Rand Brandes, this closure is only achieved in the much
later “Sweeney Redivivus” section of Station Island, where “[t]he pen remains
pen and is not transformed into the metaphoric spade” (57).
The problem here is one of fitting hand to tool and tool to verb. What
the proper metaphorical equivalent to the pen in this poem? Neither a gun nor
a spade can “fit” between the finger and the thumb;6 likewise, it is very difficult
to make the pen perform either of the verbs “shoot” or “dig” when it naturally
inclines toward the infinitive “to write.” On a microscopic level, this disparity
points toward the greater problem of making a poem “labor,” or of modeling
poetry on work, as Yeats sometimes did. The difficulty we have with the con
cept of writing as a form of physical labor is deeply linked in this poem to our
imaginative discomfort at the idea of digging with a pen. We have to wait until
Wintering Out for a more “ergonomic” pairing of hand to tool in Heaney, in the
poem “Tinder” (part five of the sequence “A Northern Hoard”):

We picked flints,
Pale and dirt-veined,
So small finger and thumb
Ached around them;
Cold beads of history and home
We fingered, a cave-mouth flame

We clicked stone on stone
That sparked a weak flame-pollen

And failed, our knuckle joints
Striking as often as the flints . . .
(Wintering Out 43)
This poem reverses the representational structures of “Churning Day” in three
important ways. First, the almost anaphoric opening of lines with “We
ed” undoes the agentless, passive constructions of work in the earlier
poem. Second, the hand at work is not only present from the start of “Tinder,”
it is also exquisitely fitted to the objects and tools of the laboring world. The
hand and the tool are so closely aligned here that the flints even acquire phys-
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iological characteristics of the human hand: “Pale and
(In
“Churning Day,” remember, the hand does not even appear until the poem is
more than one-third over). And to say the flints are “so small finger and thumb
/ Ached around them” is to indicate an extreme sensitivity, almost a hypersen
sitivity, of the worker’s digits to the tactile aspect of “smallness ”7
Third, the formal couplets and short lines of “Tinder” are more amenable
to the anatomization of action than the bulky, almost prose-like block stanzas
of “Churning Day.” This is one advantage of the lyric over prose in dealing
with the representation of labor (or of any other variety of action). Line and
stanza breaks permit the poet to articulate the work process as a series of dis
crete steps separated by the white space of the page,
opposed to the tenden
cy of prose to make the various components of an action run together. One may
compare “prose” description of a woman checking the heat of a clothes-iron
to the “poetic” version from the “Old Smoothing Iron” section of Heaney’s
poem, “Shelf Life”:

To test its heat she’d stare and spit in its iron face or hold it up next her
cheek to divine the stored anger.
To test its heat she’d stare
and spit in its iron face
or hold it up next her cheek
to divine the stored anger.
(Selected Poems 170)
The lyric allows each step in the iron-checking process to stand alone, whereas
the prose version generates the impression of fluidity and unitary action.
Heaney is drawn to this kind of precisely anatomized description of labor again
and again, from the representation of the woman baking in the first canto of
“Mossbawn” to the careful documentation of the laundry-folding process in the
fifth Clearances sonnet. The anatomization of action in these poems can only
be formally undertaken within the textual structures, the line and stanza breaks,
of the lyric.

So we see that before poetry can position the individual subject in relation to
the procedures and tools of labor, a representational scheme must be elaborat
ed to accommodate the manual aspect of work, to introduce the tactile working
hand into the lyric, visibly to grip tools and materials in verse. Elaine Scarry
writes that “[a]s in the literature of desire the genitals become the spoken or
unspoken locus of orientation, so throughout the literature of creation the
hands become the most resonant and meaning-laden part of the human anato
my” (75).8 Likewise in the history of portraiture, the inclusion of sitter’s
hands in a painting denotes his or her status
a “maker,” an artificer with the
godlike ability to create in this world. But to write of the hand is not to write
solely of the individual engaged in the act of creation or menial work; it is also
to register the tactile life, an immediate contact between the skin and one’s sur
roundings, and a variety of eroticism concerned with the administering rather
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than with the receiving of sexual pleasure. This implies a very different poetics
than the conventional poetry of the eye, which registers the visual life, a sensi
tivity to the distances and intervals between the self and its surroundings, and
a voyeuristic sexuality predicated upon watching the body of another. Seamus
Heaney is, in many ways, a poet of the hand — just as Shelley and Donne were
poets of the eye. Heaney constantly seeks to “stir us to responses other than the
merely visual” (Preoccupations 133). This tactile, manual aspect of Heaney’s
work illustrates a second important way of establishing poetry’s place in the
world, that of figuratively laying one’s hand upon the world in verse, asserting
its “here-ness,” and thereby confirming the poet’s position within a tactile,
solid, immediate reality. This strategy differs from the previously discussed
approach to the world via labor. Rather, an imaginatively full poetry of the
hand additionally concerned with sensuality and the philosophical implica
tions of the tactile fife. Over the next few pages, I will examine the ways in
which the complex figurations of the hand in Heaney outrun the simple work
function and lay a basis for a more extensive sensory and phenomenological
model of the individual subject’s relation to the surrounding world.
It is easy to overlook the fact that the title poems of three of Heaney’s books
end with figurations of the poet’s hand. But if the title poem holds a place of
major importance within any book of verse, the last fine of the title poem an
even more highly meaning-laden point in the text. In Death ofa Naturalist, this
moment is reserved for the hand. The title poem closes with an image of the
poet recoiling from the awaiting tactile world of touching, hefting, grasping,
handling, and groping that will go on to figure so importantly throughout
Heaney’s career: “I knew / That if I dipped my hand the spawn would clutch
it” (Selected Poems 5). This gesture echoes the Wordsworthian child’s fear in the
face of nature’s atropic and morbid aspect, the young Heaney literally with
drawing his hand from the former site of natural abundance (now festering),
the flax-dam. This minor moment of hesitation is amplified to the point of
imaginative crisis later on in the prose poem, “Nesting Ground”:

The sandmartins’ nests were loopholes of darkness in the riverbank. He
could imagine his arm going in to the armpit, sleeved and straitened, but
because he once felt the cold prick of a dead robin’s claw and the surprising
density of its tiny beak he only gazed.
(Selected Poems 53)
The diminutive “only” in “he only gazed” degrades the act of gazing, or seeing,
to a secondary status in relation to the primary act of touching. The movement
from grasping to gazing, from touch to vision, is a distancing motion, a passage
from the felt to the regarded; and this sense of separation from immediate expe
rience is doubled by Heaney’s casting of the piece in the third person instead of
in the personalized lyric “I” that predominates throughout Stations. This,
Heaney’s first major withdrawal of the hand, is prompted by the consciousness
of death. The poet’s imaginative impulse to caress nesting-places, “to pry into
roots, to finger slime” (“Personal Helicon,” Selected Poems 11), is countered by
the fear that his fingers will find only clammy lifelessness in the riverbank’s
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recesses. But these withdrawals of the hand also thematize and signify a
momentary refusal to generate poetic language for the experience of touch.
The fear of death in these two poems is refracted through the young poet’s fear
of failing to render tactile sensory experience in verse.
Following Death of Naturalist, North is the next Heaney collection whose
title-poem ends with an image of hands. In this volume, Heaney overcomes the
hesitations of “Death of a Naturalist” and “Nesting Ground” to formulate lyric
terms actively for the tactile imagination, discovering a “rough, porous / lan
guage of touch” (“Bone Dreams,” Selected Poems 75) in the midst of a deathmenaced, Hamletic world of bog Yoricks. In fact, the tactile impulse is so
strong in North that Heaney devotes an entire lyric to a fantasy of touching the
artifactual body that is, in the other bog poems, positioned beyond arm’s reach
behind museum glass:

My hands come, touched
By sweetbriar and tangled vetch,
Foraging past the burst gizzards
Of coin-hoards.
I reach past
The riverbed’s washed
Dream of gold to the bullion
Of her Venus bone.
(“Come to the Bower,” North 31; emphasis added)
It worthwhile to keep Heaney’s earliest tool-using, laboring poems (such as
“Churning Day” and “Tinder”) in mind while reading this sensuous and eroti
cized use of the poet’s hands in “Come to the Bower.” The thornpricked, blis
tered, aching hands of the work-poems are now engaged in a caressing,
fondling, sexualized activity. Heaney has, for the moment, discarded the georgic poetry of labor in order to outline a more comprehensive phenomenology of
touch, one that will accommodate both work and pleasure. And
this project
unfolds throughout Heaney’s career, the poet makes progressively greater
claims for the tactile life. We see this at the close of the volume’s title poem,
“North,” in the longship’s ekphrastic injunction to the poet:
Compose in darkness.
Expect aurora borealis
in the long foray
but no cascade of light.

Keep your eye clear
as the bleb of the icicle,
trust the feel of what nubbed treasure
your hands have known.
(Selected Poems 70)
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The final quatrain here can be read as an implicit commentary on strategies of
lyric closure. If an ending is a privileged and meaning-intensive moment in any
poem, this point of closure in “North” is reserved for the hand instead of the
eye. It is remarkable that the eye (“Keep your eye clear /
the bleb of the ici
cle”) is still mentioned, though restricted to the penultimate couplet position. In
effect, the final two couplets of the text document a sensory progression in the
development of lyric strategies of closure, adding a new tactile closure to a con
ventional visual ending in much the same way that a cross-section of sedimen
tary rock displays its own history by piling a new layer atop the preexisting,
older, but still visible foundation layer.
More specifically, “North” critiques a “visionary” strategy of closure and the
concomitant poetics of seeing. The very word “visionary” implies a poetry built
upon the experience of sight (Shelley would have closed this poem with “Keep
your eye clear / as the bleb of the icicle”), an epistemological experience here
followed and surpassed by a new test of knowledge, that of the hands.9 Some
readers of the poem continue to describe “North” as participating in a visionary
poetics:

Insight and composition occur in the refracting, bending, changing light of
the aurora borealis rather than a single, directed, divine shaft of ight. But
writing poetry whose source of inspiration is ever-changing, refracting fight
is more challenging and less certain than writing from an inspiring single
shaft of ight.
(Molino 101)
Yet throughout “North,” there
a regular suppression of the visual field. We
find this most explicitly stated in the line, “Compose in darkness.” A rewriting
of the visionary mode also shapes the overall trajectory of the poem. “North”
begins
an encounter with the environmental sublime, a scenario common
throughout Romantic poems such as Shelley’s “Mont Blanc”:
I returned to a long strand,
the hammered shod of a bay,
and found only the secular
powers of the Atlantic thundering.
I faced the unmagical
invitations of Iceland,
the pathetic colonies
of Greenland . . .

(Selected Poems 69)
We begin facing out across the vast Atlantic, but end focused directly on the
palms of our hands. The overall movement here
from the panoramic and
visual to the small and tactile. This deflationary (or contracting) progression is
forecast from the opening by an initial disjuncture between the poem’s Roman
tic locale and its strongly post-Romantic rhetorical mode. The seaside may be
one of the great topoi of visionary verse in English, visited by figures ranging
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from the children who “sport upon the shore” of Wordsworth’s “Immortality
Ode” to Stevens’ singer at Key West; but here the shore-walker has forsaken the
hyperbolic accents of the seer from the start, speaking in diminutives (“and
found only the secular”) and negative adjectives (“the unmagical”). By the
poem’s end, this initial withdrawal from visionary rhetoric is joined by a grad
ual perceptual movement away from the telescopic, panoramic coastal scene
towards a final, tightly focused, immediate attention to what can be held in the
hands.
This turn in “North,” from the panoramic and distant to the contracted and
immediate, a skeptical movement. It claims that the true test of knowledge
lies in the hands, in the immediacy of touch. Over 250 years earlier, Bishop
Berkeley had made a similar case for the epistemological primacy of touch in
his Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision:
I believe whoever will look narrowly into his own thoughts and examine
what he means by saying he sees this or that thing at a distance, will agree
with me, that what he sees only suggests to his understanding that after
having passed a certain distance, to be measured by the motion of his body,
which is perceivable by touch, he shall come to perceive such and such tan
gible ideas which have been usually connected with such and such visible
ideas.
(76; emphasis added)
That is, Berkeley thought that visual impressions of distant objects were deeply
grounded in the experience of touch, or that seeing actually entailed imagina
tively approaching the targeted object of sight and “touching” it with one’s
mind. This, in Berkeley’s view, is how we attribute volume and mass to a
remote object like a mountain or a ship. Berkeley noted that we only see a two
dimensional image of the mountain or ship at a distance, and that we must
recall our tactile experiences to register the objects’ three-dimensionality and
weight. At this moment, Berkeley’s skepticist account of vision proleptically
conducts exactly the same movement we see in “North,” from the distantly
regarded world to the immediacy of the tactile. For Heaney, this skeptical
movement is accompanied by a phenomenological violence (from the remote to
the bodily) reflective of a new kind of historical epiphany, described by Charles
O’Neill in his article, “Violence and the Sacred in Heaney’s North”:

Violence,” Girard writes, “strikes men as an epiphany,” and this recogni
tion provides the poem’s epiphanic injunction as the voice of the violent
past enjoins the modern poet to “Lie down / in the word-hoard,” and there,
“in the coil and gleam / of your furrowed brain” (20), the poet will find the
words and images of the past that precisely define the catastrophic present
moment.
(95)
The bodily recognition of historical violence — impossible to accommodate
within a Romantic poetics of vision — completes the skeptical logic of
Heaney’s engagement with the tactile in North.
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Field Work is the last in the triad of Heaney’s books in which the title poem
ends with the hand; its eponymous poem closes with what is probably the most
enigmatic use of hands to be found anywhere in Heaney’s work. I will quote
the final canto in full, as it displays the lyric “anatomization of action” I have
discussed earlier in this essay:

Catpiss smell,
the pink bloom open:
I press a leaf
of the flowering currant
on the back of your hand
for the slow tight burn
of its sticky juice
to prime your skin,
and your veins to be crossed
criss-cross with leaf-veins.
I lick my thumb
and dip it in mould,
anoint the anointed
leaf-shape. Mould
blooms and pigments
the back of your hand
like a birthmark—
my umber one,
you are stained, stained
to perfection.

(Selected Poems 140)
This is nothing like the anatomized labor processes we found in Death ofa Naturalist\ the poet’s hand holds no tools, and the object of his operations is the
passive hand of his beloved, not butter in a churn or blackberries waiting to be
picked. Neither is this a poem of skeptical epistemology such as “North,”
where the hand weighs and tests one’s knowledge of the surrounding world.
Here we find the poet’s hand both at play and at the act of reverencing
(“anointing”), marking his lover’s hand in an operation that seems simultane
ously ritualized and improvisatory.
On a literal level, the final canto of “Field Work” shows Heaney breaking
off a currant leaf, pressing it against the back of his lover’s hand, and staining
the resulting flesh-indentations with his saliva-moistened, mould-covered
thumb. But seen in the context of his earlier work, the gesture revisits the
stained and mouldering beauty of the reified bog bodies in North; only now, the
poet ornaments, stains, and reifies the living hand of his beloved.10 The hand
becomes art. It is, in fact, treated like a canvas about to undergo the processes
of painting or lithography; the hand is “primed” (line 8) and stained, inked and
printed upon by the currant leaf-shape in much the same way an inked wood
cut leaves its marks on blank paper.
The line between the living and the artifactual, the organic and the reified,
is redrawn here just as the woman’s Vein-mapped hand is remapped by the
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superimposed leaf-veins of the currant. (We saw a similar crossing-over of
vein-lines in the “pale and dirt-veined” flints of “Tinder”). A symmetricality
and interchangeability between the organic and artifactual spheres is implicit in
Heaney’s use of chiasmus, the trope of crossing, to render this effect: “and your
veins to be crossed / criss-cross with leaf-veins.” Rhetorical trope and visual
image coincide here to generate a moment at which the human and the non
human “cross” one another. In Heaney, this crossing-over occurs when the
human subject is most strenuously and imaginatively engaged with the natural
world, whether it be in the field of labor (as in “Tinder”) or in this scene of aes
thetic creation.11 In each case the living, breathing human being only
approaches the condition of artifact through sacrifice, or a temporary abandon
ment or selfhood. The loss (or ascesis) entailed in such a crossing-over from
the organic to the artifactual is suggested in the tone of the canto’s final three
lines: “my umber one, / you are stained, stained / to perfection.” This closing
reads like a classical, elegiac lament in its use of the vocative case and the
expressive repetition of “stained,” until the lament mode finally undone by the
last word in the poem: “perfection.”
I have already mentioned that the final canto of “Field Work” presents us
with a point at which the iconic hand is now self-reflexive, at play in the aes
thetic field, liberated from the demands of basic survival. As soon
this self
reflexive stage in the poet’s treatment of an iconic image is reached, the icon
begins to lose its representational, referential quality while it accrues multiplied
associative weight. The hand begins to function
the severed head does in
Yeats’s poetry and drama.12 (That is, it operates with diminished reference to
our everyday bodies and with a newly accented emphasis on the symbolic.) It
is significant that this self-reflexive, unpragmatic moment arises in a caesura
between Heaney’s self-lacerating explorations of conscience in the preceding
North and the subsequent Station Island. (I do not count Sweeney Astray in this
sequence of Heaney’s lyric collections because of its special status as pro
longed translation.) The moment of liberated play, when the poet “flies the
nets” of nationality and religion, is preceded and followed by periods of moral
and spiritual crisis. Heaney cannot avoid the demands of conscience and the
social world for long.
When Heaney returns to the pressing topics of contemporary political and
social Irish life in The Haw Lantern, it is not surprising that we once again find
the poet’s hand planted firmly upon the physical world. I have already dis
cussed how moments of stationing in Heaney are often carried out in a highly
embodied, “hands-on” manner. In “Terminus,” the poet conducts this hand
placing quite literally:

Two buckets were easier carried than one.
I grew up in between.
My left hand placed the standard iron weight.
My right tilted a last grain in the balance.

Baronies, parishes met where I was born . . .

(Selected
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Heaney’s simultaneous allegiance to the industrialized, iron world of moderni
ty and the agricultural, wheaten world of the past gives rise to this image of the
poet’s body stationed with one hand in direct contact with an iron weight and
the other touching a grain. The passage owes a debt to Robert Lowell’s por
trait of himself as a child on the porch of his familial summer home: “One of
my hands was cool on a pile / of black earth, the other warm / on a pile of lime”
(“My Last Afternoon with Uncle Devereux Winslow,” Life Studies 31). Young
Lowell and the older Heaney both assume stances in relation to contrasting ele
ments of their worlds by quite simply placing one hand on each element. The
position of the body in such a scenario is precarious, between two poles: “I
grew up in between.” This “betweenness” is a crucial stationing method
throughout Heaney’s mid-to-late verse, as we saw in the first two lines of “Ter
minus,” canto 3. And “Song,” “In the Beech,” and “The Disappearing Island”
provide further instances of stationing through the construction of between
ness:
A rowan like a lipsticked girl.
Between the by-road and the main road
Alder trees at a wet and dripping distance
Stand off among the rushes.

(“Song,” Selected Poems 141)
On one side under me, the concrete road.
On the other, the bullock’s covert. . .
(“In the Beech,” Selected Poems 213)
Once we presumed to found ourselves for good
Between its blue hills and those sandless shores . . .
(“The Disappearing Island,” Selected Poems 261)

There is a landscape painter’s fullness of observation in these opening tableaux.
Focus on any one object tends also to include those objects on either side of it
(the by-road and the main road). This notation of betweenness marks the
moment when peripheral vision begins to rival single-minded, focused atten
tion; and in political terms, betweenness corresponds to a mode of liberalism in
which the accommodation of “opposing” perspectives is undertaken through
the deliberate adoption of a medial position.
In Heaney’s more recent work, this extension of peripheral vision is taken
to the extreme of 365 degrees, when the poet is overwhelmed with a feeling of
“centeredness” in a landscape:

My father’s ploughing one, two, three, four sides
Of the lea ground where I sit all-seeing
At centre field, my back to the thorn tree
They never cut...
(“Poet’s Chair,” The Spirit Level 46)
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Heaney’s position at the center of the field contributes to his sensation of being
all-seeing,” a perceptual state similar to that of Socrates in the preceding canto,
the philosopher’s claritas situated "at the center of the city.” At this later stage
of Heaney’s career, the act of witnessing takes place not at the edge or border
of the field, but at its heart and center. We can compare this with the acts of
witnessing that memorialized rural forms of labor earlier in his writing life, in
poems such as "Churning Day,” where the poet seems to stand at the edge or
perimeter of the site of labor. Now, in "Poet’s Chair,” the poet is stationed at
the middle of the worked field. But this center position not reserved exclu
sively for the poet-witness:

A mower leans forever on his scythe.
He has mown himself to the centre of the field
and stands in final perfect ring
Of sunlit stubble.
("Man and Boy,” Seeing Things 14)

This hired laborer is stationed like Socrates at the heart of Athens. Time has
stopped at the center point of the field (the mower leans forever) in the wake of
thoroughly completed labor; and work has taken him from a marginal position
at the field’s perimeter to its center point of perfection
final perfect ring”).
We discover a mutuality and parity between the acts of poetry and labor as
Heaney and the agricultural worker switch positions in these two poems. In
"Poet’s Chair,” the poet is accorded the center position; in "Man and Boy,” it
belongs to the mower. The continuity between "cultural” and "non-cultural”
modes of labor evinced by Heaney’s earlier work becomes a superimposition or
identification of two (socioeconomically) different perspectival centers.
The growing emphasis on betweenness and centeredness in Heaney’s acts
of stationing indicates a different conception of space and frames of reference
than we find in the earlier poetry. The poet now takes an active role in mark
ing out areas and constructing borders where none once existed, drawing lines
in the air like Prospero:

You also loved lines pegged out in the garden,
The spade nicking the first straight edge along
The tight white string. Or string stretched perfectly
To mark the outline of a house foundation . . .
Or the imaginary line straight down
A field of grazing.
("Man and Boy,” Seeing Things 14; emphasis added)
The new concern with centering is accompanied by a fascination with the ways
in which we generate borders and perimeters. For Heaney at this stage, it
seems every center is provisional and constructed, only coming into existence
through the erasure or ignoring of other demarcations of space. For Heaney to
say “I am at the center of the field” momentarily cancels out his position with-
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in other frames of reference; for instance, at the field’s center, the poet is no
longer thinking of his position upon a map of County Derry (The farm may
be on the perimeter of the county, or at its center; the map position is invisible
to a consciousness focused on the field as a spatial unit.) This is the flexible,
mobile schema of a border-crosser. In his biographical study of Heaney,
Michael Parker expresses a muted skepticism regarding the poet’s political
reading of his own passage from his “homeland” in Northern Ireland:
Though political considerations undoubtedly affected his decision to take
up residence in the Republic, they were by no means pre-eminent. In ret
rospective accounts of the period, however, he has laid great stress on his
determination to distance himself ideologically from “the corrupt set-up” in
the North. . . . Heaney certainly now sees his crossing of the border as a
conscious political act. Perhaps it was.
(119-20)

Whether or not one shares Parker’s skepticism regarding an initial political
motive for the relocation, it seems safe to say that Heaney’s crossing has
acquired a political dimension retroactively, in the wake of the poet’s rereading
of his own actions: “I felt I was compromising some part of myself by staying
in a situation where socially and, indeed, imaginatively there were pressures
against’ regarding the moment
critical” (quoted in Deane 47-8). For a poet
driven to relocate by political and imaginative violence, any act of centering is
both a political and an imaginative act, freighted with implications of erasure,
selection, and reaffirmation. The recent figurations of centrality in Heaney’s
work demarcate a space in which the poet works through the overlapping
schematics of farm, county, nation, and various other topoi in order to accom
modate the multiple centers of his lyric consciousness. For the moment,
Heaney’s unending search for a place for poetry has arrived at another point of
rest, at the provisional and constantly redrawn center of the imagination.

Notes
1. In his biography of Keats, W. J. Bate locates this passage in The Hamp
stead Keats (303-4), written in the margin beside ines 420-3 of Paradise Lost,
Book 6:
but feathered soon and fledge
They summ’d their pens, and, soaring the air sublime,
With clang despised the ground, under a cloud
In prospect.
2. Less has been written on the euphoric and/or vertiginous moments
when this poet registers a break in contact between the earth and his feet, as in
the driving poems (“Night Drive,” “Westering,” “On the Road,” and “Post
script”) or in the Sweeney translations. Such moments grow in frequency in
Heaney’s later work.
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3. The classical trope of poet-as-plowman, with its play on the Latin "ver
sus,” is revisited repeatedly throughout Heaney’s work, from the early "Follow
er” to the more recent "Poet’s Chair.”
4. Heaney reserves applause regarding this achievement for John Clare, of
whom he writes: "It was the unique achievement of John Clare to make vocal
the regional and particular, to achieve a buoyant and authentic lyric utterance
at the meeting point between social realism and conventional romanticism”
(preoccupations 180).
5. In both "Churning Day” and "Blackberry-Picking,” it is important to
note the strong deferral of the human hand’s entry into the lyric; we wait until
line 16 in "Churning Day” for "hands blistered,” and "Our hands were peppered
/ With thorn-pricks, our palms sticky as Bluebeard’s” only arrives at the fif
teenth line of "Blackberry-Picking.”
6. The only point at which an object nestles comfortably within the con
tours of the hand comes at line 14 of the poem (this is also the line that would
end the lyric if it were a sonnet): "He rooted out tall tops, buried the bright
edge deep / To scatter new potatoes that we picked / Loving the cool hardness in
our hands” (Selected Poems 3; emphasis added). Neither the pen nor the gun —
that is, neither tool — fits the hand nearly as well as the natural object of the
potato, which of course not a tool but rather an organic material. There is an
implicit critique here of manmade, "unnatural” objects of the world and their
problematic relationship to the body. .
7. This line also replaces the unwieldy gun and spade tools of "Digging”
with flints that can be placed more realistically between finger and thumb.
8. Though Scarry’s comment arises in a discussion of the novel, it is also
worth considering the place of the hand within the lyric, the genre most suited
to the iconicization of bodily parts since Petrarch’s time at least. My preceding
discussion of work in Heaney’s lyrics is especially indebted to Scarry’s essay.
9. Heaney deliberately makes an epistemological claim for the hands as the
locus of knowledge. The poem does not end with the line "your hands have
felt” but rather with "your hands have known."
10. The activity here has a highly self-reflexive element; a hand manipu
lates a hand. This self-reflexivity lends the poem a Metaphysical tone, echoing
Donne’s conceit involving the eyes of lovers — "My face in thine eye, thine in
mine appears” ("The Good Morrow,” Complete English Poems 60) — or their
mouths in the act of kissing — "Since thou and I sigh one another’s breath” ("A
Valediction: Of Weeping,” Complete English Poems 89).
11.
Again, Scarry’s essay underlies my argument here.
12. This independent, self-activated hand reappears in a later, three-line
poem from Seeing Things, "An August Night”: "His hands were warm and small
and knowledgeable. / When I saw them again last night, they were two ferrets,
/ Playing all by themselves in a moonlit field” (Seeing Things 21).
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“What’s the difference between kinky and pervert
ed?” the tendentious joke goes: “Kinky means using
a feather; perverted means using the whole chicken.”
The satisfied laugh or groan elicited by the joke
depends on the listener’s anticipated (and, for most of
us understandable) distaste at the thought of having
sex with a chicken — either functionally or proxi
mately. But the difference between kinky and per
verse can be dangerous as well
distasteful, for the
line separating one from the other demarcates zones
of habitability: one feather is okay, but the whole
chicken is not. Jokes reinforce the line between hab
itable and uninhabitable, but depending on the time,
place, and persons involved, disrespect for that line
can turn deadly. When JoAnn Wypijewski went to
Laramie, Wyoming, after Matthew Shepard’s mur
der, she was told a different joke: “‘You can have sex
with a sheep in Wyoming, just don’t tie the shepard
to the fence’” (70). Gallows or humor?
While crossing into the zone of uninhabitability
may elicit a range of responses from laughter to exe
cution, the line that marks the exit from habitable
zones shifts with time, culture, situation, and thus is
always determined by society, by the shared under
standing of the audience. The first joke tacitly sug
gests that utilizing a chicken for sex makes body
perverted; in fact, it is not the presence or absence of
the chicken but the audience’s laughter that does so.
It is thus entirely possible for a body to cross the
threshold into abjection and not be aware of the trans
gression until the audience’s response indicates a line
has been crossed. Critical theories informed by the
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work of de Saussure, Lacan, and Foucault — work that powerfully called into
question Cartesian models of subject formation — has enabled scrutiny of these
lines, both their construction and maintenance. The language I deploy here —
"abjection,” “zones of habitability” — reveals my indebtedness to certain theo
rists engaged in this kind of scrutiny, particularly the work of Judith Butler in
Bodies that Matter, Interrogating the formation and the materiality of the sub
ject, Butler finds that the production of subjects “requires the simultaneous pro
duction of a domain of abject beings” (3). Abjection is not simply a matter of
othering, it “designates a degraded or cast out status within the terms of social
ity” (243). Today in the United States, zones of abjection include those states
of being that are cast out from the norm and that invite violent consequences:
the physically or mentally disabled body as well as the black or homosexual
body. The subject “fantasizes” that the abject constitutes a threat to its own
integrity: “I would rather die than do or be that!” (Butler 243). But the threat
is just that, a fantasy; the iteration of norms through utterances or acts (jokes
or executions) maintains that fantasy by violently casting out the threatening
body or bodies. Fortunately for those of us who live close to the fine (and I
would say that is each of us some times), critical inquiry into the economic, sex
ual, and- historical constructions of the subject has attended to how the lines
separating subject from abject are generated and sustained. However, it has not
examined closely enough its own participation in the reinforcement of those
fines. When criticism relies on the same shared understandings as the joke
about the chicken, it works to maintain those lines. One of the most damag
ing and most commonly shared understandings assumes that fear is the “nor
mal” response to abjection.
Criticism of the brief altercation between the Pardoner and the Host at the
end of Chaucer’s The Pardoners Tale provides a useful heuristic device for exam
ining such shared assumptions. In The Canterbury Tales, the Prioress’ odd
brooch and even the Friar’s cupidity, however contemptible, still fall within the
range of habitable, acceptable space. They remain in the company of pilgrims;
neither is singled out for particular castigation. Only the Pardoner crosses the
line into abjection, an excess made manifest not by his own actions but by the
Host’s vehement response. The scene I am using takes only sixty lines and
occurs almost as an afterthought to The Pardoners Tale, At the end of his tale,
the Pardoner invites the company to purchase absolution from him, either for
getting he has already revealed his game or assuming he is good enough to dupe
even these pilgrims who are aware of it. Of all the company, the Pardoner
invites the Host first: “I rede that oure Hoost heere shal bigynne / For he is
moost envoluped in synne” (lines 941-2). The Host denies the Pardoner’s offer:
“‘Nay, nay!’ quod he, ‘thanne have I Cristes curs! . . . / Thou woldest make me
kisse thy olde breech, / And swere it were a relyk of a seint, / Though it were
with thy fundament depeint!”’ (946, 948-50). The Host rightly specifies the
consequences of paying for absolution without true confession: not redemption
but “Cristes curs.” And he further exposes the Pardoner’s game. These are not
saints’ relics, but the Pardoner’s own relics, collected from wherever, possibly
even from his own ass. But the Host follows his refusal with a threat: “I wolde
I hadde thy coilions in myn hond / . . . Lat kutte hem of” (952, 954). When
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he follows his refusal with a violent threat, the Host participates in the itera
tion of a norm that works to cast out the Pardoner; the threat signifies that the
Pardoner has crossed a line, the consequences for which are violent.
The short altercation between the Host and Pardoner has received little
critical attention until recently when interest in subjectivity and abjection has
rendered the Pardoners contestable morality and sexuality irresistible. While a
number of recent studies offer intelligent, alternative explanations of what
makes the Pardoner’s offer so unpardonable, on one point they agree: the Host
threatens the Pardoner because he fears him. Yet if the scene — replete with
ambiguities and laden with emotion — begs for an analysis of its emotion, it
provides almost no information about either the Pardoner’s or the Host’s emo
tional state; thus we can never know what the Host feels. Instead of acknowl
edging the text’s silence, though, many critics interpolate their own culturally
inflected understandings of emotion into the text, a practice that is, of course,
defensible on the grounds that any act of interpretation is also an act of inter
polation, but my argument that an ethical reading will consider the implica
tions of positing one emotion over another.
A quick survey of several recent studies reveals the tendency to posit unin
terrogated assumptions about the Host’s reaction to the Pardoner: Monica
McAlpine characterizes the Host’s response as a reaction to threat (17); H.
Marshall Leicester claims that the Pardoner embodies the “horror of existence”
(44); Allen Frantzen discusses the Host’s “frightened and frightening respons
es” (144); and Carolyn Dinshaw speculates that “[p]erhaps, sensing something
of the Pardoner’s lack, the Host fears for his own manhood” (163). All of these
writers rest their logic on this notion of fear but fail to explain how they know
it fear that the Host feels. Dinshaw even acknowledges her reliance on par
ticular interpretation of the Host’s emotional state: “Harry’s response power
fully corroborates the associations I have been pointing to here” (168). The text
of the tale gives little indication of precisely what the Host feels. The only
overt mention of emotion comes at the end of the scene when the Host says he
will not “pleye” with any “angry man” (951). This refers to the Pardoner’s emo
tional state, not Harry Bailey’s, though it is just as likely that the Host responds
out of anger rather than fear. Any interpretation of the Host’s emotions would
require a justification based on careful reading and logic. Yet these writers, who
are impressively careful in their research and in the construction of their argu
ments, assume they know the Host’s emotions but refrain from providing any
evidence for those assumptions. Even if they are correct that the Host fears,
they would need either to theorize or historicize their assumptions about the
Host’s emotions. They do neither. Nor do they consider that the superlative
ly masculine Harry Bailey threatens violence out of an aggressive impulse
instead of a fearful one. As result, their arguments finally participate in and
reinforce a shared understanding that abjection provokes fear. Such a shared
understanding works to establish fear as an essential response to abjection — an
essentialization that poses the possibility of violent consequences for abjected
bodies.
The problem in attributing fear to the Host can be seen in McAlpine’s
ground-breaking
“The Pardoner’s Homosexuality and How it Matters.”
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The description of the Pardoner in The General Prologue certainly contributes
to McAlpine’s interpretation of the Pardoner as a homosexual. The text indi
cates an ambivalent sexuality when the narrator conjectures that the Pardoner
is either already castrated or effeminate: “I trowe he were a geldyng or a mare”
(General Prologue 691). Where evidence of his masculinity should be — in his
lap — he has instead a fungible penis, a “male” in which he keeps his “relics.”
Thus, at the end of his tale, when the Pardoner invites the Host over to “kisse
the relikes,” he implicitly invites the Host to kiss the “male” part in his lap, an
invitation to fellatio. In case the Host should be too dull to understand such a
subtle come-on, the Pardoner ends his request by directing the Host to
“‘Unbokele thy purs,”’ inviting the Host not just to part with his money (con
tained within the purse) but to expose himself sexually (Pardoners Tale 945);
“purs” appears as a gloss for penis (specifically an instrument for sexual plea
sure) in the Wife’s prologue (44b). The Pardoner’s offer thus contains a fairly
explicit sexual invitation. While it would be wrong to ignore the sexual comeon in the Pardoner’s offer, it is equally wrong to interpret this as a scene of
homosexuality and homophobia. Allen Frantzen appropriately remarks on the
ahistorical assumptions of McAlpine’s argument: “It is not necessary to insist
that [the Pardoner] is homosexual or to identify the Pardoner as gay; to do so
to assume (without evidence) that such a category constitutes medieval iden
tity when it seems, rather, to describe acts performed by certain persons that
contributed to their identity but did not define them” (133). While it’s possi
ble that the Pardoner’s offer constitutes a threat, it is far more likely a spiritual
than a physical or sexual one.
When Monica McAlpine argues for the Pardoner’s homosexuality, she
almost assuredly does so out of concern for justice and from an antihomophobic stance. But if the Pardoner’s sexuality matters, then so does the Host’s
response. If she were right about the Pardoner, then assuming the Host
homophobic serves to establish a tradition of fearing homosexuals; the impli
cation is that people have always feared the homosexual — an essentializing
move. The danger in McAlpine’s argument lies in its perpetuation of fear as an
understood response to abjected bodies, in this case, the homosexual body.
Though Frantzen and others address other, more historically accurate readings
of the Pardoner’s abjection, they still assume the Pardoner incites fear when
they participate in a “shared understanding” that the abject is to-be-feared (just
as the guy with the chicken is to-be-laughed-at). While these readings unset
tle our understanding of medieval subjectivity, their unquestioning assumptions
about the scene’s emotional content reinforce the notion that fear the under
stood (read: approved) response to abjection.
In The Pardoners Tale and other texts, the impulse to attribute negative
responses to fear is understandable enough. In Powers ofHorror, Julia Kristeva
argues that, when “[c]onfronted with states of distress that were evoked for us
by the child who makes himself heard but is incapable of making himself
understood, we, adults, use the word Tear’” (33). In the same way, critics
attribute negative reactions in texts to fear: the child cannot articulate the cause
of distress, the text does not. As observing adults or observant readers we can
only guess, and we guess fear. While I am indebted to Kristeva’s understand
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ing of abjection for my argument, her explanation of the interrelation between
fearfulness and abjection
less useful. She asks “why is it phobia that best
allows one to tackle the matter of relation to the object? Why fear and object?”
(33). But she does not find a clear answer to her own question. Referring to
Otto Rank’s comments on birth trauma, Kristeva concludes:

Fear, therefore, in a first sense, could be the upsetting of a bio-drive balance.
The constitution of the object relation might then be a reiteration of fear,
alternating with optimal but precarious states of balance. Fear and object
proceed together until the one represses the other. But in which one of us
that fully successful?
(33-4)

The final question in the above quotation turns, the text away from an inquiry
into why fear and toward an inquiry into the machinations of fear. The two sen
tences that ought to answer the question, though, are plagued by uncertain
verbs: “Could,” “might be.” More importantly, an inquiry into why it’s fear
begs the question of whether it’s fear. When the text remains silent, neither
naming the emotions at play nor providing enough physical description to infer
the emotions (racing heart, sweating, and so on), we finally cannot know. Since
even precise physical descriptions can be misleading (“a racing heart,” or
“sweating” might just as easily describe excitement
fear), even hard evidence
becomes suspect and calls into question the possibility of interpreting emotion
at all.. What is possible, however, to examine the implications of overriding
our epistemological limitations.
In her work on abjection, Kristeva explores the interrelation between fear
fulness and abjection, but the cultural implications of interpreting emotions are
made clearer by an anthropological model that focuses on culture rather than a
psychoanalytic model that focuses on the individual subject. David Scruton, in
his anthropology of fear, Sociophobics, observes that “[f]ear
commonly
thought of as an innate human trait, the result of the species’ phylogenetic
development, something which is triggered by various stimuli and experienced
in phylogenetic terms” (9-10). However, he argues against a purely biochemi
cal-based explanation of fear; instead, he finds “biology is, in fact, nondirective”
and that emotions occur in a cultural matrix (10). Fear, he argues, is an event
like any emotion and as such is experienced within a “framework of social rela
tions” (18). This means that when we experience fear, we do so as a function
of our culture; it also means that fear has specific consequences. Scruton’s point
here has important implications for the way theorists read emotions:
It is altogether unlikely that emotions can occur, be mediated as we have
described, and have no results. On the contrary, emotions do have impor
tant consequences: they influence our behavior. They are means, in fact,
through which society accomplishes vital tasks, for they are instrumental in
encouraging conformity to significant behavioral and attitudinal norms of
that society. They provide individuals with approved and accepted response
tendencies in situations which are judged to be important.
(26)
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If the Host indeed fears the Pardoner, he does so not out of an innate response,
but as a culturally encoded event. But this would also mean that the Host —
and other medieval subjects — fear the same things we do, that they are the
products of the' same culture. Readings that assume the Host fears the Par
doner not only rely on an ahistorical understanding of abjection but further
reinforce fear of abjection as a cultural norm: it is as acceptable to laugh at the
chicken as it is to fear the abject.
Other assumptions about fear make these readings dangerous. Scruton
notes that we tend to believe fear is an innate response to dangerous situations
and triggers a flight-or-fight mechanism. Because we see fear
a means of
protection from danger, we tend also to judge less harshly the actions of a fear
ful person: if the fear response is primal, then it in some measure beyond
rational control and originates in the drive toward self-preservation. Self
defense more comprehensible, and invariably more forgivable, than aggresssion. Perpetuating an understanding that fear constitutes a culturally approved
response to abjection also perpetuates a culture in which violence against
abjected bodies is more comprehensible and thus more forgivable. When crit
icism of The Pardoners Tale focuses on the Pardoner’s abjection as an obvious
incitement to fear, it tacitly pardons the Host’s response. No one questions
whether the Host responds reasonably; they know he fears because they assume
it’s normal to fear abjection. While the Pardoner thus comes under further
scrutiny, further abjected by the writers who wish to understand him, the Host
escapes interrogation.
The implications of such criticism, or even of laughing at a chicken joke,
may not appear to invoke dire consequences. But the other joke I cite at the
beginning of this article does. In her essay on Matthew Shepard’s murder,
Wypijewski refers to the clichéd line between love and hate to argue that such
a line is kept strong by “all the little things of a culture, mostly unnoticed and
unremarked” (67). And when we notice those lines (on one side is love — or
at least its possibility — acceptance, normalcy; on the other side is hatred,
abjection, perversion), even if we notice them only to decry them, we often
reinstantiate them: “Among those who advocate hate-crime laws, it’s always
the sexuality of the victim that’s front and center, not the sexuality of the crim
inal or the everyday, undifferentiated violence he took to extremity” (73).
When the abjected body homosexual, we have a peculiar way of naming such
acts of violence — homophobia — that carries an excuse within its condemna
tion. Calling such acts “phobic” means they are rooted in fear, a fear we believe
is beyond our control and is part of our self-defense mechanism.
Both Aaron McKinney and his girlfriend, Kristen Price, wanted to rely on
a shared understanding that the abjected homosexual quite reasonably incites
homophobia and thus a violent response: “presuming homophobia to be an
acceptable alibi, [Price] thought she was helping him when she told the press
that he and Henderson just wanted to beat [Shepard] up bad enough to teach
him a lesson not to come on to straight people’” (Wypijewski 63). And
although he told the police that Shepard did not hit on him, McKinney later
wrote to someone, attempting to exonerate himself: ‘ Being a verry [sic] drunk
homophobick [sic] I flipped out and began to pistol whip the fag with my gun’”
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(63). While Wypijewski repeatedly interrogates the assumptions that enable
such violence, her essay reveals that few others in Laramie or elsewhere do.
Even the director of a program with the Southeast Wyoming Mental Health
Center attributes McKinney’s actions to fear: “‘When it’s fear or hurt, which is
typically the primary emotion at work, when you can’t say, “I’m scared shitless,”
most hurt and fear will come out in the only vehicle men are allowed. It comes
out crooked. It looks like anger, it’s expressed as anger but it isn’t’” (quoted in
Wypijewski 70). How does he know? We need to believe fear motivates such
crimes because violence rooted in fear still leaves McKinney and Russell Hen
derson as people we can in some way accept as human.
Two responses typify our reactions to the Matthew Shepard murder, the
Littleton, Colorado murders, the dragging death of James Byrd in Jaspar, Texas:
one posits the killers
afraid, the other calls them monsters. We are prepared
either to accept the crimes
understandable because the violence initiated
from a primal response or to reject these men as not fully human. Any other
explanation threatens our conception of humanity. Regardless of our respons
es, of course, they are human. But to assert that their violence originates in fear
leaves an important part of our culture unexamined. At the beginning of her
essay, Wypijewski claims, quite radically, that “[i]t’s just possible that Matthew
Shepard didn’t die because he was gay; he died because Aaron McKinney and
Russell Henderson are straight” (62). An ethical response to Matthew Shep
ard’s murder would question not only the crime, but why McKinney and oth
ers think that fear of abjection helps to explain, if not to excuse it.
This interrogation needs to occur in all readings of culture, including read
ings of literature. In January 1999, PMLA devoted an issue to ethics. While
the articles contribute to the discussion of ethics in literary studies, not one
article interrogates the cultural implications of how we read. Whether scenes
like those of The Pardoners Tale merely reveal or actively produce fear matters
less than our professional responsibility to examine the ways our reading prac
tices may participate in normalizing violent phobias. It is the interpretation,
not the creation, of the scene between the Host and Pardoner that should con
cern us because it is impossible to know what motivates the Host to react as he
does. And the gap in this text does not comprise one of the small inconse
quential gaps Wayne Booth so engagingly ridicules; this gap the unbridgeable
distance between heaven and hell, with a deadly temptation in the middle —
the temptation to assume we know what motivates others, to assume that cer
tain emotional responses are now and have always been “normal.” Which is not
to say critics should refrain from commenting on such stubborn texts, but their
commentary ought to include (or at least have considered) its own assumptions
and consequences. Sure the chicken joke funny, but what are we doing when
we laugh at it, and what are we doing when we fear the Pardoner?

I would like to thank Gary Taylor, Sheree Meyer, Sharon O’Dair, Harold
Weber, and Elizabeth Meese for their helpful editorial comments.
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I’ve always taken pleasure in anything lucid, solitary,
spare: the arm cleaving clear water, the one hawk in
blue heaven. Now that I have this baby, though, what
offers itself up for joy is mysterious and curved. It
almost utterly shared. I wonder therefore if the fac
ulty of pleasure is the absolute I always thought it
was, or if its shape and meaning mutate with the
objects available to it. This is not the same thing, by
the way, as wondering if pleasure is Historically Con
structed, which everything and nothing is,
why
ask.
It’s more that we almost need to be pleased.
Hobbes thought so, observing in Leviathan that
"pleasure seemeth to be a corroboration of vitall
motion, and a help thereunto.” I like this notion of
corroboration, as if pleasure somehow approves of our
creaturely animation, permits it. As if we would do
well to befriend pleasure, so that it will give us its
help. It’s evidently in our interest to provide the plea
sure principle with as many different subjects as pos
sible. That way we stand a chance of getting all the
help we need.
We need a lot. I knew someone who was in love
with someone. The two of them studied the same
language, and the same problems, and once one of
them — the one I knew — checked out a library
book on that language and its problems. When she
opened the book, out slipped a postcard from Venice
or someplace twisted and ravishing and malevolent
like that. This postcard was addressed to a woman
she knew very slightly in the unfortunate handwrit
ing of the man she was in love with. On the front
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were two hands clasped, a detail from some infinitely bigger canvas, and on the
other side was one word, which was please. You should be able to interpret that
word in a lot of different ways, but really you cant. Really, the implications are
crystal clear, and not pleasing unless the word please is addressed to you. Plea
sure in general has this element of supplication. There is a power differential
in it: something is given and received. Anyone pleased lordly.
So there was John Milton, radical republican, putting pleasure at the cen
ter of Paradise Lost, and in the most surprising ways. God, for example, when
answering the rhetorical question of why he made Adam et al. free admits he
did that for his own pleasure. In turn, human sovereignty is expressed through
enjoyment. In the unspoiled paradise the one adjective you come across over
and over again
“sweet.” Here is Milton the radical republican saying
nonetheless that pleasure is a divine right, an absolute of human being.
Just as he was saying this, they were, if paradoxically, seeing pleasure very
differently in the court of Charles II. This court was notoriously sybaritic to
say the least, a garden of priapic splendor if you believe the myth, all emanat
ing from the lazy, cunning king at its center. Yet people there seem to have
regarded pleasure the way Milton should have, given his mistrust of kings and
lust and anything pretty. For one thing, they did not especially believe in it.
The most imperfect of courtly enjoyers, the earl of Rochester, for example held
that it’s easy to “tak[e] false pleasure for true love / But pain can ne’er deceive.”
Whereas for Milton the capacity to be pleased confirms autonomy with all its
powers and obligations, Rochester proposed that really pleasure subjugates,
producing illusions that only pain dismantles. If you are interested in the truth,
you want at least to be the pleaser, not the pleased, and it’s better yet to be out
of it altogether.
This isn’t the middle of the seventeenth century of course; it’s barely the
beginning of the twenty-first, and absolute sovereignty is more or less a thing
of the past, as are perhaps the forms of enjoyment that bothered Rochester.
Also, fewer and fewer postcards are falling out of books. Fewer and fewer
books are being opened in the first place. Instead, most words are flickering
through cyberspace, moth-like but more cynical than moths, less questing.
There’s nothing for anything to latch on to, which could get to be a problem for
pleasure, seeing as how always before it seemed to work like a lock and key,
needing something notched and unique to fit into a shape that was already
there somehow, commanding its own contents.
I’ve noticed more and more keys disappearing from my life. For instance,
I have an alarm system built into my car. If I am outside the car but want to be
inside it, I am compelled to press a button on my keychain. I do that and there
is a little yelp and then the car unlocks itself but there is no pleasurable grind
ing slide of a key’s teeth, no twist of the wrist or jolt the lock springing up,
released. There’s no pleasure. The car’s yielding feels arbitrary,
if I just hap
pened to be walking by when it decided to make itself available. Recently, how
ever, the baby was playing with my keychain and he must have jiggled some
thing loose because the last time I pressed the button on my keyless key
absolutely nothing happened. The car sat still for a change, and it was good, if
somewhat inconvenient.
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Like most babies, mine has his own set of keys, colored plastic ones that he
likes all right, but the jingle of the real ones, or maybe their weight, pleases him
more. In this case, his pleasure has given mine back to me, and I am humbled
by his largesse, accidental though it is. In their way, his pleasures happen like
accidents too. I do watch him laying down certain laws of liking. Yet at first it
seems that objects fall to him by chance and then he will or wont piece them
into some jigsaw of affection and, ultimately, desire. It’s impossible to say
which comes first, the pleasure or the thing that gives it. It’s impossible to say
if the baby is freed or bound when he learns to command this and not that —
the banana and not the applesauce, the dragonfly and not the duck, The Snowy
Day and never, never Good Night Moon, though (because?) he has five copies of
it. I cannot tell if with age he is growing imperious or cowed, and if cowed
whether it is by the brute force of his own pleasure or by the objects that pro
voke and thereby seem to govern it.
Yet pleasure is supposed to be a primal motive; from Freud’s point of view,
it is an absolute motive, or at least it was until, as for Adam et al., the death
drive made its despotic ambitions known. Jeremy Bentham was really much
less compromising in his Principles of Morals and Legislation, where even the
most malign instincts boil down to pleasure: “Let a man’s motive be ill-will; call
it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive; the
pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his
adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself is good. It
may be faint; it may be short; it must at any rate be impure; yet while it lasts,
and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any other that is not
more intense.”
There’s much to interest us in this particular principle of morals and legis
lation, but one thing is the question of what makes pleasure, even wretched
pleasure, “good.” What seems to do that is its discreteness, its detachment
from “consequence.” It is as if any consequence, good or bad, would make the
pleasure itself less good. The other thing that makes pleasure good is its inten
sity. In either case, pleasure is pure lyric. Narrative seduces and adulterates it.
No more sweet paradise with the walls around it. Everyone: learn to say please.
So back to pleasure and the question of what it might or might not have to
do with history. With personal history, the troublesome skein of redundancy
and change, incursion and obduracy. With narrative history, the chain of con
sequences from which we don’t know how to deliver ourselves and yet per
versely reckon an affirmation of our freedom. With history history, the fath
omless sea of particularities where the people who enjoy themselves the most
just drown, as witness the House of Stuart, or Marie Antoinette, or poor
Princess Di just when by all accounts she was happy at last. In general, histo
ry seems inimical to pleasure, which requires stately domes and the instant the
red currant bursts on the tongue. And suspense,
in the infinite pause at the
top of the ferris wheel. Even when there is a whole piece of music, joy gathers
to a point, a summit, perilous and absolute. You can plot it on a map, some
how, but not in sentences.
Before the baby was born I went swimming almost every day, at once sin
gular and accompanied. I’m an earth sign who has trouble with liquids, but this
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was my first true and absolute maternal pleasure, the water one great hand lift
ing and molding me, patiently erasing the difference between the me and the
not-me. The sun browned my back, beating a white H in the place where my
suit straps went, and the baby would rest in the effortfill peace of my swim
ming. Two weeks after he was born I went back to the water, assuming it would
bless me, but instead I found myself floundering there, lonely and cold. I drift
ed like an empty sack, unsaved and clumsy, my grace gone.
So I turned back to my books, and to authors no one pays me to study: Tol
stoy and Margery Allingham. Janet Frame. There’s world of pleasure in these
books, the pleasure of vicarious life. I hadn’t thought I would need the vicari
ous now, with my own life suddenly so present and full, so this is a source of
pleasure worth looking into. What for that matter is vicarious pleasure? Is it
imaginatively experiencing the pleasures that others — even unreal others —
take in reality, or is it taking pleasure in what happens to others, regardless of
whether they themselves are pleased? Is it that someone else your substitute,
your vicar, in the stately pleasure dome?
Vicarious pleasure seems at first to have something to do with standing
back, apart, at that chaste, absolute point that the solstice of history. Except
vicis means alternation, or change, so that if you are going to be true to the
word vicarious (and why wouldn’t you?) you have to think about there being in
the purity of pleasure like that some sudden undulation,
of clean grass as a
shape passes through it.
There’s an ethical thread in this that is hard but important to pluck apart
from the problem of definition. It has to do with what pleasure permits us to
be to each other, its place in relations of power. Here is where you have to bring
pain back into the picture, as a point of contrast. Vicarious pain, that is, oth
erwise known as sympathy. It confirms your talent for substituting yourself for
another, at least imaginatively, and from there becomes the ground of kindness,
of intervention in the unjust business of the world. Vicarious pleasure is some
how more sinister; its seeker seems starved, but righteously so, haughty and
immaculate and selfish. The thing is that pleasure of this sort, vicarious sensa
tion of this sort, would never prod you to do anything. The opposite: it would
suspend you like Mary Poppins’s giggly uncle forever pouring tea up in the
eaves.
And yet. It ought to be possible merely to respect the pleasures of others
without concerning yourself in them in any way. This would be a good, in exact
contrast to the way in which it’s a good to concern yourself in the pain of oth
ers (short of being the one to inflict it, of course). I understand that the idea
of such a good occurred to Rebecca West: “If we do not live for pleasure we
shall soon find ourselves living for pain. If we do not regard as sacred our own
joys and the joys of others, we open the door and let into life the ugliest
attribute of the human race, which is cruelty.” That’s stark, and pleasingly
Hobbesian, albeit portentous of a world more liberal than the one Hobbes envi
sioned.
The woman I knew, the one who found the postcard, held it in her hand
and thought what shall I do. The thing is, until that moment her love affair
had given her nothing but pleasure. She had been pleasingly drowsy all the
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while, whereas for the rest of her life (which had been going on for a long time
by then) she had had to keep her brain wakeful, flooded with light. With this
man she thought she could lie still and even sink. And all the while she had
been taking false pleasure for true love, perhaps even mistaking for pleasure
something radically different from it. All the while, the man who had been her
bed, her dim room, her quiet house, was thinking please, and writing that very
word, and mailing it secretly to someone else while travelling in Italy. It was
someone else and not she who could please him, yet the survival of her own
pleasure now demanded the denial of his. It now required the other woman to
say no or nothing at all. As it did seem she had done, choosing to see his plea
as nothing more than a tool, a means of marking a page she liked.
Even when pleasure
not essential, it is essential to what is essential.
What is essential is some sense of self-rule. But the inessential what pro
duces that sense. Georges Bataille worked this out in considerable detail,
somewhat predictably identifying sovereignty ancient and modern with the
powers of consumption, indulgence, and excess. “The sovereign, if he
not
imaginary, truly enjoys the products of this world — beyond his needs. His
sovereignty resides in this. Let us say that the sovereign (or the sovereign life)
begins when, with the necessities ensured, the possibility of life opens up with
out limit. Conversely, we may call sovereign the enjoyment of possibilities that
utility doesn’t justify. [. . . ] Life beyond utility is the domain of sovereignty.”
Enjoyment here subsists beyond need, which is where sovereignty is too. We
are back to the power of pleasure, or at least to the way that enjoyment affirms
prerogative, one’s place above and beyond. Bataille qualifies this, however, by
speaking of “the sovereign, if he not imaginary.” What sovereign today not
imaginary? Who can forget the pop psych trope of the inner child, who was
basically the inner tyrant, and most decidedly imaginary? To the imaginary
sovereign, enjoyment
rooted not in excess but in virtual necessity, in that
Hobbesian assistance to our own vitality.
When the woman I knew showed her lover the postcard she’d found, he
didn’t deny having sent it. He did not do anything like that. Still she left it to
him to say whether he thought she should go on loving him or not. “It’s not
that you don’t please me,” he said. When he said it she realized that it wasn’t
that. It was more that she had never known him to have done anything remote
ly
playful as what he had done when he’d sent that postcard. In her mind,
this turned out to be more decisive than the question of who had the power to
please whom — though of course play and pleasure and power all converge in
the end.
They do this because they did it in the beginning. In 1970 D.W. Winnicott, an expert in child’s play, was wondering why people (or at least English
people) like having kings, and queens. He thought it had to do with the per
manence of monarchy, with the way kings — like the indestructible object of a
child’s play — have the power to survive the buffets of love and fury and all the
other primitive passions. By surviving like that, sovereign figures organize “the
paradox that links exterior reality with inner experience.” And this organiza
tion is a great pleasure, for what is being organized is the relationship between
the accidental and the determinate. Eventually words attempt to do the orga
nizing for us, but it’s never quite the same.
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Speaking of words, the linguist Elinor Ochs was interested in baby talk, the
high-pitched ska I’ve mastered pretty well by now She found that mothers the
world over do not talk to their babies in this tone of voice. As a matter of fact,
in some places such
Samoa you hear it only when adults are speaking to their
superiors. The elevated singsong placates, appeases. It gives a pleasure that
protects the speaker from lordly wrath. In the interest of democracy, I did for
a day or two try to speak to the baby in a level alto and in sentences that didn’t
rhyme. But it was really much too hard: the family with a baby is the last bas
tion of absolute monarchy.
In fact, babies are the final refuge of the absolute, period. So much that has
been lost from the rest of the world, for better or for worse, hiding out there
behind the Stevie Wonder smile. Actually, my particular baby has an amazing
smile, focused and radiant and recognizing. Nothing pleases me more than this
smile.
In sum? Clearly there is no arithmetic of pleasure which might yield an
actual sum. There may be a geometry, but not one expressible in a series of
proofs. All I wanted to ask was what you can learn about pleasure by having a
baby around. What can you learn by observing both the baby and your rela
tionship to him? What I’ve learned is that pleasure survives its own alienation,
and possibly even thrives on it. Also I have learned that enjoyment is primal,
but not
much as you might think. It’s a power born of subjection, ours to
what already there. The subjection comes first, and then the sovereign plea
sure. Babies are tyrants. They demand to be pleased, but only because they can
do nothing else. It’s a relief to know this. It’s liberating in its
Here are some sovereign pleasures, as specific as they are not: my mouth
on the baby’s warm belly, blowing. Eucalyptus leaves spilling some of the sun
on his face. Our deep chair in darkness. There are really no words for any of
these pleasures, but that possibly is how, and why, they can bind us into a com
mon good.
I saw a woman recently. She was bobbing up and down at the shallow end
of a swimming pool and in front of her, on the deck, was a stroller, its hood
down at an angle that, frankly, recalled the bassinet in Rosemary’s Baby. Any
way, from her place waist deep in water this woman was looking up and pour
ing baby talk into the space under the hood. Then a man who must have been
her partner came and wheeled the baby back. I watched the woman watch
them go, grateful and aggrieved. After that she turned and struck out through
the water, her arms bright, her legs lost in ight as she swam.
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In the preface to his collection of stories, Slow Learn
er (1984), Thomas Pynchon discusses the effect that
Beat writers had upon him in the mid-to-late 1950s
when he was an undergraduate at Cornell University.
Pynchon argues that an opposition between the
newly canonized mythopoetic high modernists and
the subcultural or countercultural Beats arose in Eng
lish departments in the late 1950s.
Pynchon
describes his attraction to Beat writings: “It was
actually OK to write like this! Who knew? The
effect was exciting, liberating, strong positive. It was
not a case of either/or, but an expansion of possibili
ty” (Slow Learner 7). Despite the mountain of criti
cism that has been published about Pynchon over the
last thirty years, there has been very little written
about Pynchons connection with the Beat writers.
Biographically, Pynchon’s affinity for the Beat
lifestyle seems apparent in his own early, restless
wanderings. Pynchon joined the navy (as did Jack
Kerouac) in 1955 after his first two years at Cornell
and briefly rejoined after his college graduation.
Subsequently, Pynchon lived in Greenwich Village in
1958, right around the apex of Beat publications and
the subsequent emergence of Village Beat-style
bohemianism. After a two-year stint as an engineer
ing aide at Boeing in Seattle, Pynchon resumed his
travels in 1962, dividing his time between the two
famous Beat locales of California and Mexico
(Chambers xiv). The next year, Pynchon would pub

lish his first novel, V., in which the Beat influence can
most clearly be seen.
Criticism on V. is ample and covers such varied
influences as Vladimir Nabokov (one of Pynchon’s
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teachers at Cornell), the French surrealists and spy novels, Edgar Allan Poe,
Joseph Heller, and William B. Yeats.1 Yet, despite Pynchon’s own admission
that Beat writers played a formative role in his development as a fiction writer,
no critic has fully explored the connections between the early Pynchon of V and
Beat writers. Typical Judith Chambers’ book-length study of Pynchon in
which she devotes only three sentences to the Beats, most of which are quotes
from Slow Learner, In The Fictional Labyrinths of Thomas Pynchon, David Seed
likewise devotes scant two pages to the influence of the Beats upon Pynchon.
However, Seed does cite a personal letter he received from Pynchon in which
Pynchon writes, “Of all the influences I remember then [while at Cornell], his
[Jack Kerouac’s] was the most glamorous” (8). Yet Seed lumps together the
Beats with Saul Bellow and Philip Roth as equal but all ultimately minor influ
ences upon Pynchon. Seed does admit that Kerouac might have acted as a cat
alyst for Pynchon, “opening up his sense of narrative possibilities” (11), but he
never explores this thought any further. In Understanding Thomas Pynchon,
Robert Newman only devotes a page to Pynchon and the Beats, but he does
claim, “In his depiction of the social misfits of 1950s America and the idea of
yo-yoing
travel for its own sake, Pynchon is clearly influenced by Jack Ker
ouac’s On the Road, a novel that was at the height of its popularity during the
period that he came of age” (50). While Christopher Ames has touched on
some Beat threads running through Gravity's Rainbow in his
“Calling for
Ketchup in Burroughs and Pynchon,”2 elsewhere there are only brief references
to Pynchon’s potential debt to William Burroughs. Evidently, there is a gap in
Pynchon scholarship, which this essay seeks to fill.
I want to argue that V. shows evidence of a writer both fascinated and
repulsed by Beat ideology. While Pynchon praises the original, life-affirming,
positive values of the Beats, V. can be read as a critique of the social Beat move
ment,
immature, unrealizable and unproductive. Essentially, Pynchon
believes that the Beat style of life is admirable in theory but doesn’t work in
practice. Here is Pynchon’s entropy at work: the life-affirming, positive values
of the Beats become petered out, stale, and fruitless almost as quickly as they
are introduced into society and adopted by the mock-beatniks, The Whole Sick
Crew. Therefore, what Pynchon criticizes is not the Beat ethos itself but the
transference from philosophy to practice, the co-option of the Beat movement
by the media, and the misguided attempts of image-conscious, bohemian fol
lowers, who aimlessly follow trends that the media glamorizes. In addition, I
want to argue that Pynchon adopts certain writing techniques and subject mat
ter from the Beats, while critiquing misguided appropriation of Beat ideals by
“beatnik” followers.
Pynchon, more than any other American novelist, with the possible excep
tion of John Barth, is known
a quintessential postmodern writer. Converse
ly, the Beats occupy a strange, liminal space in American literature; they are
somehow suspended between modernism and postmodernism. Certainly, there
is a huge amount of variance within the Beat movement: from the Buddhistinspired poetry of Gary Snyder to the dystopian, allegorical novels of Richard
Brautigan. In addition, there
much within the Beat canon that might be
described as postmodern, especially exemplified in the writings of William
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Burroughs. With his emphasis on textual cut-ups and epistemological indeter
minacy, Burroughs could be considered more radical a postmodernist than Pyn
chon. Pynchon does claim that the late 1950s and early 1960s, the time in
which he wrote V, was a period of significant literary change in America: "We
were at a transition point, a strange post-Beat passage of cultural time, with our
loyalties divided” (Slow Learner 9). Still, the division between Beat writings
and postmodern writing is fuzzy. Although in many ways he not as radical a
postmodern writer
some of the Beat writers, it was Pynchon who helped
commercialize postmodernist writing with his astute but restrained voice, con
taining much that one could find disturbing but little that one could find offen
sive (as with Burroughs) or life-affirming (as with Kerouac). Ultimately, it is
not the ideals of the Beat movement that Pynchon effectively critiques but the
adaptation of those ideals by foolish followers.
In this essay, I will examine the influences of two seminal "Beat” novels,
Jack Kerouac’s On The Road (1957) and to a lesser extent William Burroughs’
Naked Lunch (1959), upon Pynchon’s post-Beat V. (1963). I have chosen these
two novels because I feel that their influence can most clearly be seen through
a close reading of V, In Slow Learner, Pynchon specifically cites On The Road
as a shaping influence on him (12). I choose Naked Lunch because it appears to
be linked thematically to V. To a key extent, Pynchon describes a "beat” world
in V., a world that seems exhausted, sliding towards a violent apocalypse or
towards a nihilistic or vapid cybernetic age. The male characters in V. (Herbert
Stencil, Benny Profane, and Hugh and Evan Godolphin) are borderline
obsessed searchers who, in the Beat tradition, religiously seek something to
frame or shape the chaos of their lives. That the searchers never find what they
are looking for or cannot articulate the meaning of their searches comprises
Pynchon’s ultimate critique of the Beat movement. He might admire the
instinctual passion of the Beats and their innovative praxis, but he feels that
neither offers intrinsic advantages and produces no meaningful or practical
results. For Pynchon, the Beat movement is a very brief pocket of time in the
1950s, which was swept away by an ongoing and ultimately more powerful
technological movement that stretches back to the Industrial Revolution. Pyn
chon argues that the Beats’ primal passion cannot compete with technological
advancement. Consequently, the machine ethos supplants the fleeting roman
tic ethos of the Beats, leaving its followers lost and confused, subject to the
increasingly violent aftereffects of technology run amok.

Structure and Substance of V., Naked Lunch, and On The Road

While the structure of V. is not outlandishly postmodern by today’s standards,
it was a bold departure from most novels that were published during the early
1960s. Aside from Pynchon, the only well-known American novelists who
were pushing literary boundaries during the late 1950s and early 1960s through
their use of bold and radical structural forms were Vladmir Nabokov,3 William
Burroughs, and, to a lesser extent, Jack Kerouac. While Nabokov’s influence
appears in Pynchon’s use of alliteration and wordplay, Burroughs’ and Kerouac’s
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influence can be seen more clearly. Many of Burroughs’ textually bold, and dar
ing novels were published during the late 1950s and early 1960s.4 V.’s structure
is peculiarly similar to Burroughs’ Naked Lunch. Like V., Naked Lunch jumps
globally from location to location and through time and space (from Paris to
Germany to Mexico to Italy to North Africa to America). While V.’s geo
graphical and chronological shifts are clearly demarcated by chapter breaks,
Naked Lunch's geographical moves are more haphazard, occurring frequently in
the same chapters with the only notification being a new paragraph or a cine
matic “fade out.” Pynchon and Burroughs utilize a similar technique of char
acter overload by including a huge number of characters, most of which are not
fully developed. These purposeful distortions aim to evince that most people
one encounters in real life are fleeting and two-dimensional, leaving the indi
vidual to fill in the lack of information with his or her own necessarily artificial
constructs. Both novels include incomplete, insubstantial and frequently
ridiculous characters
a means to reflect reality more accurately.
The names of the characters in Naked Lunch and V. are typically playful,
functional, and mechanistic. Pynchon’s The Gaucho, Teflon, and Stencil mir
ror Burroughs’ The Pusher, The Vigilante, and The Gimp. This comic utili
tarian naming establishes an atmosphere of existential insubstantiality and
emphasizes that human free will is an illusory concept. While Pynchon may
have adopted Burroughs’ method of naming, he concurrently distorts central
Beat ideals with his creation of Benny Profane, the schlemiel. Benny Profane
is an inversion of Kerouac’s romantic narrator-hero in On The Road, Sal Par
adise. “Benny” in 1950s Beat circles was a slang word for Benzedrine, a sub
stance that Kerouac used heavily during his marathon writing sessions of On the
Road and The Subterraneans. In On The Road, Sal’s only writing advice to aspir
ing writer Dean Moriarty is, “after all what do I know about it except you’ve got
to stick to it with the energy of a benny addict” (6). Sal and Benny do have
many situational features in common: both drift aimlessly from odd job to odd
job (both were in the navy, both work as nightwatchmen, Sal briefly works as a
cotton picker in California while Benny briefly works as an alligator hunter).
However, while Sal is starry-eyed, idealistic, and passionate, Profane the
schlemiel
despondent, clumsy, and aloof, a hollow simulacrum of Sal Par
adise.
Both V. and Naked Lunch explicitly detail encroaching mass violence in
their different global settings. Both writers disturbingly portray a world in sig
nificant decline. In V., random, chaotic violence reverberates in the Fashoda
Crisis of 1898 in Cairo, the chaos at the Venezuelan embassy in Florence in
1899, the violent rebellion of the Bondelswarts in German-occupied South
Africa in 1922, and in the desecration of Malta during the Second World War.
Naked Lunch reflects a similar sense of concurrent, random global violence and
chaos. Much of the violence occurs in Burroughs’ mythical Intervene, where
shady, criminal organizations terrorize people through brainwashing, drugs,
and physical torture. Just as Pynchon’s Foppl’s crew mercilessly tortures and
murders while colonizing in southwest Africa, Burroughs’ Africa-based Islam
Incorporated is devoted to aimless torture and murder for sadistic pleasure.
Heading Islam Incorporated is Hassan i Sabbah, who stages shows of sodomy
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and execution in front of jeering, bloodthirsty crowds. Other members of Islam
Incorporated are similarly prone to violence: A. J. decapitates American girls,
while Dr. “Fingers” Schaefer (The Lobotomy Kid) performs lobotomies upon
unwilling victims. Burroughs and Pynchon take us into the bleakest corners of
humanity, leaving the reader shuddering with disgust at human beings’ horrif
ically destructive and violent tendencies, which are exaggerated by technologi
cally advanced Western culture.

Sickness, Madness, and Addiction

The main narrative of V. revolves around a group of disaffected New Yorkers
who call themselves The Whole Sick Crew. Sickness a key thematic device
in seminal Beat writing. The state of sickness is the starting point for both On
The Road and Naked Lunch. On The Road begins with: “I [Sal] met Dean not
long after my wife and I split up. I had just gotten over a serious illness that I
wont bother to talk about except that it had something to do with the miser
ably weary split-up and my feeling that everything was dead” (3). Similarly,
Naked Lunch begins with Burroughs’ account: “I awoke from The Sickness at
the age of 45, calm and sane and in reasonably good health except for a weak
ened liver and the look of borrowed flesh common to all those who survive The
Sickness” (xxxvii). Although Burroughs defines “sickness” in Naked Lunch as
“drug addiction,” sickness seems inherent and ineradicable in Burroughs’ vision
of humanity. Burroughs claims that a “naked lunch” is moment of revelation
in which “a man realizes his cannibalism, his predatory condition and his nec
essary parasitism and addictive nature.” According to Burroughs then, humans
are biologically predisposed towards “sickness,” characterized by their inherent
capacity and desire for violence. One doesn’t necessarily have to be a drug
addict in order to be “sick.” By Burroughs’ definition, humans are inherently
cruel, selfish, and aggressive. Nevertheless, some people are “sicker” than oth
ers. That is, there is a contemporary, perverted American sickness.
Burroughs attacks this “civilized” sickness in Naked Lunch through his sar
castic and gruesome portrayals of racism, sadism, and homophobia. For
instance, a white girl from Texarkana predicates the murder of a young black
male in East Texas for “looking at me so nasty” and because “he’s give me a sick
headache” [sic] (176). Similarly, a racist southern county clerk tests a stranger
from an unnamed city by asking him what he thinks of “The Jeeeews.” Bur
roughs uncovers the motivating sexual insecurities of these pathetic characters.
A stranger passes the county clerk’s test by responding: “The only thing a Jew
wants to do doodle a Christian girl. . . . One of these days we’ll cut the rest
off” (177). In the trial of Naked Lunchr Allen Ginsberg (originally Jewish,
although he would later convert to Buddhism) defended Burroughs to the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, which considered this passage, along with many
others, to be obscene. Ginsberg argued that the passage uncovers the inane
narrow-mindedness of American bigots: “He is making a parody of the mon
strous speech and thought processes of a red-necked Southern, hate-filled type,
who hates everyone —Jews, Negroes and Northerners” (quoted in Naked Lunch
xxxi).
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While Kerouac and Burroughs detail societal sickness within Eisenhower
America in their novels, they don’t celebrate its existence as The Whole Sick
Crew does in V. Many of the Beats, especially Kerouac, set up a dichotomy
between sickness and madness. According to the Beats, sickness a weariness,
cruelty, and paranoia engendered by society or civilization. In contrast to soci
etal sickness, the Beats extolled their own visions as an illuminating form of
Rimbaudian madness, derived from passionate excess. For Kerouac and many
of the Beats, there is a special kind of madness that allows an individual to
experience life more authentically or passionately. This form of madness
encourages expression of primal instincts, thereby liberating the individual from
the sterile repression of Western civilization. As Sal Paradise emphasizes in On
The Road, “the only ones for me are the mad ones, the ones who are mad to live,
mad to talk, mad to be saved, desirous of everything at the same time, the ones
who never say a commonplace thing, but burn, burn, burn like fabulous yellow
roman candles exploding like spiders across the stars and in the middle you see
the blue center light pop and everyone goes Awwh!”’ (8). Ginsberg dedicated
his seminal Beat poem, “Howl” (1956), to Burroughs for “an endless novel
which would drive everybody mad” (quoted in Mottram 12). However, the
Beats acknowledge that while “madness” is a more authentic, creative state, it
can lead to destruction in contemporary society, which represses and perverts
the natural expression of emotional impulses. Indeed, “Howl” begins on a note
of destruction begot by madness: “I saw the best minds of my generation
destroyed by madness” (Ellmann 976). Society thwarts the natural expressions
of humans, driving the individual seeking emotional authenticity to “madness.”
As mentioned earlier, many of the Beats used drugs to help liberate their
inhibitions and to pursue alternative states of consciousness. Pynchon mainly
satirizes the Beats’ extreme use of drugs with The Whole Sick Crew’s predilec
tion for alcohol. Only when he is drunk does Benny Profane have heroic aspi
rations. Another of Pynchon’s characters, Pig Bodine, who is perpetually drunk
and aspires to be pornographic film star, seems clearly modeled after one of
Burroughs’ atavistic characters, for whom only violence, sex, and drugs have any
meaning. Likewise, Mafia Winsome’s obsessive overemphasis on sex, evi
denced in her practice of “Heroic Screwing,” which to her is “screwing five to
six times a night with many wrestling holds thrown in” (87), appears to be a
parody of Kerouac’s Dean Moriarty, to whom “sex was the one and only holy
important thing in life” (4).
Pynchon’s The Whole Sick Crew embraces the urbane civilized sickness
that the Beats reject and joyfully awake from, without reaching the illuminat
ing (but potentially destructive) state of the Beats’ visionary madness. Essen
tially, The Whole Sick Crew completely misinterprets Beat philosophy. In V.,
Roony Winsome describes sickness as “a lack of morality, rejecting morality for
personal aggrandizement, insanity, accomplishing nothing” (338). This is a
deterioration of the Beats’ concept of glorified madness, which was a countercultural response to a sickness that they saw in “healthy” society. In On The
Road, Sal Paradise becomes “sick” by leading a normal civilized life that has
become spiritually barren and insubstantial. Consequently, he and Dean look
for an alternative form of healthy life untainted by civilization, somewhere in
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America and beyond its borders. This possibility is noticeably lacking in Pyn
chon’s cold, technologically advanced world, which offers little or no hope for
personal redemption.

The Beat Generation, The Whole Sick Crew, and Decadence

In coining the term Beat Generation, Kerouac described it as “a generation of
crazy, illuminated hipsters suddenly rising and roaming America, serious, curi
ous, bumming and hitchhiking everywhere, ragged, beatific, beautiful in an ugly
graceful new way” (portable Kerouac 559). For Kerouac, beat meant “down and
out but full of intense conviction.” The Beats invented their own alternative
morality. It
important to recognize that the word “beat originally meant
poor, down and out, deadbeat, on the bum, sad, sleeping in subways.” The neo
hobo Beats, especially Kerouac, identified with the disenfranchised, the out
siders, and ethnic others. In his deification of the musical form of jazz and
social alienation, Sal Paradise expresses Kerouac and the Beats’ rejection of
America’s white dominated culture: “I wish I were a Negro . . . anything other
than a white man disillusioned” (On The Road 180).
Essentially, Pynchon’s The Whole Sick Crew is a group of Beat posers who
misguidedly attempt to emulate a bohemian lifestyle through their mechanical
and passionless forays into drunkenness and casual sex. They are readers and
theoreticians while the Beats relied upon and emphasized the need for empiri
cal firsthand experience. Whereas the Beats eagerly roamed across the country
and world in search of higher truths and higher pleasures, The Whole Sick
Crew “lived half their time in a bar on the lower West Side called the Rusty
Spoon” (26). Unlike the Beats, most members of The Whole Sick Crew never
leave the confines of New York City. In essence, they are aesthetes or simulacra
of the Beats. They base their behavior on the pseudo-philosophy of popular
culture forms: “Most of them worked for a living and obtained the substance
of their conversation from the pages of Time magazine and like publications”
(46). As Rachel Owlglass explains, The Whole Sick Crew, “does not create, it
talks about people who do” (356). The Whole Sick Crew is closer in philoso
phy to the artistic dandies and critics whom Oscar Wilde endorsed in the late
nineteenth century than to the Beats. The Beats emphasized the creation of art
through empirical or personal experience. Whereas the Beats were heavily
influenced by nineteenth-century American Transcendentalists such as Whit
man and Melville, in addition to Russian and French existentialists, “anything
properly English went over with The Whole Sick Crew” (361).
Opposed to the energy or vitality of the Beats is The Whole Sick Crew’s
lethargy, exemplified in Fergus Mixolydian, “the laziest living being in Nueva
York” (45), who connects himself electronically to the television set. Pynchon
emphasizes, “The rest of the Crew partook of the same lethargy.” Their ideas
. are decadent abstractions of theories that are themselves abstractions of per. sonal experience, distorted through the crooked lenses of magazines and televi
sion. This sort of quirky popular-culture decadence appears in Slab (presumably
based on Andy Warhol), who paints cheese danishes and claims he is revolting
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against Catatonic Expressionism. Whereas Kerouac describes the Beats as kind
and generous, Roony Winsome describes the minds of the Crew as “vile” (V.
387). While Pynchon does not implicate or directly critique the philosophy
and practice of the original Beat writers, he does appear to argue that the Beat
style of life doomed as a movement, as are most lifestyles when applied to a
large body of people. That is, once any philosophy leaves the hands of its orig
inal members, it can be misinterpreted, bastardized or misrepresented by those
merely interested in gaining a portion of the power and glory achieved by the
original members.
The Whole Sick Crews misguided appropriation of Beat-style bohemianism results in puerile, doltish characters who are frequently inane and insub
stantial. Whereas Sal and Dean are jazz aficionados who eagerly detail jazz
performances in lucid musical metaphor, Pig Bodine drunkenly mentions:
“There is nothing I love more than good shit kicking music” (117). The Whole
Sick Crew attends the jazz concerts of McClintic Sphere merely to solidify its
simulated bohemian images. When Sphere plays, they sit silently and oblivi
ous — “None of them were saying anything” (48) — whereas Dean and Sal
become passionately animated when they hear jazz. While the parties of On
The Road are long Dionysian celebrations, lasting up to three days at a time, the
parties of The Whole Sick Crew are mechanical and passionless: “The party,
as if it were inanimate after all, unwound like a clock’s mainspring toward the
edges of the chocolate room” (41). The Whole Sick Crew attends jazz concerts
and holds parties presumably because it the “in” thing to do, according to the
magazines The Crew reads. Rather than a spontaneous celebration of joy, The
Crew’s actions are hollow and calculated.

The Road Becomes the Street

In V., Pynchon repeatedly uses an image of a yo-yo to describe various mem
bers of The Whole Sick Crew and their activities. Profane feels the closest
thing to an animate yo-yo in the sense he, like it, “has a path marked out for it
over which it has no control” (201). Pynchon, in fact, describes Benny Profane
as a human yo-yo. Yo-yoing in V. parodies the frequent boomerang trips that
Sal and Dean take in On The Road, which are supposed to be an expression of
extreme free will and romanticism. The idea behind yo-yoing, conversely, is
determinism and control — after all, someone or something holds the string of
a yo-yo. For Pynchon, the hand that holds the yo-yo string may be the invisi
ble, deterministic hand of genetic predisposition that motivates people to trav
el as a form of territorial expansion and/or territorial appropriation. Profane
and other members of the Whole Sick Crew are described as yo-yos who trav
el back and forth, mostly within in New York City, typically on the subway.
Benny yo-yos from Norfolk to New York, then within New York, and ulti
mately to Malta. Similarly, Kerouac’s Sal Paradise might also be described as a
human yo-yo in the sense that he continually boomerangs back to his aunt’s
house in Paterson, NewJersy, after his successive trips across the country with
and without Dean Moriarty.
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Whereas The Whole Sick Crew’s yo-yoing takes place almost entirely
within the confines of New York City, Sal and Dean’s traveling takes them all
across America and into Mexico. Furthermore, yo-yoing becomes an abstract
game for The Whole Sick Crew. The Crew sets up a contest of yo-yoing up
and down the subway where "Slab is the king with 69 cycles over a week-end”
(277). Similarly in On The Road, traveling is sometimes done excessively as a
kind of sport. At one point, Sal mentions, "We had come from Denver to
Chicago via Ed Wall’s ranch, 1180 miles, in exactly seventeen hours ... for a
mean average of seventy miles per hour across the land, with one driver. Which
a kind of crazy record” (237). Unlike The Whole Sick Crew, Sal recognizes
that it is crazy to keep numerical records when the journey and the destination
are infinitely more important than the distance traveled. Furthermore, The
Whole Sick Crew rarely has a destination when it travels. While Sal and Dean
find a new kind of freedom in their travels, Pynchon represents Profane as aim
less in his wanderings, which themselves appear to be determined by chance
rather than an act of free will.
The Whole Sick Crew’s universe has condensed from the Beats’ worldwide
expansiveness to New York City, just as Kerouac’s expansive Whitmanian open
road has been reduced to a street. Profane has "nightmares of a single abstract
ed street” (2), whereas Paradise has dreams and visions of "the holy road” (23).
Pynchon denies mysticism and transcendentalism as ways "out” of the limiting
human condition or as alternatives to escalating world violence. Unlike Sal,
who grows through his travels by acquainting himself with different people and
different ways of life, "[s]treets had taught him [Profane] nothing” (27). In V.,
romantic dreams of the road and America have disappeared as the world has
grown steadily more sterile and mechanized. The individual’s imagination has
become constricted by urban and technological sprawl: "This was all there was
to dream; all there ever was: The Street” (31). While Kerouac uses the image
of the road
lifeblood for the new American romantic, in V., Pynchon con
nects the dreamer with the bleak urban street. The heavily industrialized, tech
nologically advanced environment limits the dreamer, who is described as "only
an inconsequential shadow of himself in the landscape, partaking of the soul
lessness of these other masses and shadows. This
the Twentieth Century
Nightmare” (303). In V., the technological/inanimate world invades the human
psychological realm that perceives concepts in crude cybernetic binaries (the
hothouse and the street, the underground and the street). The street is also
described "the kingdom of death” (47), whereas Kerouac’s road itself "life”
(211). In part, Pynchon’s direct inversion of Kerouac’s thematics ultimately
an attempt to denigrate his romantic idealism as unfeasible in and not pertinent
to the world of the late 1950s and early 1960s, in which the world hangs in
delicate balance of power, seemingly ready to crumble at a moment’s notice.

The Quest or Search

On one level, both V. and seminal Beat works are updated twentieth-century
stories about searchers and quests. V. can be interpreted as the story of the
quest of Herbert Stencil to find the woman V., whom he at least initially
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believes to be his mother. V., in her various forms, links the novel together even
though the narrative moves somewhat haphazardly from country to country
and person to person. Burroughs’ Naked Lunch has a similar global focus.
Instead of being linked by various versions of V., “the world network ofjunkies”
links Naked Lunch together (6). Junkies themselves are linked to one another
(dealer to user and vice versa) by need. Burroughs calls this “the algebra of
need” (178). In Burroughs’ nightmarish vision, humans are reduced to running
on “the silent frequency of junk” (31). Like the various incarnations of V.,
drugs become semi-mystical totems for the addict: “Junk
surrounded by
magic and taboos, curses and amulets” (5). While Naked Lunch is populated'by
a number of addicted drug searchers, V contains only one main searcher, Her
bert Stencil. While the search for V. gives Stencil a purpose, he approaches his
search coldly, much like an empirical scientist. In contrast, in On the Road, the
search itself provides mystical revelations and transcendence for Sal and Dean.
In On The Road, Sal and Dean search for a similar undefined object, which
they call “IT.” Their idea of “IT” involves a vision or insight into the nature of
existence, or a lost Eden that they naively or romantically believe to be recov
erable. At one point, Dean tells Sal, “Now man, that alto man last night had
IT — he held it once he found it” (206). Like V., IT is a concept that can take
many forms. At times, IT is the sound of a jazz musician hitting the right
notes. IT can also be a feeling of joyful abandonment that Sal and Dean get
while on the road. When Sal asks Dean what “IT” is, Dean cannot explain. He
says, “now you’re asking me impon-de-rables” (206). Their Tao-like search for
IT leads them towards artistic nonhuman forms that they hope can transcend
their own human mortality.
Before his first trip, Sal claims, “Somewhere along the line I knew there’d
be girls, visions, everything; somewhere along the line the pearl would be hand
ed to me” (On The Road 11). Sal Paradise sets off for the West confident that
he will find hope in a particular place. He wants to emulate Dean Moriarty,
whom he describes as a “sideburned hero of the snowy West” (8). Pynchon par
odies Sal’s desire for heroism in Benny Profane. The only times that Benny
aspires towards heroism are when he is drunk. At one point, Pynchon details
a drunken Benny attempting to piss on the sun: “It went down; as if he’d extin
guished it after all and continued on immortal, god of a darkened world” (17).
Pynchon debunks the idea of heroism
a drunken and deluded illusion of
human grandeur, whereas Kerouac tried to resuscitate the American hero for
the post-World War II generation. Benny, more of an everyman figure than
Dean or Sal, tells Mafia, “Nothing heroic about a schlemiel.... Somebody who
lies back and takes it from objects, like any passive woman” (268). While Sal
strives towards heroism, there appears to be no possibility for heroism in V.
While Stencil is the primary searcher in V., other characters also hunt for
meaning. Hugh Godolphin, the explorer, looks for the mythical land of Vheissu. One of his explorations takes him to the South Pole, where he sees the
corpse of one of Vheissu’s spider monkeys encased in ice. He tells Signor Man
tissa, “It was Nothing I saw” (188). He continues to describe his vision as “a
mockery, you see: a mockery of life.” Godolphin’s romantic quest ends in the
ironic perception that the surface all there is; beneath it lies only nothingness.
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Likewise, at the end of V., "Stencil sketched the entire history of V. that night
and strengthened a long suspicion. That it did add up to only the recurrence of
an initial and a few dead objects” (419). As David Seed argues, “Whereas in
the fiction of Kerouac, the quest pattern gives the narrative impetus, Pynchons
ambivalence about meaningful goals renders his characters’ quests ludicrous”
(8).
Indeed, in On The Road, the road appears to lead to a real visionary place
just as Godolphin believes that his searches would lead to the holy land of
Vheissu. When Sal and Dean go to Mexico, they believe, “We had finally
found the magic land at the end of the road and we never dreamed the extent
of the magic” (On The Road 276). However, similar to Godolphins disillusion
at realizing his vision of Vheissu to be misguided, the magic of Mexico wears
off quickly, as Sal succumbs to another physical sickness in Mexico, mirroring
his original sickness before the book begins. Still, Sal’s trips affect him, change
him for the better, and while he seems to reject Dean a hero figure, he regains
an almost neo-Catholic belief in the basic goodness of humanity and the sacred
nature of the land itself. While Pynchon’s V. ends with little hope for the
future, Kerouac sees promise in America. Indeed, the Beats thought that the
people and the world itself could be changed for the better, but Pynchon holds
no such hope in V.
Written during the gloomy heights of the Cold War, V. displays a world that
creeps towards a kind of technological Armageddon in its increasing brutality
and inhumanity. At the epilogue of V., Sidney Stencil ruminates that “some
time between 1859 and 1919, the world contracted a disease which no one ever
took the trouble to diagnose because the symptoms were too subtle ;— blend
ing in with the events of history, no different one by one but altogether fatal”
(433). In V., the human world is ultimately unexplainable and illogical, where
even the “logic” of the inert universe a false human construct. Benny Pro
fane’s last words are symptomatic of his continual ignorance and the seeming
pointlessness of knowledge: “Offhand I’d say I haven’t learned a goddamn
thing” (454).
This is not to suggest that Pynchon’s vision in V, is completely apocalyptic,
but he does argue that the Beat approach, favoring the emotions over the intel
lect, while romantic, is not practically sound. He veers more towards esteemed
jazzman McClintic Sphere’s dictum, “Keep cool, but care,” which seems like
pointed advice to both Beat writers and followers, who feel that coolness, or a
lack of emotional response, is repressive and morally suspect. For the Beats,
one cannot truly care and keep cool or distanced at the same time. In order to
care truly, one must project the self outwards. This gets us back to one of Ker
ouac’s initial meanings of “beat”
“beatific” or giving and generous. Allied
with Kerouac’s neo-Catholic vision is his emphasis that the imagination can
somehow surmount or counteract human frailties or weaknesses. Whereas
Pynchon nullifies or reduces the dreamer’s imagination to the mechanical rep
resentation of the street, Kerouac leaves us with the image of “all the people . . .,
dreaming in the immensity of it [America]” (On The Road 309). Perhaps the
dreamers will be left as Sal is, to dream on “the old broken-down river pier,” but
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the hope remains of dreaming themselves into a better future or world. For
Pynchon, this notion is ridiculous as humans have already sowed the seeds of
their doom through rampant technological advancement.
While Kerouac emphasizes the expansion of the imagination and personal
ity as alternatives to general meaninglessness, these are empty constructs for the
quintessentially postmodern Pynchon. This leads everyone — the characters,
the author, and the reader — towards a feeling of worthlessness and inertia.
Pynchon may initially have been attracted to Kerouacs romanticism, but V. is
anything but romantic. For Pynchon, the Beats’ romanticism is only admirable
in theory. Yet Pynchon does not adequately prove that the Beat lifestyle
unrealistic, only that it has been misappropriated by misguided followers. If
The Whole Sick Crew cannot live the intense, passionate lifestyle promoted by
Beat writers, it is not because this lifestyle is impossible, but because The
Crew’s commitment to life is minimal and self-interested. While Pynchon’s
vision of entropy veers closer to Burroughs’, Pynchon lacks Burroughs’ sense of
social agency. While Burroughs reels with disgust at the horror he witnesses in
the contemporary world, Pynchon appears resigned to its increased presence
and to the ultimate death of humanity in V. With all its postmodern doom and
gloom, V. revels in cynical intellectual word play and allusion. The ultimate
joke of V. is on all of us, when we realize that we are all in Benny’s position of
having not learned a goddamn thing. According to Pynchon, the historical pat
tern of entropy dominates human free will. Even Burroughs’ emphasis on the
supremacy of the author/creator in disordering narrative or form
no real
alternative to Pynchon.
That Pynchon grew more comic and less cynical in his subsequent The Cry
ing ofLot 49 (1966) shows his gradual abandonment of his doom-ridden vision
of future. For in V., written in the early 1960s, but set largely in 1956, Pynchon
seems not to have anticipated the countercultural movement of the mid-to-late
1960s (which he lampoons brilliantly in The Crying of Lot 49) and the subse
quent positive movement towards civil and social rights. Unlike Allen Gins
berg, who later became the most public of the Beat writers, playing a significant
role in countercultural movements during the 1960s, Pynchon stayed in the
shadows during the 1960s (and continues to do so today). In a way, Pynchon’s
mission was more admirable: to identify the forces that lie underneath cultur
al change throughout the past several hundred years of Western history. Still,
Pynchon’s contention that these submerged forces were largely violent and
obsessional and that they have increased and will continue to increase leaves the
reader with little hope. Furthermore, Pynchon’s reluctance to become a public
figure or make clear his political and moral views during the 1960s helps make
him appear significantly more detached from the world than the Beats and
their followers. Nevertheless, almost forty years after the publication of V..,
Pynchons critique of Beat followers or beatniks seems telling. Indeed, the
unexpected fame and subsequent pressure from becoming the media-appointed
“King of the Beatniks,” helped lead Jack Kerouac into the seclusion and severe
alcoholism that sent him to an early grave. If there is a lesson that Pynchon
wishes us to learn from his critique of the Beat followers, it
that what is
admirable and romantic in pinciple can often turn formulaic and even danger
ous when it becomes a real-life movement.
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Notes
1. See Van Dedlen; Bertesseian; Vella; Seed, “Comparison”; McCarron;
and Mesher.
2.
See Ames.
3. For a in-depth study of Nabokov’s possible influence upon Pynchon in
V., see Mesher.
4. Aside from Naked Lunch, Burroughs published The Exterminator (1960),
The Soft Machine (1961), and The Ticket That Exploded (1962) while Pynchon
was working on V. Burroughs’ first novel, Junky (1953), predates his others by
several years.
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No doubt, just as watchmakers usually
provide
particularly good movement
with similarly valuable case, so it may
happen with jokes that the best achieve
ments in the way of jokes are used as an
envelope for thoughts of the greatest
substance.
—Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to
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the Unconscious
A minor literature doesn’t come from a
minor language; it rather that which a
minority constructs within major lan
guage.
—Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka:

Toward a Minor Literature
1.

The charge that the short story is a “major” form
belies the fact that it continues to be studied
a
“minor” genre. It curious that in this age of theo
ry and practice the short story remains one of the
most theoretically “deterritorialized” narrative genres.
Though many critics and students of the genre would
vehemently protest against its “minor” or “marginal”
status, it nevertheless remains a fact that, with one or
two exceptions, no extensive study of the short story
as either a narratively major or minor form is cur
rently in print. Regardless of the reasons why such an
obvious lack of critical attention to the short story
exists, a review of the corpus of critical writing nev-
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ertheless appears to mitigate against the popularity of the short story as a seri
ous venue for many fiction writers. The present essay seeks to some extent to
offer an explanation of the genre’s “minor” status among critics while remaining one of the most “seriously playful” forms within which many current and
past “major” writers create.
Though it would be impossible, in the short scope of this essay, to offer a .
theoretical framework for discussing the major versus minor status of the short
story in general, by examining a few examples of the subgenre of the short
short story in light of Deleuze and Guattari’s first qualification of a minor lit
erature — that it bears a “high coefficient of deterritorialization” — it becomes
possible to understand how the short story has managed to retain its major sta
tus among writers while at the same time remaining a critically marginal genre.
Moreover, by considering the genre and its subsidiary forms in light of Freud’s
work on the tendentious joke as an example of a “minor” narrative genre, some
light shed not only on the narrative functions of short-short stories but also
on the question of how major versus minor literary status is conferred upon a
popular yet marginal form that to some extent depends on its marginal status
to retain its major effect.
Deleuze and Guattari describe three characteristics of a minor literature: 1)
the deterritorialization of language, 2) the connection of an individual to a
political immediacy, and 3) a collective assemblage of enunciation (18). In
order to adapt the concept of minor literature to a study of a genre within a
major language, this essay will focus on describing and evaluating the deterri
torialization of a genre: the short-short story. By deterritorialization of genre
is meant the way in which a genre — in this case the short-short story — acts
a passage point into “territory” not usually seen
territory the genre usual
ly occupies. In this case, the deterritorialization of genre signifies a space of
freedom, a territory of genre wherein experiment and inversion take place in
spite of the rigid controls of generic convention. Freud’s work on the genre of
the joke in his Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious will likewise be adapt
ed to demonstrate first the similarity between the narrative operations of the
joke and the short-short story, and second how these generic similarities are
operative within the short-short subgenre. Short-short stories by Kafka, Petronious, Colette, and Woolf have been chosen to examine generic deterritorial
ization and the narrative operations shared by both short-shorts and jokes.

2.
The relationship between the short story and the joke has not gone unremarked
by critics of the short story. Walter Allen, in his The Short Story in English, cites
the joke as the present-day survivor of the oral tale and notes that “[v]ery few
jokes, written down, would seem much Eke modern stories. They might very
well, though, remind us of many of Boccacio’s tales in skeleton form. This
throws light on the relationship of the modern story both to the joke and to
tales of earlier times” (4). Although Allen does not examine this relationship
and implies that it is one in which dissimilarities dominate, at least one short
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story critic, Clare Hanson, notes that the short-story writer Saki “frequently
uses the frame of the practical joke for the purpose of unmasking, revealing
something hidden beneath the surface of life” (47). Hanson adds that the plea
sure this unmasking yields in Sakis stories is connected to the workings of the
unconscious in the same way as in the joke. According to Freud:

A joke has quite outstandingly the characteristic of being a notion that has
occurred to us “involuntarily.” What happens is not that we know a
moment beforehand what joke we are going to make, and that all it needs
to be clothed in words. We have an indefinable feeling, rather, which I
can best compare with an “absence” a sudden release of intellectual tension,
and then all at once the joke is there as a rule ready-clothed in words.
167)

We shall return to the crucial role that “absence” plays in both the joke para
digm and the short-short, but for now it is enough to note that Hanson’s use of
Freud’s formula constitutes the only specific correlation that has been made to
date between the short story and Freud’s text. Furthermore, in regard to short
stories with “trick” or surprise endings (such as those written by both Saki and
O. Henry), Hanson perceptively situates the reader in the position of the “lis
tener,” or necessary third person, in Freud’s tendentious joke paradigm (47).
Hanson’s use of Freud signals a formal recognition of the connection
between the short story and the joke, but it also presents a veiled threat to the
critical status of the short story. For although both Saki and O. Henry are
admittedly “major” short story writers, both have been accused of being “minor”
artists for having written in the highly formulaic, technically prefabricated style
for which they are known. Their works have often been cited
examples of
what the short-story genre can be reduced to in the hands of “sensationalists,”
and the beginning writer is admonished not to imitate their methods. In addi
tion, though they are both considered to be “short-story writers,” it is in the
subgenre of the short-short that some of their most memorable work has been
done.
Paradoxically, it is precisely because their short-short stories (O. Henry’s
“The Gift of the Magi” and Saki’s “The Open Window,” for example) are so
closely related to the joke paradigm that their effects as stories are ensured and
the writers’ reputations so tarnished. Does this then mean that a study of the
short-short by way of the structure of jokes will “short-circuit” at the outset,
will amount only to a catalogue of the gimmickry at the writer’s disposal and
therefore an implicit admission that the short story is, after all, a “minor” genre?
At least two factors guard against this outcome. First, not all short-shorts
are as transparently related to the joke paradigm as those of Saki and O. Henry.
Second, the joke-work itself,
articulated by Freud, is not as easily appropri
ated as it may seem. After all, there are “good” jokes and “bad” jokes, success
fully and unsuccessfully told ones. As Freud notes, the defining characteristic
of what constitutes a joke elusive and lies not simply in the joke technique
nor in the pleasure that the joke affords its creator Jokes 145). Furthermore,
“the joke-work is not at everyone’s command, and altogether only a few people
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have a plentiful amount of it; and these are distinguished by being spoken of as
having wit’” (140). In this regard the successful joker is not unlike the creative
writer, as for both the success of their craft originates in play with words and
partakes of the workings of the unconscious as it also manifests itself in the
dreamwork (170). As for jokes themselves, they have a “subjective determi
nant” that indicates that

[o]nly what I allow to be a joke is a joke. What is a joke to me may mere
ly be a comic story to other people. But if a joke admits of this doubt, the
reason can only be that it has a facade — in these instances a comic one —
in the contemplation of which one person is satiated while another may try
to peer behind it. A suspicion may arise, moreover, that this facade
intended to dazzle the examining eye and that these stories have therefore
something to conceal.
(105-6)
Furthermore, by not being at the disposal of all tellers, the joke becomes a high
ly deterritorialized genre, one that by its own nature inherently removed from
the language in which it told.
What Freud suggests here is that the joke — any joke — paradigmatic.
The joke itself is an “envelope” for a thought that would otherwise not be
expressed (92). In other words, “the substance of a joke is independent of the
joke and the substance of the thought, which is here, by means of a special
arrangement, expressed as a joke.” The “special arrangement” — the joke par
adigm — involves three people: the “first person” (teller), the “second person”
(object of the joke), and the “third person” (the listener). In textual terms we
can revise this paradigm in any one of several ways:
first person/writer, sec
ond person/text, third person/reader; or 2) first person/narrator, second person/narrated, third person/narratee; or 3) first person/reader, second person
text, third person/context. Each revision corresponds to and overlaps with cer
tain theories of textual production: intentionality and reader response, textual
hermeneutics, and Marxist/materialist theories of the cultural production of
textual identity. By superimposing the joke paradigm we can establish a psy
choanalytic criticism that can incorporate, rather than be reduced to, a diversi
ty of critical approaches to textuality (Brooks 112).
Thus we find that at least two factors safeguard a study of the correlation
between the short-short and the joke against a reductivist cataloguing of tech
niques: jokes themselves cannot be reduced to such a catalogue; and they pos
sess a “subjective determinant” that implicates both creator and listener in the
process of construction and deterritorializes the genre. Thus the rich potential
of the joke paradigm enables us to discuss the short-short itself a facade that
“dazzles” and “conceals,” a facade that the writer “exposes” and that we as read
ers “try to peer behind.” Jokes and short-shorts, mutually reliant upon brevity
and economy to achieve their effect, share Freud’s requirement for abbreviation
(Jokes 42).
The technique of using brevity, as Freud noted in his connection with the
seminal joke borrowed from Heinrich Heine, is related to other techniques
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such as condensation, multiple use of the same material, and double meaning.
Freud notes that the element common to these techniques is "a question of
economy” (42). But
not every economy of expression, not every abbreviation, on that account
a joke as well. . . . There must be some peculiar kind of abbreviation and
economy on which the characteristic of being a joke depends; and until we
know the nature of that peculiarity our discovery of the common element
in the techniques of jokes brings us no nearer to a solution of our problem.
(20)

The problem Freud refers to is that of discovering the psychical process that
characterizes both the production of jokes in the first person and the pleasure
they produce in the listener. As regards the listener, Freud writes, "laughter
arises if a quota of psychical energy which has earlier been used for the cathexis
of particular psychical paths has become unusable, so that it can find free dis
charge” (Jokes 147). The joke thus “lifts” the inhibitory cathexis in the listen
But the creator of the joke barred from participating in this same psychic
process if the joke is to succeed — nothing ruins a joke more readily than if the
joker begins laughing in the process of telling the joke. Therefore, the psychi
cal process the creator undergoes differs from that of the listener. In his char
acteristically dualistic fashion, Freud offers two explanations for the process: 1)
no inhibitory cathexsis is lifted for the listener, or 2) there an “interference”
with the possibility of discharge that may arise from the application of the lib
erated cathectic energy to some other endopsychic use. The teller of the joke,
in telling it, produces the force that lifts an inhibition by economizing a psychic
expenditure of energy within the joke itself, thus clearing the way for the lis
tener, who brings little or no psychic investment to the joke, to receive its plea
sure.
Jokes, like dreams, are “overdetermined” according to Freud. Both employ
the processes of displacement, condensation, and indirect representation. In
both jokes and dreams, brevity results in condensation. Clearly, the literary
genre of the short-short story shares with both the joke and the dream this
reliance upon condensation through brevity to achieve its effect. However,
short-shorts require, as do jokes, a listener actively engaged in the textual
process.
Brevity, in both jokes and short-short stories, serves the purposes of com
munication: a joker, like a writer, must “capture” the listener in a relatively short
period of time. Jokes are short both because there is not much time in which
to tell them and because, owing to the nature of their dynamic, they accentuate
the ephemerality of perception. Short-shorts, as imitations of the joking
process, duplicate the joke’s advantage of brevity and are thus aligned with the
“economy of psychical expenditure” offered by the joke.
In order to trace more closely the thread weaving Freud’s discussion of
economy in the joke with that of economy, or brevity, in the short-short, it
helpful to subject Freud’s analysis to type of “secondary revision” by consider
ing it in light of a story by Franz Kafka. Because the story, “Absent-Minded
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Window Gazing," is so short, it is possible to reproduce it here in English
translation.

Absent-Minded Window Gazing
What are we to do with these spring days that are now fast coming on?
Early this morning the sky was gray, but if you go to the window now you
are surprised and lean your cheek against the latch of the casement.
The sun
already setting, but down below you see it lighting up the
face of the little girl who strolls along looking about her, and at the same
time you see her eclipsed by the shadow of the man behind overtaking her.
And then the man has passed by and the little girl’s face is quite bright.
(Kafka 387)

Revision of Freud’s analysis here involves substituting the “first person” of the
narrative for the “first person” of the joke. We will temporarily bypass the
authorial position and triangulate the text into narrator, narrated, and narratee:
we will make use, in other words, of our second revision of the joke paradigm.
In doing this we find that the narrator is itself split into the “we” of the first
line and the “you” of the end of the first paragraph. At the same time, the nar
ratee stands outside the text, in the third-person position,
listener to a text
that is simultaneously implicating the reader and constructing the reader as
Other. In this way, the first revision of Freud’s paradigm is superimposed onto
the second.
In this superimposition, the “second person” of the joke/text is the narrat
ed: the setting of the window, the sun setting, the girl, the man, the act of
eclipsing, the brightening of the girl’s face, and so on. . In the second revision,
the “second person” is the text, including the narrator, the narrated, and the nar
ratee. The revisions and superimpositions can be schematized as illustrated:

JOKE/SHORT-SHORT

Third Person
(Listener)
narratee/reader

First Person
(Teller)
narrator/writer

YOU/READER

WE/YOU

Second Person
(Told)
Narrated/text

In the second paragraph of Kafka’s story, the “first person” we/you conjures
the inhibition that is to be lifted by putting the “third person” you/reader in
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sympathy with the young girl walking in the sun. Thus when the shadow of the
man eclipses her, the you/reader’s inhibition against the ominousness of this act
lifted by a narrative sleight of hand — it only his shadow that comes into
contact with her face. But his threatening potential as abductor or molester
alluded to by his approach from “behind overtaking her.” The last line lifts the
inhibition, passing over the you/reader as the shadow passes over the girl’s face;
like the girl’s face, the you/reader is psychically left “quite bright” as well. At
the same time, because the reader as “you” is implicated in the process of con
structing the joke/text, the we/you “economizes” the lifting of the inhibition by
emphasizing the mutual construction of the narrative itself, thus crediting the
reader with the creation of the text/joke s/he also receives.
Kafka’s peculiar use of both the third-person plural and second-person uni
versal pronoun makes the story especially well-suited to a revision of Freud’s
analysis. Because the pronoun chain allows the reader to participate in both the
first- and third- person positions of the joke paradigm, the “economy of psy
chical expenditure” flows continuously through the narrative. The economic
chain of the story is interrupted only by the reader’s position outside the text,
by her awareness of herself as being in the position of listener. Once the read
er disengages from the narrative, she finds herself in the same position as that
of the third person; that is, the story can now be retold and passed on to the
next listener.
This story originates in a textually preconscious “thought”: “spring is as
fresh and vulnerable to change as a young girl alone on a street.” Given over to
unconscious revision, the “vulnerable to change” manifests itself as the man’s
shadow overtaking the girl. The season’s vulnerability is displaced to the shad
ow’s eclipse of the girl, whose brightened face restores triumph to spring’s abil
ity to overcome changing weather. The story makes use ofjoke techniques such
as displacement, allusion, condensation and substitution. And both the we/you
and the you/reader participate in the “economy of psychical expenditure”
offered by the joke paradigm and set into motion by Kafka’s shift in point of
view from the first-person plural to the second-person “you,” which can be
taken as either singular or plural or both and so completes the circularity of the
joke chain.
The success of the story, and the success of a joke, depends on the reader’s
having been “captured” by the punch line, or moment of closure. There is a
marked similarity between the success of a joke as described by Freud — hid
den similarities are revealed between dissimilar things, sense emerges out of
nonsense, bewilderment yields to illumination — and the success of a short
short. Irving Howe agrees that in the short-short, “[everything depends on
intensity, one sweeping blow of perception” (xi).
In the joke the liberated cathectic energy finds its release, for the listener,
in laughter. Though Kafka’s story is not “funny” in this sense, the release of psy
chical energy experienced in the moment of closure constitutes a type of Kristevan “laughter of the text” on the part of the reader. In fact, a revision of the
tendentious joke paradigm in terms of what Freud calls “woman’s inflexibility”
(the first condition of smut according to Freud) is itself a type of “motor dis
charge,” an expenditure that places woman simultaneously in the subject and
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object position and allows her access to the joking chain as the “first person,” or
teller of the joke (Kristeva 224-5).
Brevity and psychical expenditure, or closure, then, are two Freudian char
acteristics shared by the joke and the short-short. The third quality, absence,
what Freud calls a “sudden release of intellectual tension,” is, in the short-short,
precisely the nature of the creative condition. The writer, as Freud notes in his
essay on daydreaming and creativity, must occupy a place of absence in order to
create. In Kafka’s story, this connection
underscored by the title itself:
“Absent-Minded Window Gazing.”
That short-shorts depend not only on brevity and closure but also on the
presence of an absence is substantiated by the work of any number of writers.
For instance, in O. Henry’s story, “The Gift of the Magi,” the success of the
ending turns on this play between presence and absence in the “presents” the
couple “present” each other with at Christmas: both gifts are purchased at the
price of the very thing that the other sacrificed for. The girl sells her hair to
buy the boy a watch fob; the boy sells his watch to buy a comb for the girl’s hair.
In Petronius’s story, “The Wife of Ephesus,” the soldier attempting to
seduce the wife faithfully mourning her dead husband wins his aim by cajoling
her with the presentation of a meal as a substitute for the absence of her hus
band. Death, he declared to her, the common end and last home of all men,
enlarging on this and other commonplaces generally employed to console a
wounded spirit (262). The absence of the crucified body of a criminal (which
the soldier had been entrusted to guard) that was stolen while he seduced the
wife
what prompts her to offer her husband’s body as a substitute for the
missing body of the criminal in order that the negligent soldier not be execut
ed for failing his duty. It is this action, on the part of the wife, that effectively
moves her, as woman, from the position of object, or “butt,” of the seduction
joke into the subject position, as a third-person listener becomes the first-per
son teller of her own joke. The punch line of this textual joke coincides with
the moment of closure in the story:
“The gods forbid,” she cried, “I should at one and the same time look on
the corpses of two men, both most dear to me. I had rather hang a dead
man on the cross than kill a living one.” So said, so done; she orders her
husband’s body to be taken from its coffin and fixed upon the vacant cross.
The soldier availed himself of the ready-witted lady’s expedient, and next
day all men marvelled how in the world a dead man had found his way to
the cross.
(Petronius 265)
The wife’s action, as well as her response to the seduction, has earned her the
reputation as the paradigmatic “fickle woman.” A revision of the story by
means of the joke paradigm reveals the wife of Ephesus as the heroine of her
own seduction: society would deny her, in her widowhood, any sexual satisfac
tion, yet she plays society’s “rules” against themselves to take control of her own
future. In short, within a deterritorialized genre, the wife succeeds in deterri
torializing society’s expectations concerning her.
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3.
Only jokes with a purpose run the risk of meeting with people who don’t want
to listen to them.
—Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious

Tendentious jokes, according to Freud, serve an aim, and “where a joke not
an aim in itself there are only two purposes that it may serve. . . . [I]t is either
a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire or defense) or an
obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure) (Jokes 97). For woman in the
position of object, or “butt,” of the joke, purposes of hostility and obscenity are
necessarily conflated: in either case, woman is to be “kept in her place” within
the scheme of male domination. Feminist critics working with Freudian texts
often find that Freud himself provides the paradigm that allows woman access
to the subject position in the textual/joking chain. As Jerry Aline Flieger pro
poses, “'she,’ however offended by the male conspirators, refuses to leave the
room feeling ashamed” (960).
According to Freud, it “woman's inflexibility,” her refusal to yield to man’s
attempts at sexual exposure, that constitutes the “first condition” for the devel
opment of the obscene joke. Thus, woman is simultaneously the inhibition
underlying the joke and the source of cathectic liberation once this inhibition
is lifted. In other words, in her “inflexibility” woman has access to all three
positions on the joking chain. Her inflexibility is itself a superimposition of the
three stages of the psychical process of the joke: 1) the inflexibility that renders
woman unwilling to acknowledge herself
the butt of the joke reenacts the
first-person position, in which the teller is unable to laugh at the joke in the
telling of it; 2) that inflexibility is also the “absence” from which the joke aris
involuntarily; and 3) inflexibility, whether a matter of attitude or of the lit
eral stiffening of the body, is itself a “cathectic response,” a “motor discharge”
(albeit nonhysterical) that aligns woman with the third-person position on the
joking chain, that of the listener whose inhibitions are lifted by the joke.
Moreover, in Freudian terms, “woman’s incapacity to tolerate undisguised
sexuality” is nothing less than her refusal to have exposed as her sexuality the
pseudo-sexuality of herself as “castrated man” constructed out of man’s own
refusal to tolerate his homoerotic nature. The obstacle to man’s desire, in other
words, is not woman but man’s own inhibitions regarding his homoerotic
nature. Woman in the tendentious joke paradigm serves as the displaced object
of man’s “desire” for the company of his own, not the Other’s, company. Her
refusal to allow herself to be used this way (evidenced by her own cathectic
response of not laughing at the obscene joke) is a powerful deterritorialization
both of herself and of the joking chain to which she would be denied entrance.
Thus, woman, who through her refusal to participate in the joke with the
same type of cathectic response as men finds access to the joking chain,
becomes the Medusa who laughs, rightly, at man, who in his own homophobic
fear insists that woman herself cannot be looked upon directly. The short-short
story, so closely related to the paradigm of the joke, enables women writing to
overdetermine themselves as subjects and to gain direct access to the power of
the punch line in such a way as to “ex-pose” themselves as beyond male ridicule.
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For instance, in Colettes “The Hidden Woman” (“La Femme Cache”) the
figure of the male doctor finds himself simultaneously exposed to woman’s
repressed desire and liberated by the free expression of that desire through a
double-edged joke that the doctor and his wife each play on each other. Both
the doctor and the wife tell each other that they won’t be going to the green and
purple masked ball: the doctor because he says he will be with a patient and
the wife because of feigned modesty. In fact, unbeknown to each other they
both attend the ball, the doctor beneath a cowl and domino, the wife dressed as
Pierrot. Fascinated by the Pierrot, the doctor startled to hear it give a cough
and an “ahem” very much like that of his wife. When the Pierrot scratches “its”
thigh, “with a free and uninhibited gesture,” the doctor says in relief, “It’s not
her.” In fact it is, and this is confirmed for the doctor when the Pierrot brings
forth an antique snuffbox he recognizes as his wife’s. Convinced that she
there for a rendezvous with another man, the doctor has his own duplicity
turned back on him, and he follows the Pierrot to see whom she is meeting. In
the process he is awakened to a new sense of his wife’s free expression of her
sexuality by the way she rolls her hips, lets men embrace her in the crowd, and
even herself fondles the breasts of another woman. Finally, the doctor is sure
that she is not waiting for anyone in particular but was “tasting only the mon
strous pleasure of being alone, free, honest in her native brutality, of being the
one who is unknown, forever solitary and without shame, whom a little mask
and a hermetic costume had restored ... to her irremediable solitude and her
immodest innocence” (235-6).
The “hidden woman” of the title is both the wife the doctor knows beneath
her disguise and the “brutally” free woman the disguise allows her to be.
Woman’s position as “object” in the doctor’s joke doubly overdetermined, and
though he is startled by her mastery, he reassures himself that she will wear her
self out and go home. The doctor, having knowledge of her Otherness while
she remains unaware of his voyeurism, is not, in his mind, made an object in the
joking chain at all.
Yet this is only one side of the double-edged joke. In fact, the end of the
story, its “punch line,” lifts the doctors inhibitions regarding his wife’s unre
strained desire and turns the reader back to the beginning of the story, to the
wife's own lie: namely, the inhibitions she constructs against attending the ball
alone. These inhibitions are themselves offered as a posed resistance to her
husband’s pretense of granting her freedom. She constructs, with her lie, a text
of herself that the husband willing to accept
“really” her. In fact, Irene’s
construction of these inhibitions effectively places her in the first-person posi
tion on the joking/textual chain. This is, then, a joke that the doctor cannot
“get,” for his wife ever remains the “one who is unknown” to him. As the
“shameless woman” she destroys the very base from which the male-told
obscene joke is constructed. Thus, the “hidden woman,” the absence or blind
spot in the joke paradigm, surfaces as a subject who retells the joke as one in
which man’s own devices for objectifying woman become the instruments of his
undoing and result in his ultimate failure to “know” his woman.
Virginia Woolf’s “Nurse Lugton’s Curtain” (154-5) is another short-short
story that “exposes” objectified woman as the butt of the joke and in so doing
offers a revision of the joke paradigm that stresses the authority of woman’s
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subject position. As “Nurse,” wakeful Lugton is “phallic” woman, the “ogress”
in charge “with a face like the side of a mountain with great precipices and
avalanches, and chasms for her eyes and hair and nose and teeth.” But once
asleep, the wild beasts portrayed in the fabric of the curtain she is stitching
romp across her lap, the maternal site of playfulness and birth. On coming back
to wakefulness and regaining her “phallic” position, she restores the carnival
scene of the curtain to fixity and “normalcy.” At this moment of closure, Nurse
Lugton returns to her phallic position of authority as it rules by tyranny, an
authority that terrifies the children in her charge and illustrates the way women
are forced to use male forms of power in order to rule.
The “Otherness” and alternative view of feminine forms of power repre
sented by Lugton’s dreamworld and the fantastic lap scene coincide with Adri
enne Rich’s portrayal of female authority in “Aunt Jennifer’s Tigers.” In both
cases, needlework — a form of creative power traditionally allowed to women
— becomes the occasion for the release of repressed desire. But Woolf’s story
rewrites the joke of totalizing repression to create a fanciful vision in which
Nurse Lugton represents herself the repressive force that in its turn must be
tamed, lulled to sleep, in order for pleasure and freedom to surface and have life.
While the joke appears to be made at the expense of Nurse Lugton, Woolf’s
rhetorical strategies reveal another twist on the position of woman as object in
the joke paradigm. By combining the motif of the sleeping ogress with the
imagery of an enchanted animal world, and by shifting from third- to secondperson narration once the Nurse falls asleep and the animal kingdom comes to
life, Woolf enables the reader to account for the story “logically” as the Nurse’s
dream. That the enchantment may be dreamt by Nurse Lugton, yet she herself
may be unaware upon waking, coincides with Freud’s theory of the forgetting
of dreams as evidence of psychical censorship (Interpretation 555). Nurse Lug
ton’s “objectified” position as the waking force of repression perhaps causes her
to “forget” her natural state of emancipation, but by means of the rhetoric of the
story, the reader “gets” the punch line and in so doing frees Nurse Lugton from
the mantle of her own repressive authority.
Both Woolf’s and Colette’s short-shorts, considered in terms of the joke
paradigm, can be read as “exposures” of woman, who from the position of object
can achieve a subject position in the joking chain. The stories cleverly make use
of the rhetorical strategies of the joke-work in order to make the male construct
of “woman” the butt of the joke. In order for woman to achieve authority she
must not only endure but also embrace the pain to which her male-defined
position subjects her. This is a lesson that can be appropriated by all minori
ties who find themselves “butted” out of the joking/textual chain, made objects
of the none-too-funny joke of cultural dominance, oppression, and imposed
silence.

4.

In conclusion, a close study of the correlations between the joke and the short
short, in light both of Freud’s model of the subject positions at stake in the joke
and of Deleuze and Guattari’s account of deterritorialization as a defining ele-
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ment of minor literature, reveals similarities between the two genres that
enhance and reinforce their narrative complexity. If, as Freud has said, the
function of the joke is to protect words and thoughts from criticism, then per
haps the "protective coloring” of the short story a "minor” genre is in fact part
of its strength. Its status as a minor genre has thus far safeguarded it from the
more voracious critical beasts roaming the narrative jungle in search of meatier
game such
the novel. As a genre that, according to Georg Lukacs, "sees
absurdity in all its undisguised and unadorned nakedness” (51-2), the short
story as a "minor” form has resisted reappropriation and reterritorialization. In
this way it has managed to preserve itself a narrative haven against the total
izing and territorializing operations required of a major literature.
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In the figure of the dandy, Baudelaire
seeks to find some use for idleness, just as
leisure once had a use. The vita contem
plativa is replaced by something that
could be called the vita contemptiva. . . .
Dandyism is the last glimmer of the
heroic in times of decadence.
—Walter Benjamin, “Idleness,” The
Arcades Project (1939)

My father's mess kit was not what it sounds like,
namely a snapped-together aluminum dinner set,
complete with dual-purpose utensils, that you buy to
go camping. It was, instead, the formal uniform he
wore to attend mess dinners in the Canadian Air
Force squadrons — the 404 in Nova Scotia, the 415
on Prince Edward Island — to which he was attached
during his twenty-year association with late-century
air power. The mess kit was impressive and extrava
gant, like all military dress uniforms a combination of
evening wear and martial regalia.
The black bow tie, white shirt, and cummerbund
were standard-issue tuxedo, but the blue-grey melton
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James Jacques Tissots portrait of Frederick Gustavus Barnaby (1870). National Portrait Gallery,

London.

jacket was cut short and scalloped in the back, with trousers that were high,
tight, and stirrupped, a gold stripe down each side, ending in gleaming
Wellington boots with elastic sides and a leather loop on the heel. The jacket
had gold buttons on the cuffs, silk facing on the lapels, a pair of gold naviga
tor’s wings, small epaulettes with his captain’s insignia, and the miniature ver
sions of his two decorations — British and Commonwealth armed forces being,
at least as compared to the American military and especially in peacetime,
stingy with what servicepeople call “fruit salad.” There were white cotton
gloves, clutched rather than worn, and no headgear.
The mess kit resided most of the time in a thick plastic bag in my father’s
closet. The gloves, decorations, and a pair of white braces were kept in a sepa
rate plastic sarcophagus in my father’s top dresser drawer, along with various
cufflinks and tie pins, often of exotic aeronautical design: one in the shape of
a French Mirage fighter, another fashioned after the distinctive double-delta
silhouette of the Saab Viggen. This drawer was a source of continual fascina
tion for me, explored extensively during periods of parental absence. Contrary
to convention, I discovered nothing disturbing — no condoms or porn mags or
letters from women not my mother. Just the detritus of masculine dress, the
jangly hardware of maleness. The drawer smelled of aftershave and wood and
leather.
Because my father wore a uniform or flight suit every day of his working
life, he didn’t seem to possess any other clothes. The uniforms changed over
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Officers standing on the steps of the Tower ofLondon (1895). Mary Evans Picture Library.

the years, from the belted Royal Canadian Air Force tunics in grey-blue wool,
indistinguishable from the ones to be seen in films such as 633 Squadron, The
Battle of Britain, or The Dam Busters, to the mediocre garage-attendant green
zipper jackets and trousers of the unified Canadian forces of the 1970s. When
the RCAF was absorbed into this formless mass in the 1960s, in a misguided
attempt at republicanism, it lost its royal prefix, and my father’s romantic rank
of Flight Lieutenant (pronounced with the raf-and-jag eff sound) was modified
to the unremarkable Captain. Whether from outspokenness, lack of ambition,
or some other cause I was too naive to discern, he never advanced beyond it.
If the uniforms he wore were not always sartorially interesting, like the Ital
ian Air Force designs supplied by Giorgio Armani in the 1980s or (more dark
ly) Hugo Boss’s sharp silver-and-black outfits for the Gestapo in the 1930s,
they nevertheless presented a stop-action essay in male attire. And when my
father emerged, periodically, in the full glory of the mess kit, a peacock fanning
to display, he was a brilliant reminder of the beauty masculine clothing can
achieve when its vanities are unchecked. The military uniform is the ur-suit,
the source of the norms that have for almost two centuries governed the pre
sentation of the male form in everyday life. It spans both the range of ordinary
working clothes, from the overalls of sappers to the T-shirts of naval gunnies,
and the high-end, almost foppish finery of the dress uniform, an ensemble that,
in its way, the intrusion of dandyism into the serious male business of killing
people. The spectacular military uniform is a kind of suited repression, an

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14

158

Editors: Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (2000/2001): Full issue

154

Journal x

incongruous mixture of the lovely and the deadly. And so an encounter with
the uniform is the first step on the road to the rich and edgy territory of male
dress, perhaps the discovery of a personal sense of style, a long-overdue revival
of dandyism at the dawn of this new century
This
not simply a matter of the uniform enforcing a minimum level of
presentable polish — though there is that, as the movement of the uniform into
other areas of life amply demonstrates, from the chaos-prevention programs of
boys’ high schools to the casual-seeming but actually rigid dress codes of con
temporary waitstaffs and chain-store employees. Likewise the common under
standing of the business suit — sometimes diplomatically dubbed the lounge
suit, as on formal invitations — as a uniform of commercial life, the standard
issue duds for Wall Street or inside the Beltway. The uniform, whatever its
details, is a bulwark against the uneven seas of individuality and (let it be said)
against unsettling variations in taste and income. The uniform is, paradoxical
ly, both democracy and elitism in action.
But the relations between military uniform and suit are more proximate
still, from the cuff buttons allegedly introduced to prevent nose-wiping during
the Napoleonic wars, when Europe’s armies first fully realized the heady com
bination of violence and regalia, to the silk flashes and cravats that once indi
cated regimental membership and now signal personal style in the necktie, or
the choice between shawl and pointed collar, double-breasted or single-breast
ed, vents or no vents.
In the shadow of this declension from function to decoration, my father
confronts me as a figure reduced to his everyday uniform, complete with usedriven pockets and epaulettes, his name — my name — carved in white on a
black plastic name tag pinned above the left front pocket. These name tags,
which were secured with two spring-loaded tabs, were scattered around the
house, including the seductive top drawer. Little chunks of identity, of unifor
mity, measuring three inches by three-quarters of an inch.
Also lying around the house was this sense of order in male clothing, the
completeness of the uniform, even the beauty of it when got up in its formal
version. I thought of my father’s mess kit the first time I donned a black-tie
dinner suit. I was an usher at the wedding of my college roommate, Tim Baker,
and we rented outfits from a formal shop in Toronto. Twenty-one, a slightly
built undergraduate at 5’10” and 150 pounds, I looked boyish and (I thought)
rather devastating in the tux, snugly fastened in every imaginable place by cum
merbund and braces and links. I felt like I was actually wearing clothes for the
first time in my life, strapped in tight for whatever the world had to offer. Our
ride to the church in Tim’s beat-up blue Toyota, sunroof and windows wide
open, Bruce Springsteen on the stereo, was for me one of those crystalline
magic moments of late boyhood. We honked the horn and waved at people
walking sloppily along Bloor Street, the lords of formalwear acknowledging
these peasants of casualness.
In the end I didn’t follow my father into military service, though I thought
about it more or less constantly during the final years of high school. I had a
real twinge just once, at a Christmas Day mass in 1979, a few months before I
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was to graduate and go off (as I planned at the time) to study geology at the
University of Toronto. My decision to switch to philosophy and English came
later in that up-and-down year, during an early summer vacation when, float
ing aimlessly in my uncle’s pool like Dustin Hoffman in The Graduate, the word
"metaphysics,” not "plastics,” came swimming to mind. The Christmas event
was of another order. In jeans and an old football jersey, number 60 for my
hero, Bubba Smith of the Detroit Lions, I shuffled into church with my fami
ly. I had argued with my father even as we were leaving the house, an old argu
ment that neither of us really cared for any longer. God doesn’t care what I
wear, I had said. God deserves your respect, he’d replied.
Now we were in the church, Pope John XXIII in the Westwood section of
Winnipeg, and there was a collective turning of heads at something behind
where I was sitting with my parents and two brothers. I looked back. A young
man in the belted red tunic and black trousers of the Royal Military College,
clearly back from Kingston, Ontario, for the holidays, was walking up the nave,
his mother on his arm. He wore white gloves and had his pillbox under his
arm. He was upright and tall and gorgeous, and I suddenly felt like an idiot in
my football sweater. My father said nothing but I could feel him radiating Itold-you-so’s down the pew. I thought, I want to look like that. I want to be the
young warrior at home, earning admiration and envy as Ifloat through the crowd or
congregation.
The appeal of the uniform, like the violent conflict that creates it, atavis
tic and troubling. Wearing one establishes a young man’s relationship with a
community, and with his own masculinity. Putting on a uniform is also, there
fore, taking one’s place in the larger order of things; it a rite of passage that
asserts adulthood. The badges of rank and regimental insignia, the orders of
valor and corps identifiers, speak a complicated semantics of hierarchy and
accomplishment. As a youth I could identify, by ribbon colors alone, most of
the major decorations of the Commonwealth armed forces, from the Distin
guished Service Order and Military Cross to the Distinguished Flying Medal.
In the film Ryans Daughter, when the traumatized English army officer arrives
in Ireland, a disabled hero of the trenches, the junior ranks of his obscure post
ing eye the plain maroon ribbon of his Victoria Cross with envy and awe. Like
them, I recognized the tiny slash of ribbon for the sign it was, if not of valor
then at least of violence ably survived.
The hint of violence is essential to the uniform’s power. That is why there
are so often hazing rituals associated with the privilege of wearing it, not mere
ly formal qualifications like age or education. Hazing, often violent and humil
iating, is a displacement ritual. We no longer think it appropriate to subject our
young men to tests of pain and fortitude, to see if they belong in male society,
but we do, in certain corners of that society — athletic teams, fraternities, the
military — indulge in mild versions of such tests involving full-body shaves,
canings and beatings, or the forcible consumption of excrement. Even these
second-order initiation ceremonies are too much for our sensitive times,
though. When a pirated video of similar brutal practices in Canada’s elite Air
borne Regiment was brought to light in the mid-1990s, it led to a different, and
far more public, form of humiliation: the commanding officer, knife-like lieu
tenant-colonel in a beret, was forced to resign and the unit was disbanded.
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The continued presence of shaving in hazing rituals would be fodder to a
cultural anthropologist of the right inclination. Bobby Orr, the gifted Boston
Bruins defenseman of the 1970s, related in his memoirs how he was welcomed
to the team by being pinned to the locker-room floor, lathered up, and rough
ly shaved clean from top to toe. It was a favorite in my high school locker
room, too, and continues to be the haze of choice among blue-collar minor
league hockey teams, daring fraternities, and elite squadrons the continent over.
Just as interesting as the homoerotic sublimations of the act itself, with the
helpless neophyte manhandled by his beefy new colleagues, the act of remov
ing hair. Hair plays a large role in male entry to adulthood, of course, from the
first sproutings on groin and chest to the first shave, an act of initiation so com
mon and apparently unremarkable as to have escaped sustained theoretical
attention. But that is too bad, because the act of shaving, for many boys, marks
their passage to a self-image of manhood. It most often occurs before the loss
of virginity, and there might be years in between. Significantly, it is often done
in the presence of the father, who passes on the mundane knowledge of razor
and lather. Most very young boys are fascinated and awed by the father’s act of
shaving, observing technique in the service of transformation, a daily ritual of
maleness. My brother Steve and I used to take turns watching our father shave
when we were children.
Learning how to shave — to remove the very hair that marks puberty —
thus takes its place in the set of routine skills that modern urban fathers rou
tinely pass on to their sons. These skills also include tying a necktie, polishing
shoes, perhaps wearing cologne. They are hardly the stuff of rugged maleness,
at least as traditionally conceived, but they signal the creation of a presentable
male figure in the non-lethal society of business and everyday life. No one will
ever make a movie mythologizing these father-son bonding rituals, in the man
ner of Field of Dreams, say, with its tear-jerking evocation of the fabled Game
of Catch between dad and junior, but for many of us they loom just as large, if
not larger.
It was my mother who taught me to tie my shoes and, later, to bake and
cook; but it was my father who taught me how to tend to my body and its
accoutrements, how to prepare myself for presentation to the gaze of the world,
how to dress. I laboriously copied his demonstration of how to create a chunky
full-Windsor knot, though I was not comfortable enough with it to do it every
day at my Catholic boys’ school: like most of us, I kept a knotted tie in my
locker and simply pulled it over my head each morning. When I did start tying
ties regularly, I was so fixed on my father’s instruction that I stuck with the fullWindsor well past the point of fashion, only shifting down to the sleeker half
Windsor six or seven years ago. It was like learning how to throw left-handed.
Nowadays I shop for clothes by myself or in the company of one or two
trusted female friends, who can be counted on for accurate flattery and good
advice, but it was my father who took me to buy my first suit for school. And
when I was in university, on a rare visit to take me out for lunch, he offered to
take me shopping afterwards at Harry Rosen on Bloor Street in Toronto. It was
1984 and the fashions were all English and collegiate, long rows of striped ties
in garish colors arrayed like confections in wood-and-glass cabinets. The shirts
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were fanned out in swaths of pastel broadcloth, multi-hued couches of cotton.
Thinking of Tom Cruise in his underwear in Risky Business, and my then-girlfriend’s recently communicated fantasy, I picked out a pale pink oxford-cloth
button-down. My father smiled and got out his credit card. I kept that shirt
for years, wearing it through at the collar and cuffs, fading it almost to white
with many launderings, and finally left it in a closet during one of many moves
in my late twenties. It no longer fit me at the neck or across the chest: I was
no longer the boy my father treated that day in Toronto.
There is a depth of unrealized feeling in male attitudes to fashion and dress.
My friend Russell, a novelist, for a couple of years wrote a weekly newspaper
column about men’s fashion. His sartorial advice was tart and peremptory but,
to my mind, almost always accurate: no shirts with "swanky” designs on the
collar, no backpacks, no crummy shoes. He received a lot of mail, much of it
intemperate to the point of derangement, from men who felt slighted by his
pronouncements. He speculated that the reason for this lay in the fact that
these men, like all men, acquired whatever basic understanding of fashion they
possessed from their fathers — or from role models to whom they stood in
some kind of quasi-filial relationship. The phenomenon works in the other
direction too. When Russell struck a chord with a man by recommending, say,
a Burberry raincoat, he received letters suffused with longing and nostalgia,
miniature and often halting paeans to lost fathers who wore that very symbol
of male sophistication and, so attired, towered in the imagination of the boy
now grown to manhood.
The complexity of this relationship overwhelms most of us, I think, but
there
clearly a filial homage in play every time I put on one of my Italian
suits, even though they are not the kind of thing my father would ever wear or
have worn, even as a young man. Too expensive, too stylish, too dandyish. But
my own dandyism, which proceeds more proximately from cinematic heroes
such as Cary Grant or Gary Cooper, is nevertheless implicated in those
glimpses of the RCAF mess kit from my father’s closet. My uniforms run to a
Fendi silk-and-wool three-button in dove grey; a brown, two-vent, high-gorge,
narrow-trouser number by Tombolini; and a couple of classic-cut Armanis, one
grey and one black. But every time I complete the ensemble of elegant male
attire, I feel the sense of fulfillment that the French word for suit, complet, cap
tures so much more economically, and truly, than the boring word "suit.”
It is true that you can wear a suit like a uniform, the way bankers and down
town lawyers don their navy pinstripes and white-shirt/red-tie Identikit urbanhominid camouflage each morning; but the suit also, and better, conceived as
a stretched canvas, a blank slate. It does not allow anything at all, but within its
limits lie nascent the possibilities of wit and dash, sex and seduction. The con
strained freedom of assembling the elements in felicitous combination makes
the suit a modern narrative in potentia, a story of downtown life waiting to be
told. Beauty and utility emerge conjoined, in the pockets and buttons and
padding that create the quintessential male silhouette — a silhouette whose
minute variations from year to year (bigger shoulders, vents or no vents, and so
on) are followed by the dandy not in the interests of fashion so much as of con
noisseurship. A truly good tailor can give back some of the elements that con-

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14

162

Editors: Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (2000/2001): Full issue

Journal x

158

venience and mass production have mostly taken away: the functional surgeons
cuffs that may be unbuttoned and folded back, the way Jean Cocteau wore his
sports jackets; or the right-lapel button that will be received by the left-side
buttonhole, whose usual flower, if present at all, just plays with an originally
ordinary way to achieve more protection, as seen (say) in an old photo of a wil
lowy Frank Sinatra.
The suit is an idea, a set of associations. It comes to us in images, stills and
movies, that reflect its presence in twentieth-century male life. The received
wisdom says that whereas most men like to imagine women naked, women like
to imagine men in suits. The suit finishes them, puts them in proper context.
It smoothes out their imperfections and pads their deficiencies. It is armor
against the contingencies of a hostile, judgmental world. And yet the last few
decades have seen a steady decline in norms of dress in North American soci
ety, with the disappearance of evening wear, the nearly complete baseball-cap
ping of the population, the tendency of grown men to dress like simulacra of
Bart Simpson: T-shirt, sneakers, and shorts. In fact, most of them are worse
than that, since Bart’s invariable red T-shirt at least sports no corporate logo,
no abusive or inane slogan.
Dandies, meanwhile, are almost universally disdained. Frasier Crane, the
fussy television psychiatrist mocked successively in the prime-time comedy
shows Cheers and Frasier, is the exemplar here. His fashion sense and aesthet
ic discrimination are at once displayed and undermined. He is frequently taken
for gay. In a typical scene from the latter show, Frasier, off to meet an attrac
tive policewoman at a cop-hangout bar, rushes off to his bedroom, saying, "I’ve
got to put in new collar stays, and — ooh, ooh — I have a fabulous new cash
merejacket I’ve been dying to premiere!” His long-suffering regular-guy father,
a cop himself, sighs, “Yeah, this is gonna work.” Here, a sense of style equat
ed with being educated beyond sense, a pointy-headed idiocy. Given all this,
which is hardly controversial, it is nevertheless dismaying how often the suit,
when it worn at all, is worn badly, or simply a bad suit. It impossible to
have a suit that is too
; the idea is a conceptual non-starter. But it is easy, all
too easy, to have a suit that creates deficiencies rather than hides them. Some
times, as for the character Ben in Louis Begley’s The Man Who Was Late, this is
a tale of lifelong disappointments, miniature “tragedies” of cuff width and
sleeve buttons. Finally, late in life, Ben finds a Paris tailor who can solve these
problems, but the man retires to the country soon after, leaving Ben disconso
late: another moment of arriving too late.
Surely part of the reason that so many suits one sees are bad suits is that
they are resented by their wearers. This is self-defeating, and unnecessary. At
its best, the suit is the outward sign of intelligence and attention. It takes its
place in a lexicon of sophistication, an element in a grown-up world of travel
and business in which bartenders know your usual drink, drivers bearing signs
meet you at the airport, documents and telephones are brought to your table in
restaurants, and every rental car in every visited city is a sexy convertible. This
fantasy of male success, which surely cannot be unique to my daydreams, has
little to do with the more robust pursuits of an Ernest Hemingway or Ted
Williams, the fishing and hunting and horseback riding next to which this
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other ideal of maleness may seem slightly effete, but its role models in litera
ture and film are arguably more impressive: the flaneurs of the Symbolist
moment, dandies such as Wilde and Beardsley, the young Disraeli, Ronald Fir
bank and Diaghilev, slightly ambiguous figures such as Grant. (Ellen Moerss
work on the dandy as a staple literary figure, a central avatar of modernism, is
the best assessment of these movements.)
One should also add the dandies of pop music. In the 1998 film
Goldmine, a loosely fictional bio-pic about a David Bowie figure called Brian
Slade, a voice-over describes the late-sixties transition from Mod to Glam this
way: “Taking their cue from Little Richard, the swank London Mods, short for
Modernists, were the first to wear mascara and lacquer their hair — the first
true dandies of pop. And known to just about any indiscretion where a good
suit was involved. Style always wins out in the end.” The last line is spoken
over a scene of Brian, dressed in a purple French-cuffed shirt, black-and-white
barred tie, taupe shoes, and a black pinstriped suit, having just sodomized a
young boy in traditional British school uniform.
Velvet Goldmine explicitly links the Mods and the glitter-rock crowd to
Wilde’s languid modernism — the film starts with him in Ireland, and a brooch
allegedly belonging to him becomes a magic talisman through the narrative.
But it also alludes more gently to inter-war bird-of-paradise beauty junkies
such as Stephen Tennant, a man who used to go out with a handkerchief tied
over his eyes so as not to expire from “excessive sensibility.” Tennant’s fiction
al counterpart appears as lovely comic confection in Nancy Mitford’s novels,
a Canadian-born beauty who descends on the staid aristocratic household of
Love in a Cold Climate, but he is also said to be the model, in darker form, for
Anthony Blanche, the depraved stuttering dandy of Waugh’s Brideshead Revis
ited. It is Blanche who, in two separate scenes of that novel, tries to poison the
young Charles Ryder against winsome Sebastian Flyte, warning him of the
Flyte family’s “fatal English charm” — a charm that, in the event, proves indeed
to be Charles’s undoing. In love in turn with alcoholic Sebastian and his self
hating sister Julia, Charles is caught in the sticky amber of Anglo-Catholic
decline during the 1930s.
This may be the somber side of the dandy-aesthete: the bitter outsider,
given to outrage and cynical (if accurate) condemnations. Consider, for a dif
ferent view, Grant in a wide-lapel pinstrip in Hitchcock’s Notorious, a dandified
spy falling in love with Ingrid Bergman in Rio de Janeiro. Or, even better,
Grant as Roger Thornhill in North by Northwest, the suave Madison Avenue
advertising executive thrown by mistake into Cold War intrigue. Thornhill is
one of American cinema’s great unlikely heroes, a modern paragon in slick
hand-sewn dress. Habitually charming, even glib — “In the world of advertis
ing,” he says, “there no such thing as a lie; there is only expedient exaggera
tion” — Thornhill is Urban Man polished to a high gloss. Twice divorced,
devoted to his mother, he favors cold martinis, French cuffs, and mono
grammed matchbooks. In vivid Technicolor, his exquisitely tailored silver-blue
suit, a three-button whose lapels nevertheless fall into a fashionable deeper
gorge, precisely matches the distinguished greying hair at his temples. In the
film’s opening scenes, Thornhill emerges quickly as a
narcissistic, appar
ently superficial mannequin.
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Cary Grant and Eva Marie Saint in North by Northwest (1959). Photofest.

But under pressure he is also agile, wily, resourceful, and brave. When a typi
cal Hitchcockian trope of mistaken identity spins him into a world of espionage
and betrayal, he manipulates the apparatus of modern life — telephones, hotels,
trains, taxis, bars, banter — with enviable, grown-up assurance. And in the ver
tiginous world ruled by the urbane menace of villains James Mason and Martin
Landau, where Hitchcock’s unexpected overhead shots and thrilling signature
sequences (the strafing crop-duster, the scramble on Mount Rushmore) seem to
reflect a sort of cognitive imbalance, it is Thornhill who finds his feet. The
film’s title evokes Hamlet’s description of his feigned madness; it savors decep
tion, mistaken identity, the yawning chasm between appearance and reality. It
is also, in its off-kilter way, a romantic comedy. How ironic, but how fitting,
that the professional deceiver should carry the day — and carry off Eva Marie
Saint, the beautiful double-agent who entered the picture on a mission to
deceive him. Under the suit lies a man, and a particularly appealing one, too.
The suit doesn’t disguise these properties so much as reflect them, allow them
play.
In our society, dandyism comes haltingly when it comes at
It is a func
tion of early adulthood, I think, and that first blush of success that frees a man
to close the frustrating gap, so typical of post-graduate life especially, between
taste and means. The unspoken tragedy of urban life in our century this con
stant struggle to afford the self-presentation we desire. I don’t have to want the
baggy convict-wear and brand-name jackets of the urban scene to appreciate
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the yearning evident in the startling statistic that the average inner-city African
American spends $2440 on clothes in a year, compared to the $1508 considered
sufficient by the average US consumer. I would consider it rolling pretty high
if I granted myself an annual clothes budget of $2500, but apparently that’s
nothing to write home about in East Los Angeles or the Bronx. Its not about
how much money you have; its about what you choose to spend your money
on.
I am struck by accounts of the entry into fashion consciousness, especially
as granted by writers who might be thought above such things. David Mamet,
in a long-ago article in the New York Times Magazine, described the way he
would buy secondhand tweed jackets and then have them carefully tailored to
his tastes: sleeves shortened, elbows patched, rear vent sewn shut to prevent
“rooster-tail” (this before the advent of the now ubiquitous Italianate ventless
jacket). In The Facts, Philip Roth mocks himself, post facto, for his clotheshorse tendencies as a youngish man, the way he ran out with his first big
advance check and bought some tailored Savile Row suits: “I proceeded to have
clothes made by three distinguished tailoring establishments, half a dozen suits
that I didn’t need, that required endless, stupefying fittings, and that finally
never fit me anyway.” This lack of fit is indicted as part of a “restlessness,”
mainly sexual, that afflicts Roth at 35. And yet, he cannot quite silence an
enthusiasm for that reckless young man, nor can he entirely quell the affection
aroused by an even younger, still more dashing version of himself, the hotshot
freshman comp teacher he was in 1956, aged 22, who bought a Brooks Broth
ers suit to look more impressive. Contrast with this the dourness of George
Steiner’s Errata, say, which is admirably forthright about professional jealousies
and intellectual epiphanies but reads as if the author never wore anything in
particular, indeed as if he were continually naked.
But the quintessential dandy of American letters is probably, for good or
bad, Tom Wolfe, whose cream-colored suits and high-collared dress shirts were
adopted in the 1960s as a means at once of identifying the emerging social
commentator and of pissing off the people he was writing about and talking to.
Wolfe is, in this sense, the early literary analogue of someone such as Dennis
Rodman, the Detroit Pistons and Chicago Bulls forward who took to extensive
tattooing, cross-dressing, and polychrome hair-dyeing as a means of getting his
share of available attention in the saturated late-century mediascape. Wolfe’s
latter-day attempts to pick fights with Norman Mailer and John Irving over his
blowhard novel, A Man In Full, his tauntings of The New Yorker, are desperate
versions of the same desire for notice. Yet, this is dandyism gone bad, its orig
inal impulse of disdain transformed into something far less defensible, and
more dangerous: publicity-seeking. When Harpers magazine made the odd
error of featuring Wolfe sitting opposite Mark Twain, another cream-suited
dandy, on its 150th-anniversary cover (and, worse, including inside a ridiculous
and shallow essay from the previously acute author of The Painted Word and
Radical
we knew that dandyism in American letters was in trouble.
Fictional accounts of young men at play are just as compelling as real-world
examples, maybe more so, from John Barth’s postmodern jape, The Sot-Weed
Factor, which includes a description of the rituals and variables of eighteenth-
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Jeremy Irons and Anthony Andrews in Brideshead Revisited (1982). Photofest.

century male dress so delicious it makes the mouth water, to Sebastian and
Charles in Waughs elegiac Brideshead. Charles’s priggish cousin Jasper remon
strates with him about, among other things, his lunchtime drunkenness and
flashy habits of dress: “When you came up I remember advising to dress as you
would in a country house. Your present get-up seems an unhappy compromise
between the correct wear for a theatrical party at Maidenhead and a glee
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singing competition in a garden suburb.” Charles, for his part, is undeterred by
this precise insult. "It seems to me that I grew younger daily with each adult
habit that I acquired,” he says of this undergraduate flowering. "Now, that
summer term with Sebastian, it seemed as though I was being given a brief spell
of what I had never known, a happy childhood, and though its toys were silk
shirts and liqueurs and cigars and its naughtiness high in the catalogue of grave
sins, there was something of nursery freshness about us that fell little short of
the joy of innocence.”
Waugh’s regard for style transferred itself easily into the uniformed milieu
of wartime England — though, as an officer with the extremely fashionable
Household Cavalry, or Blues, he had only contempt for the Royal Air Force
uniforms I grew up envying. Airmen come in for all kinds of superior joking
in his Sword ofHonour trilogy, finally depicted cultureless near-morons in the
concluding volume, Unconditional Surrender. Like all writers of his generation
and class who served in the war and wrote about it — Anthony Powell in his
roman fleuve, Dance to the Music of Time, or Simon Raven in his second-rate
version of the same, Alms for Oblivion — indeed like most soldiers of his time,
Waugh was obsessed with the relative "smartness” of English regiments. The
Coldstream Guards or Corps of Rifles are honored less for their prowess than
for their fine red tunics or frogged green jackets. It is war to the tune of invid
ious social distinction, all passed for judgment in bright colors and badges.
Hans Castorp retails his partial seduction by the perfect turn-outs and slick
style of the humanist Settembrini, and who can resist the pull of hard collars
and spats, the cream-colored suits and high waistcoats of spa-life fashion?
Even the cynical narrator of Graham Greene’s The Comedians cannot conceal
his admiration for a poverty-stricken dandy, who, despite living in near squalor,
is
fastidious about his suit that he covers himself with an expansive hand
kerchief when he urinates. Reading these accounts, you cannot help thinking:
I want to wear silk all the time! I want to be festooned and beswagged!
They also have a young man’s eagerness about them, the dandy in waiting.
It one thing to view Cary Grant in all his grown-up perfection. His appeal
is the appeal of the fashionable father you never had, a slightly foppish but
unquestionably strong man who knew the ways of the world. This is surely his
appeal for women too, whether realized with subtlety (Grace Kelly’s sly banter
in To
A Thief) or with crudeness (Audrey Hepburn repeatedly throwing
herself at him in Charade). By contrast, watching Sebastian and Charles dress,
or listening to the youthful ambition of Mamet and Roth, we hear something
else, an echo from an earlier life-stage, the call of possibility. Here the suit of
clothes still has an air of playfulness, of a costume worn. It is a uniform not in
the common pejorative sense of the thing you don every day, without thinking,
but in the antic sense of the uniforms worn by naval suitors in Jane Austen’s
novels, the finery sported by subalterns in the Raj, the arrogant peacock strut
ting of young Florentine carabinieri.

In my line of work, wearing suits is not normal, and so some of this playfulness
continues to be available. Universities are sites of arrested development anyway,
so a program of stylish adolescent rebellion often seems called for, bucking the
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patched-tweed-and-hairy-sweater norm in favor of something more glam
orous, more suggestive of the outside world’s vast potential for beauty and plea
sure. My students understand this very well, in their own mass-produced way.
They care about how they look; like anyone alive today, they are past masters of
the nuances of brands and models, styles and options. This is sometimes ener
vating, but among other things it issues in a surprising and complimentary
degree of interest in my clothes. Style has become a running theme in the
annual course evaluations they fill out, sometimes even entering into otherwise
abstruse discussion of Aristotle or Spinoza in their papers.
Every professor realizes, sooner or later, the vast attention that students
give to every detail of his or her appearance. A political science professor I had
in college wore just two suits, a blue and a grey, prompting the guy next to me
to speculate that he actually had a closet full of identical ones, like Superman
costumes. My colleague Allan receives on his course evaluations long paeans to
his impressive wardrobe and suggestions he should go into acting. On mine I
have been asked what brand my watch and where I bought a certain rather
flamboyant tie. I have even been shyly consulted for fashion advice, something
to add to the already lengthy list of topics — illness, relationships, car trouble,
family conflicts — that make up the unseen, pastoral element of university
teaching.
The half-formed dandyism of students, so depressingly conformist com
pared to the fin-de-siècle wonders of the last century’s turn, so apparently dri
ven by consumerism and branded free advertising, nevertheless confesses itself.
Their desires speak louder than the bright colors of their FUBU shirts, the
need to individuate all the more insistent for being diverted into a back-turned
Kangol cap. It is the least I can do to make myself an example.
All this concern with clothes strikes others as unseemly, of course, espe
cially since it seems to sit oddly with the other-worldly ambitions of my sub
ject, philosophy. How it possible for someone to be engaged in lofty thoughts
when he is checking the creases on his trousers? How can concern with the
implications of the Habermasian ideal speech situation be reconciled with con
cern for a precise color match between tie and socks? A simple answer to that
the one the former prime minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau, himself a style
maven of no mean gifts, once gave to reporters in an Ottawa press scrum. They
wondered if he would have the nerve to call out the military to deal with sepa
ratist terrorists in 1970 Québec. He said: “Just watch me.” But sometimes,
more seriously, I refresh the memories of my knit-brow colleagues with Machi
avelli’s account of his engagements with the ancient authors during his politi
cal exile, in a passage I happily underlined during an undergraduate political
theory course in the long-ago year of 1981, when we all thought the end of the
world was much closer than we do now.
“When evening comes, I return to my home, and I go into my study,” the
disgraced diplomat wrote to his friend Francesco Vettori in December of 1513,
describing his daily regimen.
[A] nd on the threshold, I take off my everyday clothes, which are covered
with mud and mire, and I put on regal and curial robes; and dressed in a
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more appropriate manner I enter into the ancient courts of ancient men and
am welcomed by them kindly . . . and there I am not ashamed to speak to
them, to ask them the reasons for their actions; and they, in their humani
ty, answer me; and for four hours I feel no boredom, I dismiss every afflic
tion, I no longer fear poverty nor do I tremble at the thought of death. . . .
I have noted down what I have learned from their conversation, and I com
posed a little work, De principatibus, where I delve as deeply as I can into
thoughts on this subject.

Would that we all possessed Machiavellis jauntiness in the face of worldly
adversity, and his sense of the finery’s simultaneous mark of respect and bul
wark against the misfortunes of this life. My buddy Mark Thompson used to
own an expensive, cutting-edge tailored suit that he liked to wear to job inter
views, not because it was suitable for them but precisely because it wasn’t. It
was tasty and beautiful beyond the expectations of the working world, a suit to
wear while strolling in the Piazza San Marco, a suit to wear on a date with Eliz
abeth Hurley. Mark called it his “fuck-you suit.”
Whenever possible, your suit should be a fuck-you suit. It should some
how, very slightly, irritate the mundane prejudices and routine pomposity of the
Cousin Jaspers of the world. The socks should be a little too sky-blue (Astaire)
or champagne-colored (Grant). The tie should be a smidge too unsual for Wall
Street, the shirt too lavender or citron, the silhouette a little too exaggerated.
Your raincoat should be, as Allan’s
the result of a weeks-long quest in
Parisian boutiques for the perfect white-cotton blouson with navy lining and
dashing turned-back cuffs.
It also helps, of course, if, like me, you don’t have to wear a suit every day,
don’t have to wear a suit at all. Then the suit as costume may have free rein,
and every foray into the world can take its proper place as an urban adventure,
a complex encounter of beauty with ugliness, of style with boredom, of youth
with time. Thus arrayed, you may glide through your day in a Todd Oldham
quasi-Edwardian frock coat in purple raw silk. You may skim the sidewalk in
your chunky Comme des Garçons shoes. Your bright blue tie may billow and
flap out behind you. Think of the dandies of another, allegedly more decadent
age, and wonder why we do not set our bar so high most of the time, why we
allow our own decadence to be all of the mind and spirit, a decadence of medi
ocrity and acquisitiveness, rather than what it was meant to be, a challenge to
received wisdom and bourgeois sluggishness.
Think, finally, of your father and his own sense of style. Think of what you
have borrowed, what you have invented, what you have painfully thrown off.
Behind the careful tailoring and colorful silk, this stroll is a primal encounter
with your culture and your upbringing. It is a personal story not yet told, a nar
rative of self-creation waiting to happen. You only get one chance to take this
particular walk — don’t waste it. You are the young and the restless. Don’t seek
approval; demand only respect. Be a man. Be a dandy.
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1. How Not to Do Things with Art

For many years now I have dwelt among university
folk, especially those who cultivate the fields of the
humanities. Anyone who has studied these people
knows that one of their most cherished tales has its
initial setting in a provincial town in Germany in the
late eighteenth century. It is there, we are told, that
Immanuel Kant, the legendary Sage of Königsberg,
set out on the pathway to the world of beauty. He
documented this adventure in his Critique ofJudg
ment (1790), in which he reported his discovery that
the fundamental criterion of beauty is uselessness.
As the folktale would have it, this discovery
proved influential because it was so brilliantly suited
to the conditions of modernity they were develop
ing around Kant and his contemporaries. If it were
to be modern, art could no longer exist as an object of
patronage, just
individuals would be enlightened
only if they were awakened from the dogmatic slum
bers of tradition, culture, and history. To be modern,
art would have to be autonomous. Fulfilling the pur
posiveness of its purposelessness, art might then
model for us the harmonious perfection of conscious
ness, communication, and civilization toward which
humanity strives to find its way.
As all who have heard this tale know, Kant’s
argument has been passed down from generation to
generation in many versions. (As just one example, I
might mention Clement Greenberg, whose doctrine
of formalism proved very impressive to a coterie of
the Ab-Ex tribe gathered at the Cedar Tavern on the
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isle of Manhattan around the middle of the twentieth century.) As is only to
be expected, these retellings were accompanied by various quibbles, cavils, and
outright objections; and recently many have actually claimed that the Kantian
legend has come to an end. In league with various allied movements, such as
poststructuralism, feminism, and postcolonial studies, postmodernism is said to
have relegated Kant’s universalist aesthetics to a past that we may now look
back upon as a simpler, more primitive time. Yet it is evident that Kant’s influ
ence has not simply disappeared, as we may gather from a recent collection of
essays, Revenge of the Aesthetic, which is dedicated to Murray Krieger and to his
argument that the aesthetic undermines all the coercive uses words may be
made to serve.
I will have more to say of these matters in what follows. For the moment,
however, I wish to draw attention to a specifically pedagogical form in which
the aesthetic criterion of uselessness has been popularized.
In the second half of the twentieth century, and especially in its last two
decades, the uselessness of aesthetic education became a compelling proposi
tion in the Western art world. The criterion of uselessness thus jumped from
the artwork, formally considered, to the artist, considered in terms of his or her
formal training. Thus we arrived at the categories of the self-taught artist and
of outsider art, and it is to these categories, and to the tales appertaining there
unto, that I now turn my attention.

2. When the Legend Becomes Fact...
John Ashbery’s Girls on the Run is an homage of sorts: “after Henry Darger” is
the annotation following its tide. In the fleeing girls of Ashbery’s title we may
recognize the heroines of Darger’s "outsider” art, and ekphrastic moments that
call attention to this connection are scattered throughout the poem. “I was
looking at a book he created, glued and spliced” (23), for instance, evokes Darg
er’s working methods.
Henry Darger, like Kant, is now a legend of some kind. Of what kind?

3. How to Succeed in Art without Really Trying
Outsider art is defined from the viewpoint of the presumed insider. More
specifically, it is distinguished from art by academically trained artists on
account of its institutionally eccentric origins. Outsider artists do not hold
MFAs from Yale or from Cal Arts or even from Ball State University, and they
often have no more than the most elementary schooling in the most basic of
subjects. They may never have set foot in a museum; one does not find them
sipping wine at vernissages in Soho; often they do not even dress in black except
when they are going to church or a funeral. The men among them are not given
to sporting tiny ponytails, and the women do not seem to favor Oliver Peoples
for their eyewear. In short, it is safe to say that they have not heard of Kant,
not even as strained through the vernacular of Walter Benjamin or Jean Bau-
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drillard. They appear to be a people unto themselves: that is their distinction
and their virtue. In the words of Arthur C. Danto, “They live and create in
worlds of their own, often, as in the case of Henry Darger, for no one but them
selves, with no ambition to become part of the artworld” (27).

4. Everyday People
No poetry more mandarin than Ashbery’s, and yet none better stakes out the
utopian ground on which people both “mainstream” and “idiosyncratic” and
both “high” and “low” might communicate with one another, fully and peace
fully. His lines are designed to allow “birds” and “earmuffs” (4), “pee” and
“crinoline” (7), or “bowls of muesli” and “the sidelong bats of evening” (14) to
be as the lion and lamb of Edward Hicks. This sort of encounter goes on and
on, with even the last line of the poem — “The wide avenue smiles” (55) —
recalling both the sanctified pavement of John Miltons canonical heaven and
the perversities of surrealist streets. The diction of his characters is similarly
generous, as when Talkative speaks of skies that are “gilded and armored” and
then of the chance to “get out of hock, / redeem Daddy’s dear old coupons”
(53).
There could be no one more unlike an outsider artist than Ashbery, with his
academic background, prestigious awards, and international recognition, and it
is of such perceived disjunctions — of their beauty — that this poem is made.

5. Folk Heroes

The popular assumption
that the phenomenon of outsider art proves that
education is not only useless but even worse than useless in matters of aesthet
ic creation. In Sidney Janis’s pioneering book on this subject, a quotation from
Horace Pippin, one of the most famous of self-taught artists, serves to exem
plify this conviction: “To me it seems impossible for another to teach one of
art” (189). Devotees of outsider art adore this kind of quote, collecting it in
much the same way that “pickers” drive down dusty backroads looking for
unworldly makers of paintings, sculptures, and other stuff to which the art
world might extend its tender mercies.
To folks who are neither insiders nor outsiders, these sorts of dealings
might call to mind Pat Boone’s harrowing appropriation of the art of Little
Richard. Yet in this case it must be said that outsider art people generally have
not sought to remake works in a different form so as to cater to a different audi
ence. Those who gag at the spectacle of well-heeled tourists eating the Other
may be justly suspicious about these artworld goings-on, but it is important also
not to oversimplify the case, from which we have much to learn about the cul
ture of educated folk at the end of the twentieth century.
In an era when MFAs in art, like those in creative writing, were coming to
be both popularized and relentlessly criticized, outsider artists were brought
forward as “folk heroes, models for some of the most adventurous and impor
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tant artists" in the mainstream of things. In making this observation, the cura
tor Marcia Tucker went on to describe these heroes in the context of a “desire
to leave the ivory tower (5). A governing paradox in the entire conception of
outsider art, in fact, is that these self-taught creators are supposed to be a les
son to the rest of us.

6. School’s Out

School was over, / not just for that day but forever and for seasons to come”
(20): in this state of being, too, things both high and low, the refined appurte
nances of leisure and the relaxed impulses of undisciplined nature, may be
imagined to share a common ground.

7. Ab Ovo
Outsider art is supposed to free us from the accumulated ignorance represent
ed by our colleges, museums, galleries, and scholarly traditions. One of the
virtues attributed to this art, in fact, is that it can be described
the product
of unconscious compulsion. In the context of an art world characterized in
terms of narrow traditions, institutionalized training, and tendentious critical
discourse, this compulsion represents freedom. This is not simply a freedom
from academicism but from education in its broadest sense and thus from every
aspect of culture.
This is the reason writers on outsider art relish histories of colorful charac
ters who did not call themselves artists until collectors taught them to do so.
To think of oneself as an artist, even tentatively, would be to think too much.
One’s actions would then be tainted by a presumed interest in an audience, per
haps even by a concern with sales, success, and a career. And so instead of being
an otherworldly force, one would be a human being preoccupied with the need
for social adequacy — and thus slouching toward mediocrity like the rest of us.
For the same reasons, those occupied with outsider art recount stories about
people who do not call the objects they make “artworks” but rather “critters,”
“toys,” or simply “things.” These things then seem to constitute art avant la lettre, and the encounter with them creates, for the viewer or collector, a sense of
being present at the dawn of culture. This time, though — to paraphrase
another folk hero, John Rambo — culture will let us win. We can all triumph
because this time, the birth of culture can seem to be purely individual rather
than social, historical, and political.
Accordingly, although many makers of outsider art speak of their work as
being religiously motivated, the fans of this work need never take this prosely
tizing to heart. They do certainly record the beliefs of its makers, with an
earnest show of respect, but they never so much as imagine the possibility that
they might be converted by these works to a particular creed or prophecy. Such
professions of religiosity — which sometimes are a major aspect of the, artworks
themselves,
in the texts that cover the surfaces of many of the objects made
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by Howard Finster — are but another quaint design element, the weirder the
better. (Similarly, when actually made a part of the artwork, the fetish value of
these texts is elevated if they are lettered inexpertly and spelled idiosyncratically, a la Finster.) The appeal of an ante- or anti-cultural art that it poses no
risks to the viewer, who cannot be mocked, taken in, intimidated, or in any way
made to feel ignorant. The spiritual motivations to which many artists testify
are then valued not only for their quaintness, in a modern or postmodern con
text, but also as evidence of guilelessness. Didacticism is a big plus when ones
concern is not with knowledge but rather with authenticity, in which case the
more fervently didactic the work, the better. In these circumstances professions
of faith are signifiers of innocence, of an antique purity of heart, and thus of a
valuable collectible.
The conviction that compulsion liberates also accounts for the conventions
governing the biographical portrayal of outsider artists, which are hyperre
spectful even in the cases of those (such as Adolph Wolfli) who were incarcer
ated for violent acts. The snarky asides one might expect to see in articles on
figures such as David Salle, Cindy Sherman, or Richard Serra never appear in
accounts of outsiders, who are presented as if they can do no wrong because
they never have to strive to be right. Outsider art thus promises us that we can
lay our intellectual burdens down and just be our funky selves — tastefully.

8. Antiques Roadshow
Readers of poetry like to collect good lines. In fact, "That’s a good line,” said
with the right attitude, can help to mark one as an insider in some poetry cir
cles. Sometimes Ashbery caters to this folkway, as when he writes, quotably,
"But the unthinkable is common knowledge now” (12). More often he seems
to strive deliberately to upset it. If the "bowls of muesli crooning to the side
long bats of evening” fail to check your impulses in that direction, then perhaps
you will be brought up short by, say, this line: "Under frozen mounds of yak
butter the graffiti have their day, and are elaborate, / some say” (17). Or if you
can still find that quotable (maybe you would allude to Gertrude Stein), one
could pull out others that would be all but impossible to cherish in decontex
tualized glory.
A deceptively simple proposition is suggested: the fact that you can collect
things does not mean you can own them.

9. What Becomes a Legend Most?
A composite of America’s favorite outsider artist, along the lines of the "Peo
ple’s Choice” artworks made by Vitaly Komar and Aleksander Melamid, would
turn out to be a poor, illiterate black man who has spent some time in an insti
tution (hospital, jail, or asylum) and who now obsessively makes things in
which he takes pride but which he will not give away or sell unless he happens
to be in the mood to do so. It is also crucial that the artist’s materials be cheap
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or makeshift: such stuff as mud, roots, scrap paper, plywood, house paint, and
found objects. This is important because these materials can then seem to
embody the unfranchiseable quiddity of the artist’s being. The fact that draw
ings have been made with ballpoint pens on old shirt cardboards, say, results in
the same effect that is produced by idiosyncratic spellings, religious designs,
and unpretentious makers. As we know from popular movies such
Good Will
Hunting (1997), the best packaging for genius is the most unprepossessing.
Once one has learned to appreciate the beauty of unlearning, one can move
on to understand why a truly ideal outsider must be like Henry Darger, who
lacked only the distinction of racial otherness. Nicknamed "Crazy” when he
was a boy, he spent several years of his childhood in an institution for mental
ly handicapped children. He was religious, attending as many as four masses
and he composed his immense life’s work in a small apartment crammed
with treasured junk. A janitor (just like Matt Damon in Good Will Hunting!),
he worked in such secrecy that his masterpiece was totally unknown to the out
side world until after his death. This is The Story of the Vivian Girls, in what is
Known as the Realms ofthe Unreal, of the Glandeco-Angelinian War Storm, Caused
by the Child Slave Rebellion (c. 1916-73), a manuscript of approximately nine
teen thousand pages accompanied by about two hundred and fifty illustrations
on pieces of paper glued into sheets six to twelve feet long. The illustrations are
made in large part from images of girls traced from magazines, newspapers, col
oring books, comic strips, advertisements, and other sources; the beleaguered
girls, who are often naked, sometimes come decorated with rams’ horns, but
terfly wings, or, more often, penises.

10. Free Association
Girls on the Run is delicious nonsense from beginning to end, and in this respect
it is markedly different from Darger’s work. Darger’s writing and art are filled
with violence in the forms of slavery, war, and natural disasters, and this vio
lence often graphic (to use the language of parental advisories). One might
mention, say, whole bunches of disemboweled girls.
Ashbery’s poem tones down this aspect of Darger’s work. The sole refer
ence to disembowelment is conditional: "Now it’s time to surrender, or be riven
asunder, garroted, eviscerated / by the actual time of the explosion” (32). Aside
from a fugitive reference to "the awful bushel of shins” (29), carnage is not an
issue. Bombs, explosions, war, and military matters are mentioned, but only
rarely and in passing.
Yet all is not well in Ashbery’s words. In this poetry of goofy clarity there
are no profundities, nothing to be construed or puzzled out, just pleasure all the
time. Since such a pleasure is inhuman, however, it is also a form of cruelty. It
reminds us of why we may condescend to some artworks (say, some Impres
sionist masterpieces) by judging them too beautiful: so that we may refuse to
recognize how they mock every miserable accommodation we make to the stu
pidities we dignify with the name of necessity.
Ashbery takes the same approach to Darger’s mythology that he does to his
violence. He remakes it into collaged images, idioms, and scenes that convey
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something of Darger’s oneiric intensity while eliminating, soothingly, any signs
of enslaving narrative. Whereas Darger’s work is generally regarded as the
product of obsession, of an enslaving compulsion, Ashbery chooses to see it as
a gift of an uncertain kind freely given from an unclear source and accepted for
no definite end. In this way he emancipates Darger’s work, granting it auton
omy of a sort.
As evident from the way Darger’s work invariably described, one of its
most striking aspects
its sheer magnitude and the impression of obsessive
accumulation and reiteration, beyond any conceivable practical purpose, which
is conveyed thereby. Those thousands of handwritten pages, those hundreds
and hundreds of stereotyped girls! Even if one reads only the poetry that Ash
bery wrote prior to Girls on the Run, one might readily imagine why this aspect
of Darger’s work might appeal to him. It corresponds to the sense one gets
from much of Ashbery’s writing that any given line or poem might just go on,
with its beguiling inventiveness serving as its sole and sufficient justification for
existence. His writing finally does not behave in this way, of course; all sorts of
cagey measures divert it from the impossible ideal of free association. Before
Darger’s work was even revealed to the world, Ashbery’s writing was attuned to
its drives toward repetition, accumulation, and expansion, just it was attuned
to the ironic enclosure of these drives within Darger’s menial person and
rathole of an apartment.

11. The Rise and Fall of the Outsider
Others before me have pointed out the seeming paradox that the so-called out
sider is now securely institutionalized within the world of fine art. In fact, the
erstwhile "modern primitives” of outsider art are now so fully accepted into the
art world that one may actually hear laments about the loss of their distin
guishing outsiderness. The case of the Reverend Finster is exemplary in this
regard. Having become so successful that he was invited on “The Tonight
Show” and commissioned to do album covers for R.E.M. and Talking Heads,
he has become an institution and industry in his own right, cranking out massproduced tchotchkes for the tourists who visit his Paradise Garden in Pennville,
Georgia. Aficionados of outsider art now speak of their acquaintance with Finster’s earlier work much as young people in the early nineties boasted of having
listened to Nirvana back in the early days, long before “grunge” came and went
as a marketing ploy, when the group had not yet left Sub Pop to sign with a
major label.
This vexation is related to other disputes, some of which are even interest
ing, about the history, nature, institutionalization, and probable future of out
sider art. For instance, there is the fundamental dispute about what to call this
art. Although I have adopted “outsider art” here because this is the term that
came to be most widely used at the end of the twentieth century, it by no
means an uncontested one. In fact, arguments over the naming of this sort of
art, and hence over the interpretation of just what sort of thing it is, have been
with us for as long as anything like it has been identified under any name.
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Since the 1930s the names that have been ventured include modern primitives,
Sunday painters, popular painters, amateurs, hobbyists, naïve artists, folk
artists, creators of art brut, contemporary folk artists, grassroots artists, vision
ary artists, nonacademic artists, vernacular artists, and isolate artists, in addition
to outsider artists and the name that seems to be gaining ascendency at present,
self-taught artists.
In any case, and under any name, it remains a remarkable phenomenon that
so much excitement should have been occasioned in recent decades by the
image of the artist set free from education. This a phenomenon that bears a
fascinating relation to other movements at the fin of the last siècle, including the
so-called “return to beauty” among cultural insiders concerned with literature
and the arts. As in the case of attacks on the 1993 Whitney Biennial, this
return was called for in reaction against some recent art and cultural criticism,
but it has also appeared in other contexts. An early contribution to this return
was Dave Hickey’s 1993 book, The Invisible Dragon: Four Essays on Beauty.
From the end of 1999 through the early weeks of 2000, an exhibition curated
by Neal Benezra and Olga M. Viso at the Hirshhorn Museum in Washington,
DC, “Regarding Beauty,” was devoted to the reconsideration of this allegedly
neglected issue. A recent book by Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just
(1999), is another sign of the times.
Insofar as it represents an ebb and flow of cultural energies, this return is
interesting or at least anodyne. At its best, as in the aforementioned collection
of essays, Revenge of the Aesthetic, it shows an inspiring devotion to the stimu
lation of art; at its worst, it
Hilton Kramer and Rudolph Giuliani. Most
interesting in the present context, though, is the way this pledge of allegiance
to beauty in the 1990s parallels the boom in outsider art.
As a reaction to recent emphases in criticism (cultural studies, feminist the
ory, postcolonial studies, and so on), the return to beauty shows a desire to
reclaim a time presumed to have existed before an emphasis on marginalization
shoved aesthetic tradition out of the center of things. And even though it
valorized precisely on account of its marginalization in relation to that hither
to dominant aesthetic tradition, outsider art shows the same nostalgia. In both
cases, art is to be made useless again — useless for politics and economics,
ethics and ethnics, identity and sexuality, and other contemporary preoccupa
tions — so that the aesthetic may be redeemed
an experience at least of
philosophical value, if not of presumptive universality. In both cases, an out
sider — self-taught artist in the one case, self-evident beauty in the other — is
made to absolve the educated self of the preconditions to its judgments. This
self may then rest easy in its learning. For if this learning in and of itself
demonstrably useless to qualify one either to create beauty or to appreciate it,
one’s education can certainly not be accounted a privilege, much less a defining
part of one’s values, now can it?

12. We Are the Case

The debates over nomenclature that are de rigeur in the field of outsider art
find a parallel in the drama of names in Girls on the Run. These names are of
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such motley types as to suggest that one of the intentions of this poem is to pre
sent us with an apparatus in which we can see displayed the aesthetic possibil
ities of naming, with particular reference to mid-twentieth-century American
culture.
Some names, then, will be exceedingly ordinary, as if taken from a forties
movie or a fifties sitcom: Judy, Henry, Mary Ann, Dianne, and Peggy, for
instance. This is the sort of name that appears in the greatest number of vari
ations. Around this core we are also offered nicknames that might come from
the same era, which is the mid-century recalled by the cute little cartoon girls
on which Darger was fixated: Tidbit, Dimples, Tootles. These consort well
with appropriate persons such
Farmer Jones, Uncle Wilmer, Aunt Jennie,
Uncle Philip, and Old Mr. Jenkins, around whom we also meet predictable fig
ures such as Mother, Daddy, the Principal, the relaxed policeman, the truant
officer, the nurses, the crowd, the perpetrators, and the detective. Stuart Hofnagel, Rags the mutt, the twins, General Forester, and even Mr. McPlaster,
whose name invites friendly jibes: we will not be surprised to find the girls in
their company.
Around these figures we encounter others whose monikers are less conven
tional, at least in terms of mainstream cultural history. Damion, Laure, and
Larissa, for instance, seem to come from a slightly different register than the
one whence the Peggies and Tommies arise. Larry Sue might well give us
pause, as might Uncle Margaret. Shuffle and Spider might lead the likes of
Dimples to some quizzical thumb-sucking, and it hard to tell in advance what
topics might arise in a conversation involving Young Topless, The Overall Boys,
and Bill the barrel. Then we have the characters who seem to have wandered
out of the realm of allegory (Pliable, Hopeful, Talkative), fable (Cupid), litera
ture (Lochinvar, Jenny Wren, Swann), romance (the old seer), history (the
king), and religion (the Creator). Yet all these figures, too, are dispersed among
the others in the most matter-of-fact way imaginable.
In addition to those either named or identified by occupation or associa
tion, we must also note an indeterminate number who appear under the cloak
of pronominality or, even more elusively, as interjected voices (“Ssh, you are
loud” [25]). The overall effect is then to make Girls on the Run a flight from
the coherence of the semantic, generic, sexual, and social orders conventionally
presumed to be represented in names. In this respect it is notable that aside
from a few who are marked as adults, such as Mr. McPlaster and General
Forester, almost all the characters here have only first names. (Stuart Hofnagel
is the exception to prove the rule.) These are names without adult seriousness,
or adult pretention, as the case may be. They do whatever they do without fuss
ing about whether it amounts to beauty or art or nature or anything else. Per
sons do not appear here as embodied beings in mortal comradeship, love, or
community but rather as impulses, sensations, perceptions, thoughts, utter
ances, and actions all on the same battleground or playground (Ashbery, like
Darger, sensibly declining to draw a hard-and-fast distinction between the
two). “We are the case” (49), it is asserted at one point, and that is about as
much assertion as we can bear in this lexicon of fine art and popular rubbish.
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13. We Have All Been Here Before
At the same time that it has been exhibited, popularized, and marketed in the
last century, outsider art has given rise to criticism, sometimes of a withering
sort. Most of this focuses on the issue of primitivism: that is, on the tenden
cy to regard the outsider artist as a kind of Noble Savage uncontaminated by
modern civilization, especially in the form of education.
To some extent such criticism has accompanied the categorization of selftaught or outsider art virtually from its inception. Most of it, however, has
appeared only within the last two decades. Adrian Piper, Kinshasha Holman
Conwill, Amiri Baraka, Thomas McEvilley, Lucy Lippard, and Wendy Steiner
are among the scholars who have offered important critiques of the economic,
curatorial, and ideological attitudes associated with outsider art. The motives
behind the career of this art are not only reprehensible, however, and the future
of the phenomena that have come to be grouped under this term is by no means
clear.
To begin to evaluate what this future may be or ought to be, we need to
understand why we should have encountered this primitivism redivivus at pre
cisely the time when one might have thought that the aftermath of the civil
rights movement in the United States, as well as the history and ongoing poli
tics of colonial liberation movements worldwide, would have warned educated
people away from the pitfalls of this attitude. After all, it was in the last three
decades of the twentieth century that primitivist attitudes were being self-con
sciously rooted out in the discipline of folklore, to which outsider art objects
would once have been relegated, as well as in the overlapping discipline of
anthropology. And certainly theory and criticism in the art world fully partook
of approaches critical of primitivism when not, as has often been the case, lead
ing the way in their development. How then can we account for the career of
outsider art, which even now continues to show considerable vitality, despite
the criticism of scholars such as those I have just mentioned?

14. But Before I Answer My Own Question . . .
I know it might seem that I am doing nothing here but breaking a butterfly on
a wheel. Regardless of whatever preconceptions you may have about Ashbery’s
poetry, you may feel that my way of putting Girls on the Run into the context of
all this “background information” concerning outsider art represents a pedantic
approach, or worse, to the pleasures of reading. I would then be committing
the perennial sin of the critic against which all returns to beauty are directed:
the tedium of annotation, the heresy of paraphrase, the crime of pressing the
aesthetic into the service of a foreign army (history, sociology, politics, “theory,”
what have you).
And yet I pay homage to Darger and Ashbery in doing so. All of Darger’s
art is precisely about the breaking of butterflies on wheels: about an absurdly
excessive enslavement and torture of pie-eyed innocence. In keeping with
Darger’s example, Girls on the Run teaches us that “foreground” can hope to
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emerge from "background,” or a given "inside” from any "outside,” only in a
momentary, one-line-at-a-time way through which an obscurely motivated
playfulness never resolves itself into exemplary forms. Taking a cue from one
of Darger’s sources, one might call his and Ashbery’s work comic-book sublim
ity, with an emphasis in both cases on the terrible unknowing that Kant so
hopefully identified as being productive of the unimaginable impression of the
sublime.

15. Inside Out
Outsider art at once the antithesis to and the culmination of Kantian tradi
tion — and maybe, just maybe, it something else besides.
It is antithetical to this tradition insofar as the surrealist movement, art
brut, the disciplines of folklore and anthropology, Marxian criticism, and vari
ous exponents of outsiderness have succeeded in their efforts to show that the
autonomy of art has always been an ideological construction, not a transcen
dental and universal condition. Kant may or may not be explicitly evoked in
these efforts, but even where they make reference only to "academic art” or to
"cultural institutions,” they cannot help but refer to the Kantian tradition.
After all, in his Critique ofJudgment this legendary figure did take pains to point
out that he found the notion of an unschooled artist unthinkable. Academic
training is necessary to the artist, Kant argued, for the same reason that people
in general ought to have an aesthetic education: because it is only through such
institutionalized measures that rudeness can be tempered, taste cultivated, cul
ture itself made possible.
Nevertheless, the conception of outsider art also the last gasp of Kantian
aesthetics: a final, belated, vulgar attempt to establish that there may be such a
thing as purposive purposelessness.
Kant foresaw the possibility that his work might come to such an end and
sought to head it off with his contrast between civilized beauty and uncanny
sublimity, his mockery of untutored genius, and his disgust with "New Hollan
ders” and "Fuegians” (258), whose appearance suggested to him that the very
existence of humanity might be useless. He also foresaw that in the future, peo
ple would be "ever more remote from nature” and so would "hardly be able to
form a concept of the happy combination (in one and the same people) of the
law-governed constraint coming from highest culture [Kultur] with the force
and rightness of a free nature that feels its own value” (232). What he could
not anticipate — even though contemporaries such Denis Diderot were sug
gesting this lesson — was that the image of nature to which he was dedicated
might grow so remote that it would have to be imagined entirely outside of the
realm of his beloved humaniora, in the land of the exotic. Therefore, he could
not foresee that his truest disciples, at the end of the twentieth century and the
beginning of the twenty-first, would be those who disclaimed his notion of aca
demic culture. Because it also demands that the figure of the cultural outsider
must serve
the background to a universalized sensus communis, the phenom
enon of outsider art at the end of the twentieth century represents a logical
unfolding of Kant’s aesthetics.
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But why should this Kantian logic, so often criticized in recent decades,
find its artworld culmination in this same era and in this form? This primitivism redivivus of outsider art results from the desire to maintain a traditional
conception of the humanities at a time when such a conception has been found
bankrupt both within and without the fields of academe. We live in a time in
which, as Vincent Pecora has put it, we are witnessing “the slow decine in the
power of the university to create, legitimate, and preserve cultural capital in
aesthetic forms and to convey it to its students in exchange for the price of
admission” (205). Therefore, those who demand that their purposelessness
must be purposive, like Kant’ must try to revive the traditional ideals of the
humanities in the only place where they can escape contemporary social histo
ry: within the untutored self. Accordingly, they must proclaim the uselessness
of education. Like critics of academia such as John Ellis, Gertrude Himmelfarb, and the Blooms, Allan and Harold, they cannot accept that there may be
many good reasons — cultural, historical, political, intellectual, and, yes, aes
thetic — why educated persons have lost their imaginary power (and it always
was imaginary) over taste.
The devotees of the self-taught proclaim the uselessness of education
because it is now proving useless to them. It will no longer cater to their irra
tional sense of cultural entitlement. In the context of an American university
system under widespread attack for its support of affirmative action and its pro
grams in ethnic studies, the fact that African Americans and other minorities
are so highly valorized in outsider art then easy to explain: they have not
sought admission into cultural institutions, and so they are exceedingly attrac
tive. The fact that many of the artists in question are absolutely brilliant is
irrelevant to this question of how they have been framed within the world of
art. In this case as in so many others — only think ofJoseph Conrad’s LordJim
— exoticism is the last refuge of the insider.

16. Exotic Kant

Another ekphrastic moment from Girls on the Run: “Thus, our doom, ringing
with half-realized fantasies, is a promise of a new beginning on another conti
nent” (10).

17. The Beastliness of it All
If there is an exoticism reducible to fantasies, symptoms, and ideologies gener
ated by ethnocentrism, racism, colonialism, imperialism, and other tiresome
forces, aesthetically speaking, there is also an irreducible exoticism. Neither
outside (in categorically alien lands or persons) nor inside (in self-affirming
images of the alien), this irreducible exoticism is what makes beauty such a
beast.
In the case of Kant’s aesthetics, this irreducible exoticism appears in the
figure of the genius. As beauty is unpredictable — “we cannot determine a pri-
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ori what object will or will not conform to taste; we must try it out” (31) — so,
too, the genius who creates it. The genius "must be considered the very oppo
site of a spirit of imitation' and hence of the spirit of conventional education,
“since learning is nothing but imitation” (176). Kant did try to domesticate the
irreducible exoticism of this figure by making the genius a cultural hero, in con
trast to charlatans and primitives, and by raising the figure of the scientist above
him. Yet in the profoundly unaccountable nature of this figure, as in the refusal
of beauty to be dictated to, Kant had to leave open the possibility that cultural
heroes of another sort might one day spring forth from nature, including artists
who are Fuegians or New Hollanders or even self-taught persons. For though
we grant, for the sake of argument, Kant’s insistence that an element of acade
mic correctness is requisite in art, his premises still allow us to conceive that
outsider artists might intuit that correctness for themselves, just as they are
credited with doing by critics who compare the principles evident in their works
to those followed by academically trained artists.
Despite himself, Kant showed that one cannot explain the nature of beau
ty, because it is beauty that discovers us. In fact, since its autonomy cannot be
logically restrained by particular conceptions of nature and civilization, it actu
ally discovers us through what is not us. In the moment in which we appre
hend it, then, we are transformed by it. We may be remade, for instance, by our
perception of the primitive in the humanist, the charlatan in the philosopher,
or the bewildered populace in the systematic pedagogue, to name but three of
the bits of nonsense Kant’s art allows us to appreciate.
“[W]e shall put a brave face / on it for a time, then school will be over”
(53), Talkative assures us in Girls on the Run, beautifully, as far as I can see.

Works Cited
Ashbery, John. Girls on the Run, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999.
Clark, Michael P., ed. Revenge of the Aesthetic: The Place ofLiterature in Theo
ry Today. Berkeley: U of California P, 2000.
Danto, Arthur C. “The Artworld and its Outsiders.” Self-Taught Artists of the
Twentieth Century: An American Anthology. Ed. Elsa Longhauser and
Harold Szeeman. New York: Museum of American Folk Art, 1998. 1827.
Hickey, Dave. The Invisible Dragon: Four Essays on Beauty. Los Angeles: Art
Issues P, 1993.
Janis, Sidney. They Taught Themselves: American Primitive Painters ofthe Twen
tieth Century. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat P, 1965.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique ofJudgment. 1790. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indi
anapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987.
Pecora, Vincent P. “Culture Wars and the Profession of Literature.” After
Political Correctness: The Humanities and Society in the 1990s. Ed. Christo
pher Newfield and Ronald Strickland. Boulder: Westview P, 1995. 199211.
Scarry, Elaine. On Beauty and Being Just. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999.
Tucker, Marcia. “Preface.” Transmitters: The Isolate Artist in America. Ed.
Tucker et al. Philadelphia: Philadelphia College of Art, 1981. 4-5.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/14


186




Editors: Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (2000/2001): Full issue

Published by eGrove, 2001

187

Journal X, Vol. 5 [2001], No. 1, Art. 14

Travel, Literature, Spirit: A Personal Meditation
Ihab Hassan

Ihab Hassan is the
author ofmany books
ofliterary and critical
essays, including The
Postmodern Turn
(1986), Selves at
Risk (1990), and
Rumors of Change
(1995). He has writ
ten two travel mem
oirs, Out of Egypt
(1985), and Between
the Eagle and the
Sun: Traces of Japan
(1996). Currently, he
is working on a “short
book about everything,
withoutfootnotes.n

Days and months are travelers of eterni
ty. So are the years that pass by. Those
who steer a boat across the sea, or drive a
horse over the earth till they succumb to
the weight of the years, spend every
minute of their lives traveling. There are
great number of ancients, too, who died
on the road. I myself have been tempted
for
long time by the cloud-moving
wind — filled with a strong desire to
wander.
—Matsuo Basho, The Narrow Road

to the Far North
Old men ought to be explorers
Here and there does not matter
We must be still and still moving
Into another intensity
—T. S. Eliot,
 Four Quartets
“My Destination”

I gave orders for my horse to be brought round
from the stable. The servant did not understand
me. I myself went to the stable, saddled my horse
and mounted. In the distance I heard bugle call,
I asked him what this meant. He knew nothing
and had heard nothing. At the gate he stopped
me, asking: “Where are you riding to, master?” “I
don’t know,” I said, “only away from here, away
from here. Always away from here, only by doing
can I reach my destination.” "And so you know
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your destination?” he asked. "Yes,” I answered, “didn’t I say so? Away-FromHere, that is my destination.” “You have no provisions with you,” he said. “I
need none,” I said, “the journey is so long that I must die of hunger if I don’t
get anything on the way. No provisions can save me. For it is, fortunately, a
truly immense journey.”
—Franz Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes

I am no traveler of eternity, not yet, only a cosseted drifter, but I know that trav
el begins in childhood dreams, and wise old men die peregrine. We all think of
our failures — the best think, as Robert Lowell said, with “suicidal absolution”
— and wonder: where, where on this journey, did I swerve? That swerve, is it
not part of the road? Perhaps only the absolved know it.
Still, though few fare in such absolution, journeys continue to beckon.
Men and women have an errant disposition. They go, hoping to catch one last,
clear glimpse of the mystery, hurtling on a wet, crowded boulder through space.
Journeys do join time and space, human identity and human mortality, in a
secret motion. Yet I think of travel mainly as the story of time, that arch voy
ager, tale of days and months as Basho says, and so in some measure the tale
of all sojourners, born to traverse their own span. Whatever its metaphysics,
travel also throws us, pell-mell, into the world. We wake up one day and find
ourselves there — Cape Town, Lahore, Paris, Sapporo, Perth, Milwaukee —
without quite knowing how or why. There we stay, or move on, or backtrack.

What, then, brings on the traveling mood? Though I am no Ishmael — driven
out to sea by that damp, drizzly November in his soul — I think his mood can
move us all. Or at least some version of it, packaged for a Crystal Line or
Princess Cruise.
Certainly, I know counselors against travel. Thoreau boasted sourly that he
traveled much in Concord; and Emerson sadly confessed that place is nothing,
his giant goes with him wherever he goes. Travel may betray some insufficien
cy in us, a prickly need that deeper or happier natures refuse, a whim like a
wound. Still, wandering the earth, we learn a little its ways and run against the
stranger, within ourselves, we most dread to meet. We experience the world
sensuously — that foreign, high-pitched ululation or wail, that rich, funky
smell of garlic and urine — feeling the shock of differences even as we absorb
each shock to some dark core. Seeing how human beings vary in language, cus
tom, creed, color, mien, we try to coax our divergences into wider civility. Shall
we ever do better, turning our variousness into proofs of hospitality in a shared
home?
The evidence of the past millennium is grim. We fill mass graves with oth
ers around the world, fertilize them with the killing fields. Or else we ironize
travel, turning it into a sly, kitschy, postmodern joke, like that ad for Kuoni trav
el: Michelangelos David with a camera, in canary-colored shorts, blue shades
and Day-Glo frames. For the desperately naive, the exotic can be packaged,
sterilized. You are in Cairo or Calcutta? Look at the index, look at the moni
tor of your guide; don’t look left or right where dirt, danger, squalor live. (Its
really the obverse of those sleek SUVs in suburbia, out on supermarket safaris.)
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Can we wonder that yuppies now take their Grand Tours in Patagonia, the
Gobi Desert, the Nullabor Plain, and when the gods go crazy in the sky, they
now shower the Kalahari with empty bottles of Pepsi or Coke?

But let's curb our own irony here: Myth and Romance live. Who has not
turned the corner of an alien street and come suddenly upon Helen — she
whose face launched those Grecian ships — Galahad, Bluebeard, or Tamerlane?
Who has not heard, on a foreign pavement, somewhere over and behind the left
shoulder, the hollow step and sigh of Infinity?
Voyages whisper loss, departure, things thrown to the wind. As Ecclesi
astes put it, man goeth to his long home, and the mourners go about the streets.
Yet in voyages we also hear the cadences of the universe, going hence, coming
hither, a sound not wholly our own. Like quests, pilgrimages, initiation rites,
shamanistic trances, near-death experiences, like epic journeys and orphic
descents to the underworld, travel aspires somehow to what it can never pos
sess or know. And this gives it darker glow. Yes, journeys enact childhood
dreams, but in later age, they may hint the void. What if the traveler can never
return, or returned only as a pale revenant, a wan, unwelcome ghost? Who
knows when dispossession lures us to naught, when it promises rebirth?
And is not America itself an ambiguous realm of nothingness and pleni
tude? Boundless in the eyes of its European settlers, its space became a vacan
cy, fancy-filled. In emptiness grew the American Dream. For space is not
place; it is nearer the Absolute. Is it what drew migrants such as myself here?
Robert Pinsky warns his daughter about a certain kind of immigrant, in “An
Explanation of America”:
Such a man — neither a Greek adventurer
With his pragmatic gods, nor an Indian,
Nor Jew — would worship, not an earth or past
Or word, but something immanent, like a shadow . . .

I, myself, sometimes feel that arid immanence in happy exile, as if the desert
could roll over the Atlantic, past the Mississippi, the Great Plains, the Rockies,
to lap the Pacific. Nietzsche admired nomads, chandalas (outcasts): their free
dom comes from traveling light, from a wide restlessness, he thought. I, too,
admire them, but I know that if a dead shadow fell across my path, I would
shudder out of its way.
Motion is no mere kinesis. Motion an intellectual, often spiritual thing, and
travel is a metaphor, rife with mischief and right for our times.
Paradoxically, travel, mobility, is a root, a radical, Mary Campbell says in
The Witness and the Other World (1988). Motion animates our myths of origins,
our earliest literatures; it acts in metaphor, our most essential figure of speech,
which etymologically means a change of place. As soon as we are, we learn to
go. Movement becomes an attribute of power, lately of glamour, earlier of dev
iltry or divinity. A meteor in the sky, a man on a galloping horse, strike awe in
the sedentary heart. A jet-setter — preferably on the Concorde — with an
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unlimited air travel card strikes envy. This is no levity. Why else do joggers
attract so much irritation or derision? What tempts village ruffians to pelt
passing car? Even a man in a light skiff arouses a harassing instinct. “They
shouted at me, they yodeled, they threw stones,” Paul Theroux laments as he
rows around Cape Cod.
Bruce Chatwin gives that lament a deeper tone. In The Songlines (1987),
he moots the idea that natural selection has designed us, from brain cells to big
toe, for a career of seasonal journeys through thorn scrubs and blistering desert.
But why, I wonder, couldn’t natural selection, which alters in a few generations
the beak of the finch, finally adapt human beings to the quiet computer, the
cushioned jet? Is the brain more indurate than a beak? And supposing, as Dar
win notes in The Descent of Man (1871), that the migratory instinct in certain
birds overcomes the maternal, what can this tell us of women, who are not fowl?
And is it true that migratory species aggress less than those with fixed abodes?
Would this apply to Hun and Tartar? Further, were the wandering tribes of
Israel right to consider settled states, with all their pyramids and ziggurats, as
behemoth or leviathan? And did the ancient Egyptians really project on the
next world the journey they failed to make in this one, as Chatwin claims?
I have found no answer to such queries and speculations, only hints, aphorisms,
further queries. But I know that travel writers overflow the libraries of the
earth. And the best of them — don’t miss Freya Stark — write shamelessly
well. After all, the traveler we read foremost a writer, often an artist. This
artist may choose to make the curiosity and solitude of travel an allegory of the
human condition. Like Jonathan Raban, say, they offer themselves examples
of the estranged hero, reporting on the foreignness we suspected, but failed to
experience, in our world.
But the journey also becomes symbolic of the writing process itself and of
the artist’s own quest for self-understanding. In this perspective — a kind of
silent translatif — inner and outer world, letter and deed, translate into one
another. Indeed, in some cases the author need not travel at all. He can, like
Italo Calvino in Invisible Cities (1974), let his imaginary Marco Polo do all the
wandering for him on dusty roads. Or, like Emily Dickinson, she may simply
board her frigate, a book, ride her courser, a page of ‘ prancing poetry.”
And isn’t Michel Butor right: travel becomes itself a kind of writing?
Romantic voyagers — François René de Chateaubriand, Alphonse de Lamar
tine, Théophile Gautier, Gérard de Nerval, Gustave Flaubert — were often
bookish writers; books frequently inspired their trips, and since they were writ
ers, they often read on the trips, wrote journals, and produced books of their
own later. Butor says, “They travel in order to write, they travel while writing,
because for them, travel is writing.” Besides, most travelers mark (write on) the
lands they visit; they name or disfigure them in some clear or hidden way.
Finally, writing itself is a kind of travel, a text of secret displacements. “If
reading is a crossing — even if it often pretends to be only an erased passage
through the cloud of whiteness — writing, always the transformation of read
ing, is necessarily even more so.” Even as Butor writes two words in a sentence,
the earth turns, traveling also in space with its writer. If this is a conceit, it still
makes a larger point.
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Always, though, I have needed to remind myself while traveling that this also
my life: the journey is a fragment of autobiography, first lived, then written
down. But the living and the writing are never the same.
How can they ever be? I walk or ride or fly, gawking at odd things in far
away places. I may even make mental notes of my experience — but they are
not my experience. The “bio” and the “graph,” despite all of what the scribes
say (that goes for Jacques Derrida too), never wholly parse in nomadic autobi
ography.
Think of it. You write it down: this means you recall, you invent. Mem
ory the mother of the Muses, but she could have been their daughter too.
Autobiography is living by other means, not only after your death but also while
you live. Autobiography literally recreates your life: entertains it, creates it
again in another mode, redirects it because writing makes you see what you
ignored about yourself. And so you endeavor to become the person you have
written out. We not only “construct” — hateful jargon — ourselves in autobi
ography; we reconstruct our past and future as well. It’s dizzying.
In traveling, though, there come moments of brute existence, unmediated
by writing, perhaps by any words at all. They may be moments of mortal peril.
Or of the natural sublime, demanding surrender to some awesome scene. Or of
erotic frenzy, another kind of self-loss. Do not mock. The ambivalent lure of
otherness — other features, other accents or hues — rages in every exotic fancy,
not to say lymph or gland. This call of distant loves hints at surcease from self
hood, weird rebirth. The eros of travel is sinister, and a ruttish metaphysician
born.
Travel and autobiography may be twin aspects of our internal life — I almost
said of the soul. But travel casts a wider net over the human condition, our
whole roiled postcolonial world. It is not only the economic fact of travel, its
incalculable revenues; it is also its geopolitical impact on nearly everything we
know, we do.
For international travel, Dean MacCannell argues in The Tourist: A New
Theory of the Leisure Class (1976), has become the sign of our civilization, the
best indication that modernity has triumphed over other social forms. Cer
tainly, the non-modern world has not disappeared; it has been artificially pre
served as the scene of tourism. Thus sightseeing becomes an attempt, doomed
to failure, “to overcome the discontinuity of modernity, of incorporating its
fragments into unified experience.” This insight, which applies only to certain
kinds of travel, invites some further reflection on the geopolitical space we
inhabit.
We live in a time of planetization, globalization, and retribalization, each
tribe seeking new autonomy. We live also in a time of realignments, a world
chaotically and sometimes viciously interactive. Yet current realignments —
deals and whispers in the geopolitical dusk — are themselves evidence of an
older process. The planetization of the earth may have begun with neolithic
hunters or with the first outcast who mated elsewhere. But with Christopher
Columbus, Sebastian Cabot, Ferdinand Magellan, Vasco da Gama, Francis
Drake, the earth became interactive in another
This was an exuberant and
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bellicose moment for the West, grievous for other people who gradually fell
prey to colonization, excepting some, like the Japanese, so remote and
intractable as to stay free. Later, industrialization in the West made its power
and knowledge paramount. By the middle of the twentieth century, Martin
Heidegger could bewail “the complete Europeanization [he did not say Amer
icanization] of the earth and of man,” an infection, he claimed, that “attacks at
the source . . . everything that is of an essential nature.”
Heidegger proved purblind in politics. Where he saw only sameness, we
perceive now variety, a gallimaufry of cultures. Where Heidegger saw only
hegemony, we see now rivalry and interdependence, whether in ethnic cleans
ing or global warming. We see shifting tectonic plates in geopolitics
in the
earth’s crust. And withal, the individual traveler, adventurer, seeker, still
remains intent on plunging into essential being.
True, there is travel and travel. Some will put you on the Seabourne Goddess,
the Lindblad Explorer; some will earn you a knighthood or a seaswept grave.
Yet travel — even in the cultural bubble, say, of a Japanese tour — always cross
lines, transgresses realms, and so reminds us obscurely of our homelessness
in the world.
It is something you feel when you are packing a trunk and three suitcases
to leave. How can any of it avail to preserve your identity when you are cross
ing Asia or Amazonia in a boat or train? Or when you become lost (as I was
once lost, in a Shanghai crowd) and suddenly panic as a tide of Sinic faces car
ries you toward a destination you half-welcome, half-dread. It
a feeling of
self-loss, hardly unique to feeling lost in China. Michael Parfit captures it per
fectly, in South Light (1985)
his plane from Christchurch to McMurdo Sta
tion, Antarctica, passes the “point of safe return :
Here in this airplane we have left all the encumbrances of our identities
behind. . . . Now all that is important about who and what I am is in two
orange bags I can carry by myself, and is here in the aircraft with me. ... I
have become lighter, freer, less burdened in life, and if my life itself ceases
somewhere off on this unknown trajectory on which I have launched
myself, it will perhaps not make as much smoke going out as I had thought.
I have thrown my dreams into a sack over my shoulder and headed out.

For saints, homelessness
really at-homeness everywhere. Think of pil
grimages — crossings between the sacred and profane — pilgrimages East and
West. Think, say, of Eleanor Munro’s luminous work, On Glory Roads (1987),
which shows that cosmic myths sustain pilgrimages even as they mirror the
motion of migrant birds or planets. Munro responds to the force of these
myths in local rites at Lourdes, transfixed “because through those imprisoning
bodies, some entangled yet separate will had glinted out with shocking imme
diacy.” In the pilgrim’s movement, then, we find a recapitulation of natural
rhythms — the tides, the seasons, the stars — as well as the cultural history of
humanity. We also find a presence that suddenly rushes to fill every moment
and every place.
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But look East now. The same intuition tacitly inhabits many texts. One clas
sic example, Basho’s The Narrow Road to the Far North (circa 1693) will do.
Basho took several journeys, pilgrimages to places hallowed by their natural
beauty or ancestral piety. He traveled also to renew his own spirit, strewing
verses as he tramped along, one foot in this world, the other, he said, in the
next. Still, in the spirit of Zen, he drew his imagery from the tap-roots of the
earth, the quivering instant.
For Basho, though, Being never shows its beauty bare. It is mediated by
every cherry blossom or frog in a pond. It is mediated
well by history,
ancient sages, priests, heroes such as the tragic warrior Lord Yoshitsune and his
giant retainer Benkei. Indeed, the epiphanies of Being abound in the very sor
did midst of life:

Bitten by fleas and lice
I slept in bed
A horse urinating all the time
Close to my pillow.

Basho’s journeys betray no defiant transgressions. We hear no brash, self
vaunting notes, the kind Walt Whitman strikes in “Song of the Open Road,”
or Huck Finn sounds as he prepares to “light out for the Territory ahead.” We
hear not the jubilant
“I did it!” — the kind I gave out at Port Said.
I did not come to “Oriental serenity” early in life; I have hardly come to it at
all. I feel closer to characters such the eponymous hero of Saul Bellow’s Hen
derson the Rain King, all rage and error, though I admire more and more Basho’s
way.
Still, I ask myself: why, why do so many Western travelers risk their lives
far from societies they seem to disavow? Often, they elude their own sahib
kind, which they find more dangerous and repugant than any natives. Often
they themselves go native, repugning a life they perceive
vapid, sated, nox
ious, a delirium of boredom and high-tech genocide. Culture shock is what
they experience on returning
In short, their journeys are as much quests
as escapes — rarely pilgrimages — no less judgments on Occidental reality than
forms of dissent and assays in utopia.
Why, again, all the errancy, the long desire, the clenched teeth and gimlet
eyes? Here we touch on something strange — something I want to call the
traveler’s “wound.” Frequently this is a literal, if obscure, infection, a mysteri
ous disease such as the Grail King’s. Herman Melville suffers it in
(1846), Francis Parkman in The Oregon Trail (1847), Ernest Hemingway in The
Green Hills ofAfrica (1935). They all endure some debility, some “pathetic flaw”
(Melville), a failure in their pampered immune systems. It is as if, in each trav
eler, two organic
well as cultural orders struggle more than meet. Thus the
wound, secret agon of the blood, throbs also with infections of the colonial
plague. Yet the wound is not only external, a gash in history, cicatrix of cul
tures. It is also in the traveler’s mind, in his or her divided consciousness, alien
ated state.
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How does this wound — an asymmetry of being — affect the wanderer in
each and all? Is travel writing a search by the homeless for the route home?
Are only imaginary homes such as Oz real, which Salman Rushdie says is any
where and everywhere, except the place from which we began. I like to think
of the traveler’s wound as the mark of whim, Emersonian Whim”: "expect me
not to show cause why I seek,” he cries in "Self-Reliance.” That is spirit in
action, the gleam of light within, "more than the lustre of the firmament of
bards and sages.”
In my life, I have taken some intellectual and fewer physical risks. I have never
endured ultimate tests: torture, outstaring death, loss of a beloved — yes, my
first wife — the black dog of despair. I have never even seen a corpse. And as
I have had no experience of the Emits, I have no ultimate, not even penultimate,
knowledge of myself. Perhaps that is what I thought to find in my easy jour
neys.
Why do you and Sally travel so much, friends ask? Oh, I have ready
answers to give, give even myself. "I lecture, I go to international conferences.”
Yes, like the wandering scholars of the Middle Ages, like jongleurs and trouba
dours, I move around, without danger or squalor, pretending to serve literature.
Or I say, "I go to revive my mind in historic places.” What, like that dank, mal
odorous cave on Patmos, which I once visited because D. H. Lawrence had
written in his Apocalypse (1931): "O lovely green dragon of the new
the
undawned
come, come in touch, and release us from the horrid grip of the
evil-smelling old Logos!”? Or again, I might murmur: "Well, there are
moments, certain moments.”
And there were, such as that early morning stroll, on a summer day, by the
Sound of Arisaig, Scotland, when I walked in a soft western breeze through
lush, green woods of creeping moss, larch, fir, oak, giant pines, the rustle of
some unseen rivulet, somewhere off toward Drimindrach, light playing every
where, gleaming on the water and flickering through the canopy of Druidic
trees, and I thought: here everything flows and flashes and breathes, even stone
breathes, and I, seemingly alien to this scene, also breathe, what can this vast,
ilent con-spiracy of breath mean? Then I thought: it is enough that I see it,
so much Eving beauty; that what the unspeakable conspiracy means. But that
was only a moment — it could recur in the awesome desertscapes and moun
tainscapes of Uluru (Ayers Rock) or southern Utah — and it came late in my
life.
I went to the antipodes also late in Efe. I was in my mid-sixties then, old by
any reckoning except my own; that reckoning was a child’s, the child within us
ah. I felt wholly myself, except for an arthritic hip joint, enough to impede jog
ging, and remind me on long walks that a body in pain aches also for the lightness, the transparency of youth.
Could age become youth in the antipodes, pain a rarer joy? All was invert
ed Down Under. July brought snow; drizzle fed from clear skies; swans glided
in black plumage; trees shed bark instead of leaves. And whoever had seen a
wallaby, wombat, dingo, platypus, kookaburra, pademelon, gecko, emu, or
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bandicoot in the rightside-up world, or woken to the screech of galah, rosella,
and sulphur-crested cockatoo? All was inverted in Oz, was everything possible
there too? I began to read about Australia, as I had once done about America,
before ever setting foot on their invented shores, and what I read helped to
reinvent my life just a trifle more. But it’s what you see, what you sense and
feel, what seeps through the flesh, that changes your life even more. (Couldn’t
Emerson’s shadow "giant” see?)
Uluru, the heat and flies and shimmering, dry flood, blood-red, of Aus
tralia’s Red Center. Can you see it, the sheer, mad improbability of that rock,
the size of a city cubed or of a smoldering asteroid upended in the earth — can
you see it without sharing, at least for an instant, the aborigine’s sacred awe?
Without thinking, Something passed this way long ago. Without altering per
manently two or three synapses, a few circuits in your brain.
Certainly, for most of us, much of the time, travel may intensify our self
concerns, the needs of our bodies, the itches of our minds. Like bedridden
invalids, we feel every pain, every discomfort even, as a betrayal of the universe,
absent nurse. And so the desert flies at Uluru or Giza, the crippled mendicants
near the Taj Mahal, the stench of excrement along the Great Wall of China,
leave on us an impression as lasting as the Seven Wonders of the World.
Still, journeys may somehow recover for us the quiddity of existence. How
ever tawdry, gaudy, arduous, equivocal, they may suddenly pluck the nerve of
our lives, suddenly dispel the amnesia and anesthesia, the complacent nihilism,
of our habits. They are metaphors, displacements, portages, crossing not only
cultures but realms of our being, even as they put our selves at risk. For in
homelessness — in no strange land — we may at last find our ease, become at
ease, in the world. And like the great contemplatives whom Evelyn Underhill
has lucidly described, we may attest to a “world that is ‘unwalled,”’ a personal
ity progressively emptied, unlimited.

These are friendly abstractions. But why do I personally travel? Certainly not
for the lambent moment. It would be more honest to say: I don’t know. It
would be more accurate to admit: it is the form my impatience takes — impa
tience, our only sin, Franz Kafka says. And it would be more satisfying — aes
thetically, mythically, metaphysically — to think: all my journeys recapitulate
my first, out of Egypt — or it out of the womb? — and rehearse another, yet
to come. In any case, I find wise and pleasing these lines of Zbigniew Herbert
about the journey we all take:

Then your native land will seem small
a cradle a boat tied to a branch with your mother’s hair
when you mention its name no one at the campfire
will know which mountain it lies behind
what kind of trees it bears
So if it to be a journey let it be long
true journey from which you do not return.
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